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1 Introduction and Overview
The biggest challenge to writing a survey about experiments in political economy is an-
swering the question: What is political economy? This being the information age, the
natural rst step was to google "political economy". This produced the following remark-
ably broad denitions of the topic.
According to Wikipedia1, "Political Economy refers to di¤erent, but related, ap-
proaches to studying economic and related behaviors, ranging from the combination of
economics with other elds, to using di¤erent fundamental assumptions which challenge
orthodox economic assumptions." The source then goes on to list several completely dif-
ferent subdenitions of the term, followed by an even longer list of disciplines which relate
to political economy: sociology; political science; anthropology; psychology; history; eco-
nomics; law; human geography; ecology; international relations; cultural studies; and
communication.
To narrow things somewhat, the eld "Positive Political Economy" seems to encom-
pass everything (and more) that pertains to laboratory experiments in the economics
tradition. It is the title of at least two books, and focuses on the kinds of issues and
methodologies most familiar to modern-day economists.2 However, even this does not
help much in narrowing the scope of this survey. According to one of the Cambridge
University Press webpages,3 "Positive Political Economy investigates how observed dif-
ferences in institutions a¤ect political and economic outcomes in various social, economic,
and political systems." If one opens up the book, it turns out to be a collection of essays
on various topics in macroeconomics and econometrics. Given that the present volume
already includes a chapter on experiments related to macroeconomics, I will exclude that
brand of " political economy" experiment from this survey.
Clearly the subject matter, "Political Economy", denes an area of study that encom-
passes several elds of economics, overlaps with several other disciplines, and is also a
major eld of study by political scientists (Wikipedias omission from related disciplines
notwithstanding).
So, now that we have slightly narrowed the topic, the practical question is where
to start and where to stop? First, rather than thinking like an economist and looking
at economics experiments that are related to political economy issues, I have chosen the
"political" half of political economy as the starting point. There is no chapter in either this
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_economy November 18, 2013.
2See Alt and Shepsle (1990). It is also the title of a monograph series published by Routledge.
3http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/print.asp?isbn=9780521572156&print=y
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or the previous edition of the volume that covers political science experiments. Yet, some
of the chapters, most notably the chapter on public goods (Ledyard 1996), cover material
that could easily be categorized as political science; some of the seminal contributions
in these areas were made by political scientists, explicitly with application to political
science in mind.4
To make the survey manageable, I have further limited the scope considerably in
three ways. First, I have excluded from consideration all non-incentivized experiments in
political science and political economy. To give an idea of how much this leaves out, in an
earlier volume coauthored with Donald Kinder (Kinder and Palfrey 1993), we devoted fully
one-half of the book to nonincentivized experiments, and the other half to incentivized
experiments, "in the economics tradition." This exclusion is not meant to demean that
literature nor to suggest that it lies on a lower intellectual plane. It is excluded mainly
for compatibility of this chapter with the rest of the chapters of the handbook.5 Those
experiments are in the psychology tradition, and the experiments I will be discussing all
fall clearly in the economics tradition, at least methodologically.
Second, I exclude eld experiments and economics-style experiments conducted in a
eld setting, focusing exclusively on controlled laboratory experiments. An obvious reason
is that the basic methodology of eld experiments is fundamentally di¤erent. Neither the
degree of control nor the ease of replicability that distinguish laboratory settings is there.
These experiments also have the feature that the level of intrusion into the lives of the
subjects is much greater than in economics-style experiments,6 and this raises a di¤erent
and more complicated set of issues, both logistical and ethical. Another reason why I have
excluded eld experiments is that I have never conducted any such experiments myself,
and therefore am only qualied to judge the contributions of this work as an interested
outsider rather than a true expert. This reects a respect for the di¢ culties inherent
in and skills required for eld experimentation. Just as someone who has never run
an economics or political science experiment in the laboratory is ill-equipped to reliably
judge the quality of a paper in that eld, someone who has never been involved in a eld
experiment is poorly equipped to write a survey on it.
Third, I will not include public goods experiments as a special section of this survey.
John Ledyard already contributed an excellent one to the previous edition, and there is
a chapter in the current volume as well. There will be some passing discussion of public
4This includes work by the recent Nobel prize winning political scientist, Eleanor Ostrom.
5An exception is the chapter in the previous edition, concerning individual choice experiments
(Camerer 1996).
6This may be changing somewhat in laboratory experiments, as experimenters attempt to scale up
the mini-economies and mini-polities being studied.
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goods experiments, however, where appropriate.
This leaves us with a subset of the laboratory research in positive political science, a
small bite from the political economy beast.
1.1 Methodology: Relationship to Experimental Economics
This survey also focuses exclusively on experiments that follow the style pioneered in ex-
perimental economics several decades ago by by Vernon Smith: incentivized, controlled,
laboratory experiments. The analogy between this style of political science experimen-
tation and economics experimentation reect the close intellectual heritage shared by
economic theory, formal political theory, and political economy a heritage whose over-
lap can be seen in the ideas and seminal contributions of Condorcet, Cournot, and Adam
Smith, carrying forward to the more familiar modern contributions of Kenneth Arrow,
Duncan Black, William Riker, and others.
The shared connection with rigorous theory is not only due to a long heritage of shared
ideas and research questions, but is also reected in the birth of laboratory investigations
in economics and political science. The pioneering researchers in the laboratory in both
disciplines were trained primarily as theorists who became mainly interested in learn-
ing whether the theories were reliable, or curious about environments where theory gave
little guidance. They turned to laboratory experiments to test theory, in the grand tradi-
tion of the physical and natural sciences. In those other disciplines, scientists undertook
laboratory experiments, not because there was no eld data (indeed eld observation is
also important in physics, geology, and biology), but because laboratories opened up new
questions for which eld data was either unavailable or inadequate.
Laboratory experiments in economics designed for theory testing have three key fea-
tures. First, such experiments create real, but isolated, environments, which operate under
a set of institutional rules that are highly controlled and specically designed to address
the research questions of an experimenter. Second, the participants of these experiments
are given incentives that are consistent with the theoretical structure of preferences and
technology that is present in the theoretical models. For example, in market experiments
the incentives are designed to induce demand and supply functions. Third, an e¤ort is
usually made to avoid specic contexts that could confound the incentive structure. For
example, in market experiments the participants buy and sell abstract things, as opposed
to labeling the items as "hair spray", "broccoli" or some other real commodity. The pre-
dictions of these theories about behavior in the controlled environment were quantied
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and the results of the experiment therefore provided a direct test of the theory.7
One of the pioneers of political science experiments in the economics tradition is
Charles Plott. He conducted early market experiments, as well, to compare the e¤ects
of di¤erent ways of organizing market in terms of the detailed rules governing trade and
exchange,8 but his initial forays in the laboratory were in political science in the early
1970s, and the institutional focus of his early experiments had its foundation in social
choice theory. Plott had the insight that in principle one could apply induced-value
methods to study and compare the e¤ect of di¤erent political institutions and voting
rules on committee decisions and policy outcomes, although the specic implementation
required some innovative techniques. The use of formal theoretical modeling in political
science ("positive political theory") and social choice theory was developing rapidly at the
same time, and these theories were similar to economic theories in the sense that they were
deeply rooted in the basic concepts of incentives, rational choice, and equilibrium. The
models generated precise quantitative testable predictions about behavior and outcomes in
non-market settings such as committees, elections, courts, bureaucracies, and legislatures.
The nature of institutions being studied is somewhat di¤erent in political science than in
economics, but both disciplines are concerned with basic questions of resource allocation,
mechanism design, e¢ ciency, and distribution. Both have quantitative units of account
that determine these allocation decisions. In political science, the score is kept with
votes; in economics, the unit of account is monetary. The existence of these quantitative
accounting methods in both disciplines naturally lends itself to mathematical analysis.
And the rigorous theory developed with such mathematical analysis permits the precise
formulation and statement of hypotheses and predictions that are amenable to testing in
the laboratory. The quantitative perspective is also useful, as it is in the sciences, to make
precise observational statements and measurements (national income, margin of victory,
etc.) even in the absence of theory. Pure observation, measurement, and laboratory data
together provide the fodder for new theory.
Experimentation using controlled, incentivized, context-free environments naturally
followed rather than preceded such research in economics. At the time economists began to
design and conduct laboratory experiments with markets and games in the 1950s, rigorous
theory as we think of it in economics was virtually nonexistent in political science. The
development of a rigorous and quantitative theoretical approach to the study of politics 
social choice theory and positive political theory was virtually a prerequisite for this style
7A fourth feature of experiments in the economics tradition is the absence of deception, which is also
generally the case in incentivized political science experiments.
8See, for example, Plott and Smith (1978),.
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of laboratory research in political science. More recently, as research in positive political
theory and political applications of game theory is maturing and having an impact in
all subelds of political science, the experimental playing eld for political scientists is
rapidly expanding.
1.2 Chapter Road map
The focus of this chapter will be on political economy experiments that can be loosely
organized around ve di¤erent categories, and all are tightly linked to formal theoretical
modeling in political science. The goal is not to discuss every experimental paper on
every topic in political economy  that would require a book  rather, to identify the
main insights and tentative conclusions of the most important of these experiments. The
frontiers of research in political economy experimentation have been moving rapidly, and
this survey will attempt to give a snapshot of this frontier at one point in time. They
ve topics are: (1) committee bargaining; (2) elections and candidate competition; (3)
voter turnout; (4) information aggregation in committees; (5) voting methods that reect
preference intensity.
The pioneering experiments in political economy studied basic principles of commit-
tee and voting behavior that had been developed in the axiomatic social choice theory
literature in the 1950s and 1960s. The aim was a study of the fundamental properties of
majority rule, and to gather scientic evidence about how actual behavior in committees
compared to these abstract theoretical constructs. A key question asked was whether
Condorcet winners, when they exist, become the outcomes of committee decision making
under majority rule. If so, why? If not, when does it fail and why? The social choice
literature was almost entirely normative at the time (1970s), with essentially no empirical
component at all.
To scholars well-versed in political economy and social choice theory, these questions
almost seemed too obvious a point to merit empirical investigation, but it turned to be a
much more di¢ cult question to address, including the thorny problem of specifying exactly
what it means for a committee to operate under majority rule. There are many possible
procedures governing the proposing and seconding of motions, discussion, recognition,
amendments, adjournment, and so forth. A complete description of these is a daunting
task.9 Running an experiment to investigate the e¤ect of procedures on outomces forces
the experimenter to dene in very precise terms the specic rules that the laboratory
9The most recent edition of Roberts Rules of Order (2011) rambles on for more than 800 dense pages.
Roberts Rules for Dummies (2004) is 360 pages long.
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committees had to follow. These rules may then be tweaked in subtle ways to address
questions of robustness and comparative statics.
This is comparable to the early experiments to study the law of supply and demand
in economics, when "competitive markets" were implemented. What does "competitive
market" mean in terms of the details of how the market is to be organized? For example,
is it organized a double auction or a one-sided auction? Is there a centralized open book
or do trades go through a market maker instead? Do trades clear continuously or is it
organized as a call market?
In committee experiments there are similar choices to make about majority rule pro-
cedures that had to be faced. What does "majority rule" mean in terms of the details of
committee procedures? How are proposals made? Is there a chair of the committee who
has the power of recognition? How can amendments be made? Is there an open or closed
rule? Such questions are endless!
Not surprisingly, it turns out that for both kinds of experiments committee exper-
iments and market experiments the performance of abstract mathematical theories to
predict behavior sometimes worked well and sometimes did not, and this variance in per-
formance depended on both environmental parameters (preferences, feasible alternatives,
technology, etc.) and institutional parameters and details.10 This dependence suggested
that the axiomatic theories, which largely abstracted from institutional details, needed to
be reformulated in a way that incorporated such details as procedural rules into the formal
theoretical structure in order to obtain empirically valid and robust theoretical results.
One could easily argue that laboratory experiments in political economy provided the
rst non-circumstantial evidence that institutions matter in committee decision making.
This evidence was not only non-circumstantial but also had the benet of being replicable
and relatively easy to check for robustness. The theory o¤ered precise comparative static
tests about how changing the environment or institution leads to changes in committee
outcomes. These e¤ects were causal, because the environment and institutional details in
a laboratory experiment are clearly exogenous, unlike, say, comparisons between di¤erent
political systems based on historical data. This allows for much stronger claims about
cause and e¤ect, as opposed to simple correlations between preferences, institutions, and
outcomes.
In the next section we discuss experiments coming out of two rather di¤erent ap-
proaches to the investigation of committee bargaining procedures and decision making.
First we try to clarify the main ndings and explore in further detail results from the
10Many of these solution concepts came from cooperative game theory for example the bargaining
set and the von Neumann Morgenstern solution.
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initial wave of political economy experiments based on axiomatic social choice theory and
cooperative game theory. Second, we will explore the much more recent experiments on
committee bargaining that are designed to test theories from noncooperative game theory.
Noncooperative game theory, by specifying the institutional details as "rules of a game",
often makes more precise predictions about institutional e¤ects than the axiomatic ap-
proach. Many of the experiments discussed in later sections, including most political
economy experiments of the last two decades, will also be out of the noncooperative game
theory tradition. In the next section, the main focus is on noncooperative game theo-
retic models of committee decision making in a distributive politics (divide-the-dollar)
setting where Condorcet winners do not exist. These are constant sum games, which
are in stark contrast to the earlier focus on non-constant sum environments such as the
Downs-Hotelling spatial model where preferences were often specied so that a majority
rule core existed. These noncooperative bargaining models also di¤er from the axiomatic
ones by specifying details of the dynamics and timing of procedures and strategies. The
axiomatic models were completely static in nature.
Section three explores an important second wave of laboratory experiments in politi-
cal economy, which followed on the heels of the committee bargaining studies of majority
rule. This second wave was also interested in the empirical properties of majority rule
institutions, but focused on competitive elections and candidate competition rather than
committee bargaining. There is a range of questions addressed by these electoral compe-
tition experiments, and most of these are also central questions that have been studied
in more traditional empirical political science. In particular, we will focus here in the
following four topics: retrospective voting; testing the median voter theorem about can-
didate platform convergence in winner-take-all majority-rule elections; the e¤ect of polls
as coordinating devices for voters and information aggregation in elections with more than
two candidates; and the e¤ect of candidate quality on candidate divergence.
Section four investigates a di¤erent set of research questions related to questions of
political participation, especially voter turnout. The study of political participation has
close theoretical links with related questions about public good provision, free riding, and
coordination games. This section will highlight some of the connections between ndings
in voter turnout experiments and the insights and regularities from related game theoretic
experiments on entry, coordination, and threshold public goods.
Section ve examines several recent experiments on the e¤ects of voting rules and pro-
cedures on information aggregation in committees. For the last decade, there has been a
surge of theoretical research addressing questions of e¢ ciency and information aggregation
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by voting. This new literature has its roots in questions originally posed and analyzed by
Condorcet in the 18th century, and is now commonly referred to as The Condorcet Jury
Problem. Each person in a committee (or electorate) has a piece of information about a
true state of the world, and the committee is choosing a decision, where the best decision
depends on the state of the world. One can think of this dispersed information as hunches
or intuitions, or even di¤erent interpretations of the same data. From a theoretical analy-
sis based on noncooperative game theory, one can show that di¤erent voting rules and
procedures can have di¤erent information aggregating properties. For example, di¤erent
outcomes are predicted under majority and unanimity rules; this varies in surprising ways
with the size of the committee, and also depends on whether voting takes place simulta-
neously or sequentially. Most of the laboratory studies of information aggregation look at
environments where there is no preference aggregation problem: that is, all voters have
the same (state-contingent) preferences, but di¤er only in their information.
Section six summarizes results from experiments that examine theoretical models of
voting procedures that are explicitly designed for environments where intensity of prefer-
ence plays an important role. This includes experiments that address traditional questions
of interest in political economy, such as logrolling and vote trading, as well as the design
and performance of more novel specialized voting procedures such as storable votes and
qualitative voting.
2 Experiments in Committee bargaining
This section has two subsections: (i) early experiments from the axiomatic social choice
theory tradition, which focus on the core of majority rule games and related concepts
from cooperative game theory; and (ii) more recent laboratory studies of bargaining in
committees with much more structured rules about proposal-making and voting rules
that are su¢ ciently simple to be studied as well-dened extensive form games.
2.1 Unstructured Committee Bargaining
This line of research, beginning with the landmark article by Fiorina and Plott (1978),
explores two distinctly di¤erent kinds of questions. First, it tests the basic theory of the
core in small committees, and examines its robustness with respect to the ne details of
committee procedures. The theory tells us that as preferences and/or procedures change
in certain ways, outcomes from committee deliberation and decision making should change
in corresponding ways. Second, it explores what happens in case the core fails to exist. We
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know from Plott (1967), McKelvey (1976,1979) and Schoeld (1983), that nonexistence
problems are rampant in these environments.
The basic theoretical structure in most of these experiments is the following. The
set of feasible alternatives, A, is a convex compact subset of <2, usually a square or
rectangle.11 There is a nite set of members of the committee, I = f1; :::; i; :::; ng with
Euclidean preferences, where n is an odd number for most experiments. Therefore, the
environment is fully specied by [A; I; x], where x = (x1; :::; xi; :::; xn)  An is the prole
of membersideal points. For any such environment, we can dene the simple majority
rule binary relation. For any pair of alternatives, a; b 2 A, we write a  b if a majority of
the members of I strictly prefer a to b. In this case, we say a defeats b under majority rule.
If a does not defeat b, we write b  a. The majority rule core, or the set of Condorcet
winners, C  A, includes precisely those alternatives that are undefeated under majority
rule. That is C = fc 2 A j c  a 8a 2 Ag. An implication of the results in Plott (1967)
is that in these environments, if n is odd and the xi are all distinct, then (i) the core
coincides with one of the members ideal points, call it xi

and (ii) the other members can
be paired up in such a way that for each pair, the line connecting the ideal points of the
pair pass through xi

. The condition is sometimes referred to as pairwise symmetry, and
has a natural generalization to environments with arbitrary quasi-concave and continuous
preferences with ideal points, in terms of pairs of utility gradients at the core point.
2.2 Fiorina and Plott (1978)
Fiorina and Plott (1978) created sixty-ve ve-member laboratory committees, each of
which deliberated under a simplied version of RobertsRules. The policy space included
a ne grid of points in a two-dimensional policy space. The two dimensions in the model
correspond to policy choices, such as spending on defense and tax rates, but no labels
as such were used in the experiments in order to maintain a neutral context. The policy
space was, literally, the blackboard. The preferences of the members were induced using
monetary payments that depended on the outcome and di¤ered across subjects. For
each subject, the iso-payment contours coincided with their indi¤erence contours in the
theoretical model, either concentric circles or ellipses, so this method was an innovative
extension of the induced value approach to political environments, where voter preferences
are characterized by quasi-concave utility functions in a multidimensional Euclidean space
with unique ideal points. Figure 1 below illustrates an example of a voters payo¤ function
11In the actual experiments, the outcome space is given by a nite grid of points on the plane.
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and indi¤erence curves in the policy space.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Figure 1. Fiorina and Plott (1978). Sample Indi¤erence Map.
Deliberation was moderated by the experimenter, according to the following procedure.
The deliberation by each committee started at a status quo point that generated low
payo¤s for all members. At any time, a member could raise their hand and propose an
alternative point; a vote between the status quo and the alternative ensued, with the
alternative becoming the new status quo point if it passed by receiving a majority of
votes. This could continue indenitely, as long as members made new proposals. At
any point, a member could propose to adjourn the meeting. If the motion to adjourn
received a majority of votes, then the session ended and subjects were paid based on
the last alternative that had passed (or the original status quo, if no alternative ever
passed). The main treatment variable in the initial experiment was the preference prole,
using two preference proles for which a core existed (Series 1 and Series 2) and one
where a core did not exist (Series 3).12 Figure 2 shows the distribution of ideal points for
one of the ve person committees where a core point exists, where voters have elliptical
indi¤erence curves. Alternative predictions are labeled by the letters A, B, and C. "A"
is the core point and also coincides with several other solution concepts examined in the
paper, such as the von-Neumann Morgenstern solution. "B" corresponds to what would
be the Condorcet winner if voters acted as if they had city block preferences. The two
"C" points are dimension-by-dimension medians.13
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Caption : Figure 2. Series 2 Preference Conguration.
In the Series 3 preference prole, where a core point did not exist, the ideal point of i voter
in Series 1 was shifted a small distance, breaking pairwise symmetry. Thus, this treatment
was designed to test whether the discontinuous nature of core existence would lead to a
discontinuous change in committee outcomes. It was an important variation to investigate,
since results by McKelvey on global cycling (or "chaos") were widely interpreted at the
time as implying anything can happen in the absence of a core point.
12There also some some secondary treatment variations regarding payo¤ magnitudes and communica-
tion limitations.
13There are two "C" points because it depends on the order.
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Figure 3 shows the distribution of outcomes in the Series 2 (right panel) and Series 3
(right panel) committees. Series 3 voters had circular indi¤erence curves with their ideal
points indicated in the gure.14 In Series 2, three out of the ten committee outcomes were
exactly at the majority rule core point of (61,69), and the mean outcome was (60,72).15
The Series 3 outcomes show a remarkable central tendency, with a variance of outcomes
less than half of what was observed in the low payo¤ Series 1 committees.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Caption : Outcomes in Series 2 (right panel) and Series 3 (right panel) committees.
2.2.1 Three Principal ndings
The principal ndings were:
1. Core Clustering. When it exists, the core is the best predictor among 16 competing
hypotheses to explain committee outcomes. While few outcomes are exactly at the
core point, the outcomes tend to cluster nearby the core point, when it exists.
2. Robustness. The secondary treatments had little e¤ect, although there was greater
variance of outcomes when payo¤ magnitudes were low (low incentives).
3. Continuity. When the core point did not exist, but the preference prole was close
to admitting a core point, the outcomes still clustered around a region in the policy
space in much the same way as was observed when a core point existed! Thus, it
appears that the distribution of committee outcomes varies continuously with the
preference prole of the members.
The third of these observations is perhaps the most important. Why? The theory
of the core is not a behavioral theory, but simply a property of the majority rule binary
relation. The deliberation procedure, while simple to describe, is virtually impossible to
model as an extensive form game. There is no theory of who makes proposals, no theory
of how people vote on proposals, no theory of adjournment, and so forth. That is, Fiorina
and Plott (1978) and subsequent studies along the same line investigate environments
14The quadrilateral in the Series 3 gure indicates the Min-max set for that preference conguration.
These points can only be defeated by a minimum winning coalition of three voters. All other points can
be defeated by even larger coalitions.
15In Series 1 committees, only seven out of forty committee outcomes were exactly at the core point.
The frequency of core outcomes did not depend on the secondary treatment variables explored in Series
1: communication and payo¤ magnitude. However, the variance of outcomes was much lower in the high
payo¤ commitees.
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and procedures for which there is no accepted behavioral model to describe or predict
individual actions. These are experiments that test both axiomatic theories of social
choice, as well as ad hoc behavioral theories.16
2.3 The robustness of core clustering.
With few exceptions, subsequent research has reinforced most of the conclusions above.
Berl et al. (1976) investigate some variations on the original Fiorina and Plott (1978)
study17 and nd, among other things, that experimenter participation in the committee
was inconsequential. Furthermore, the results were robust to additional variation in non-
Euclidean preferences (using city block metric preferences). A later study by McKelvey
and Ordeshook (1984), restricts agendas to issue-by-issue voting, and nds that outcomes
still cluster around the core. This, together with the ndings about limitations on de-
bate/communication illustrate how robust core clustering is with respect to signicant
procedural variation.18
RickWilson and his coauthors have conducted a range of di¤erent variations on Fiorina
and Plott. One of the more interesting extensions is to assess everyone on the committee
a xed cost (called an "agenda access cost") whenever a proposal is successful (Herzberg
and Wilson 1991). This has two interesting and countervailing e¤ects. First, it expands
the set of core outcomes. For example in the Fiorina and Plott environment without a
core, a core point exists even with rather small access costs. The second e¤ect is more
subtle. Because changes are costly, members are more reluctant to vote for any change,
and this creates a drag on the process. Voters might even vote against a change that
makes them better o¤ in the short run, because they fear the change will lead to further
changes that will impose additional costs. The ndings therefore are mixed, reecting
the ambiguity of the theory. For example, if a core already exists in the absence of
access costs, the experimental results show that imposing access costs leads to more
dispersion in the nal outcomes, a negative e¤ect. Outcomes still cluster near the core,
but with more scatter, and occasionally the process fails entirely, without every moving
away from the initial (bad) status quo. These experiments are particularly instructive
because they suggest behavioral models of individual behavior, such as risk aversion, and
also suggest that individuals are not myopic in their voting decisions, but anticipate the
16Fiorina and Plott and later studies suggest alternative hypotheses that are suggestive of a behavioral
model (such as fairness).
17In spite of the earlier publication date, the experiments reported in Berl et al. (1976) were motivated
by an early version of Fiorina and Plott (1978).
18With issue-by-issue voting, a new alternative can alter the status quo on only one dimension.
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future consequences of current votes.
Plott conducted some additional experiments showing that the results replicate to
larger committees19 and also for committees where there was agenda control by one or
more of its members. In Kormendi and Plott (1982), one member of a ve member
committee serves as a gatekeeper (called a "convener" in the paper) who was allowed to
o¤er or unilaterally block proposals, in an environment with the same preferences as one
of the Fiorina and Plott core treatments. This agenda power restriction changes the core,
since blocking coalitions must include the agenda setter. The core expands and becomes
the line segment between the original core point and the agenda setters ideal point. They
run one treatment with one agenda setter and another with a second agenda setter, and
the outcomes in both cases line up closely with the core (set) predictions. Hence these
experiments show that the majority rule core, modied to account for changes in proposal
procedures, continues to predict committee outcomes. The important corollary is that
subtle changes in procedures can cause dramatic changes in outcomes, exactly as predicted
by cooperative game theory.
There are some exceptions to the robustness of core clustering. One of the more
striking results is from an experiment by Eavey and Miller (1984a), which follows up on
an earlier experiment by Isaac and Plott (1978), and is not in a spatial setting.20 Isaac
and Plott looked at three-person committees with a convener, but with an abstract nite
set of possible outcomes, so the environment was not framed to the subjects as a two-
dimensional policy space. There is a unique core, which predicts outcomes very well.
Eavey and Miller point out that the core in that experiment was also a fair outcome that
gives a reasonable payo¤to everyone. They design a "critical" experiment in which the fair
outcome is di¤erent from the core, and both are unique. They nd that the fair outcome
was selected 8 out of 10 times, and the core was only selected twice. The results with
ve-person committees were similar, but there was a bit more scatter in th data. Eavey
and Miller conclude that interpersonal comparisons (fairness, altruism, universalism) are
relevant consideration in outcomes, especially for very small committees.
Salant and Goodstein (1990) propose a solution concept that predicts sets of outcomes
rather than specic outcomes, and argue that their alternative approach can explain both
the phenomenon of core clustering in spatial models and the apparently contradictory
ndings of Eavey and Miller in abstract nite policy spaces. They point out that in the
abstract policy spaces, there is no natural metric for closeness between alternatives, and
19Plott (1991) replicates the FP results for committees with between 23 and 45 members.
20McKelvey and Ordeshook (1981) also nd evidence that core selection can depends on other details
of the preference prole.
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therefore one cannot address the question of whether outcomes are far or close to the core
outcomes. In other words, the notion of core clustering as applied to spatial committees
is not a general concept that can be applied to any committee setting. Their main insight
is that the solution concept of the core is based purely on the ordinal preferences of
the committee members, but outcomes of committee experiments clearly depend on the
cardinal preferences of the members. This was apparent from the very rst experiments
by Fiorina and Plott, where they found more core clustering (less scatter) in their high
payo¤ committees than in their low payo¤ committees. The concept of fairness invoked
by Eavey and Miller implicitly use some notion of cardinality or at least interpersonal
comparison of utility.
The Salant and Goodstein "selection set" is based on payo¤ thresholds, and has a
motivation similar to epsilon equilibrium. Committee members are assumed to have a
threshold payo¤ di¤erence, such that they are insensitive to payo¤ di¤erences less than
that threshold. Loosely speaking, given a threshold t, an outcome, x is t blocked if there
is a coalition, C, consisting of a majority of members and an an alternative y such that
the payo¤ di¤erence between y and x is greater than t for all members of the coalition.
Therefore, the larger is t the larger is the selection set (i.e., t-stable outcomes). For t = 0,
only core outcomes are stable. For t su¢ ciently large, all outcomes are stable. Also
note that for a xed t, if the payo¤s of all members are scaled up (as in the Fiorina-
Plott high payo¤ treatment), the selection set shrinks. They then conduct their own
experiment21 and estimate t from their data. Using this estimate, bt, they re-examine data
from a number of earlier experiments, including Fiorina-Plott and Eavey-Miller, and ask
whether the outcomes in those experiments are in the selection set for bt. They nd that
their theory post-dicts very well out of sample. In fact, for the Eavey-Miller experiments,
the only two bt-stable outcomes are the core and the "fair" outcome. This suggests a
completely di¤erent interpretation of the Eavey-Miller results that has nothing to do with
concerns about equality or fairness.
2.4 Continuity and Experiments with an empty core
A large number of experiments followed up on Fiorina and Plott by exploring preference
congurations where a core does not exist. One reason for doing so was to investigate
the predictive value of alternative models based on cooperative game theory, such as
21The voting agenda procedure in their voting experiment was constrained to a specic, well-dened
multistage game, in contrast to the less structured committee protocols used in most other experiments
in this section.
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the von Neumann Morganstern set (V-set) and various incarnations of the bargaining
set. Unfortunately, these alternative models from cooperative game theory were not
particularly successful in explaining the data across these di¤erent experiments. They also
had additional weaknesses including existence problems (not as severe as the core, but
problematic nonetheless) and also a failure to predict the actual winning coalitions that
might form, and how these coalitions depended on the winning outcomes in a committee.
Motivated by a desire to overcome these drawbacks and develop a general predictive theory
for these committee games, McKelvey et al. (1978) developed "the competitive solution"
for N-person simple games without side payments. The concept was based on the notion of
pivotal coalition members. In order for a winning coalition to hold together, they suppose
that the coalition must bid for its membership in the sense of supporting an alternative
that makes its members at least as well o¤ as the alternatives (implicitly, the bids) by all
other minimum winning coalitions each member could join. In the competitive solution,
some members will be pivotal in the sense that the bids by di¤erent winning coalitions
make them exactly indi¤erent between which coalition to join. Thus the competitive
solution implicitly selects both outcomes and (minimum winning) voting coalitions.
Unlike the later work by Salant and Goodstein, the competitive solution does not
depend on cardinal information about preferences to make predictions about outcomes
in committee bargaining voting. McKelvey et al (1990) conduct several experiments and
show that in spatial voting environments the competitive solution fares pretty well.22
However, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1983) report a subsequent experiment in a non-
spatial nite alternative environment where the competitive solution is clearly rejected.
Consistent with some other ndings discussed in this section, part of the source of the
rejection is due to the fact that cardinality of preferences appears to play a role.23
2.4.1 A Fourth Principal Finding
This leads to a fourth principal nding from this large class of committee voting experi-
ments:
4. Cardinality of preferences matter.24 Solution concepts that depend only on ordinal
preferences over policies will generally fail to account for variation of committee outcomes
22Ordeshook and Winer (1980) conduct experiments with weighted voting, and nd results that are
broadly supportive of the competitive solution.
23Some related ndings are reported in Miller and Oppenheimer (1982).
24A number of subsequent studies have shown further evidence for the cardinality principle. For
example, Herzberg and Wilson (1991) nd that agenda access costs a¤ect both the outcomes and the
agenda path to these outcomes in majority rule committees with spatial preferences, both with and
without a core. See also Eavey (1991) and Grelak and Koford (1997).
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across di¤erent cardinal utility proles.25
2.5 Committee Bargaining with a xed extensive form structure
2.5.1 Agenda-control experiments
A landmark paper by Romer and Rosenthal (1978) set the stage in political science for
a wave of theoretical work that looked at the power of agenda setters when bargaining
in the shadow of an unpopular status quo. The main idea is illustrated in its starkest
terms by the example of Niskanen (1970), where a budget maximizing agenda setter has
the power to propose a budget that must pass some voting body by majority rule. If
it fails, the status quo budget is 0. Suppose that all voters have euclidean preferences
so that utlity declines symmetrically to the left and right of a voters ideal budget, and
suppose the median voter has an ideal budget equal to B > 0. Then the win set (i.e., the
set of proposals that will pass) is the interval [0; 2B]. Hence the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome of the two stage game where the setter proposes a budget Bp in stage
one and the vote is taken between 0 and Bp in stage two is 2B. Every voter to the left
of the median voter votes no, and everyone to the right of (and including) the median
voter votes yes. If we think in terms of bargaining theory, this is a not-so-transparent
variation on the very closely related ultimatum game. In fact, it really is just a two person
game between the agenda setter (proposer) and the median voter (responder). As in the
ultimatum game, the responder gets nothing and is indi¤erent between rejecting the o¤er
and accepting it. Romer and Rosenthal extend this idea to a more general setting in a
one-dimensional spatial model and an arbitrary status quo and an arbitrary ideal point
of the setter. As long as the setters ideal point and the status quo are on opposite sides
of the median voters ideal point, the setter has bargaining power and is able to pass a
proposal that is closer to his ideal point than the median outcome would be if he did not
have the power to set the agenda.26
25A more recent re-examination of these older committee experiments shows that the uncovered set,
which is purely ordinal, organizes the data quite well across a broad set of experiments, in the sense that
a large percentage of observations are contained in the uncovered set (Bianco et al. 2006). However, in
many cases without a core, the uncovered set is a large subset of the Pareto optimal outcomes, and as
such makes rather nebulous predictions. For environments where a unique core outcome exists, the hit
rate is quite small and is a¤ected by order-preserving payo¤ transformations.
26Obviously, this basic idea extends in a straightforward way to far more general environments. For
example, discrete or multidimensional issue spaces, voting rules other than majority rule, multistage
political process (e.g., veto players, bicameral voting bodies, and so forth). Many such institutional
features can be brought into the model under the general framework of structure induced equilibrium,
an important insight and concept introduced by Shepsle and Weingast (1979). One can view the Romer-
Rosenthal model as an early example of structure induced equilibrium.
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Eavey and Miller (1984b) conducted an experiment to test the predictions of this "set-
ter model". Their design can be thought of as a modication of the "convener design"
discussed above, but they ran a number of di¤erent variations on procedures and the way
the alternatives and preferences were explained to the subjects. In their strong agenda
power treatment, the proposer can make only one single take-it-or-leave-it o¤er: if the
proposal fails then the experiment is over and a predetermined status quo is implemented.
This creates a well-dened two stage extensive form game. The subgame perfect equilib-
rium is for the convener to propose the alternative he prefers most, among those proposals
that at least a majority (weakly) prefers (under the induced monetary payo¤s) to the sta-
tus quo. The proposal should always pass, according to the theory, and the median voter
is indi¤erent between the proposal and the status quo.27 They also had a weak agenda
setter treatment when the agenda setter could o¤er alternatives multiple times. That is,
they could not commit not to recontract if a proposal failed. Finally, they had a baseline
open agenda treatment where the agenda setter had no power at all.
Eavey and Miller had a couple of di¤erent implementations of the setter game. In
one, they used an environment with a small number of alternatives, as in Isaac and
Plott (1978); in the other, there is a one-dimensional policy space with single-peaked
preferences. The two settings however, were essentially isomorphic, although the spatial
context allowed for a ner set of feasible alternatives. In all experiments, the convener
has complete information about the preferences of the voters (cardinal payo¤s as well as
ordinal payo¤s), but the voters only know their own payo¤s and are given absolutely no
information about the payo¤s of the other voters or the convener.
The rst nding, more or less a replication of past experiments, was the frequency of
core (median) outcomes with an open agenda. In both the weak and strong agenda setter
treatments, they observe non-median outcomes favoring the agenda setter, a qualitative
prediction of the setter model. However, the magnitude of the agenda setter e¤ect is less
than the subgame perfect equilibrium of the model. Setters do not make proposals that
would fully exploit the other voters, assuming those voters are simply maximizing their
payo¤ in the experiment. Rather, setters o¤er proposals giving other committee members
signicantly higher payo¤outcomes than are predicted in the subgame perfect equilibrium.
They also nd no di¤erence between the strong and weak agenda control protocols.28
One conjecture is that this is due to the way they implemented the game. Rather than
27Like the ultimatum game, since there are a discrete number of alternatives, there is also an equilibrium
where the median voter receives a minimum positive surplus relative to the status quo.
28This latter nding is similar to results reported in Isaac and Plott (1978) on the e¤ect of a closed
rule (i.e. only one proposal).
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simply playing a simple two stage game as in standard ultimatum experiments, extensive
discussion and haggling was allowed to take place during the experiment. This would
allow coalition formation to arise among the voters, and also allowed personality factors,
including how articulate or persuasive the convener is, to a¤ect the outcomes. The article
includes snippets of the discussion, which clearly show the importance of haggling and
persuasion. Furthermore, none of the subjects had an opportunity to become experienced
in the task (as was usual practice in these old committee experiments). To this authors
knowledge, nobody has ever gone back and tried to replicate these experiments with
a protocol closer to now-accepted common practices in experimental (non-cooperative)
game theory.29 Given the strategic similarity between two person ultimatum games and
the setter model, a reasonable hypothesis is that the ndings of Eavey and Miller (1984b)
- that proposers are able to partly but not fully exploit their favorable bargaining position
- reect essentially the same phenomenon as in ultimatum games, but with more than
two players. Interestingly, while the setter experiment and the rst ultimatum game
experiments were conducted independently and essentially at the same time, neither group
of researchers were aware either of the other experiments or even the existence of other
closely related models.
Lupia (1994) also studies a variation of the setter model to explore the e¤ect of in-
complete information by voters about the exact location of the setters proposal. The
complete information baseline treatment more or less conrms earlier ndings. The setter
is able to exploit his agenda power, but is unable to fully extract all rents from the median
voter.30 In the main incomplete information treatment, the voters do not observe either
the setters ideal point or the proposed policy. However, the setter must pay a cost to
make the proposal, so in equilibrium voters can infer something about the setters ideal
point simply from observing whether or not he makes a proposal. The voting behavior in
this signaling experiment is consistent with the hypothesis that voters often make correct
inferences from the setters decision to make a proposal.
Principal ndings:
1. In agenda control experiments, the setter or convener is able to exploit her power,
leading to outcomes that give her greater utility than the majority rule core outcome.
2. Agenda setters or conveners are usually not able to fully exploit their agenda power.
29The closest to this are the multilateral bargaining experiments with voting, discussed below.
30The author attributes this partially to his design which allowed for repeated game e¤ects. Still, he
nds the main comparative static e¤ect for his design, with more extreme setters proposing more extreme
policies.
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3. Findings are similar to results from alternating o¤er bargaining games, such as the
ultimatum game.
2.5.2 Voting over xed agendas
There is an extensive theoretical literature on voting over xed agendas. Some of the most
general and insightful results concern a certain kind of strategic voting, usually referred to
as sophisticated voting, and the predictions about the set of possible equilibrium outcomes
under sequential binary amendment agendas. A sequential binary amendment agenda
procedure can be represented as a sequence of n alternatives in some policy space X,
denoted (x1; :::; xn). In such a procedure, there is rst a pairwise vote taken between x1
and x2. Then the committee votes between the winner and x3, and so on. Finally, the
last vote is between the winner of the n  1 vote and xn. Thus, in set notation, one can
represent the rst vote as being between fx1; x3; :::; xng and fx2; x3; :::; xng. If x2 defeats
x1 in the rst round, then the second round vote can be represented as being between
fx2; x4; :::; xng and fx3; x4; :::; xng, and so forth. These games are dominance solvable
(Niemi and McKelvey 1976) and the sophisticated (backward induction) outcomes are
uniquely dened if preferences over X are strict and there are an odd number of voters.31
The sophisticated outcomes (i.e., outcomes when everyone votes sophisticatedly) can
di¤er, sometimes dramatically, from the outcomes that would arise if everyone simply
voted myopically, or naively, i.e., if everyone voted at each stage as if it were the last
stage. The classic example of this is based on the so-called Condorcet cycle for majority
rule voting, where there are three voters f1; 2; 3g and three alternatives fA;B;Cg. Voter
1 has preferences A > B > C voter 2 has preferences B > C > A and voter 3 has
preferences C > A > B. This results in a majority rule cycle, with A >m B >m C >m A
where >mdenotes the strict majority binary relation. The existence of such a cycle implies
that sophisticated voting will lead to di¤erent outcomes than "naive" voting in a two stage
agenda. Consider the sequential binary agenda, (A;B;C), where in the rst stage A is
voted against B and in the second stage the winner of the rst stage is voted against
C. Then, working from the end, the last stage outcome will be B if B is the rst round
winner and will be C if A is the rst round winner. Therefore, with sophisticated voting,
the vote in the rst round is treated as, in e¤ect, a vote between B and C rather than the
literal vote between A and C. Thus, voter 1 will vote for B in the rst stage, even though
his naive or myopic preference is to vote for A. For the other two voters, their myopic
31Farquharson (1969) was the rst to study general properties of sophisticated voting over xed agendas.
Voters are assumed to have complete information about the preference orderings of all the voters. With
incomplete information, the equilibrium analysis is much di¤erent (Ordeshook and Palfrey 1988).
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and sophisticated voting strategies coincide. Thus, the sophisticated outcome here is B,
while the outcome would be C if everyone voted myopically.
Like nite alternating o¤er bargaining and other simple extensive form games in eco-
nomics, agenda-setting games are natural candidates to study behavioral issues of sub-
game perfection, dominance solvability, strategic sophistication, and equilibrium. Also
like bargaining games, the theoretical results have shaped the way scholars in the eld
approach applied questions (such as agenda inuence in the legislatures), and therefore
careful testing of the theory of sophisticated voting over binary agendas has the potential
for signicant impact.
The initial experiments related to sophisticated voting are reported in Levine and
Plott (1977), Plott and Levine (1978), and Cohen et al. (1978), and used much more
complicated agendas than the simple example above. While the agendas they explore
are more general than the binary amendment procedure, the basic ideas of backward
induction, dominance, and sophisticated voting can be applied directly, because every
vote involves a binary choice between subsets of feasible alternatives, and the agendas are
determinate in the sense that the terminal nodes of the voting tree are all associated with
unique feasible outcomes. There is one important di¤erence in these early experiments:
voters only had information about their own preferences over the alterntaives, so these
were games of incomplete information. However, extensive discussion was an important
component of the committee decision making procedures, and voters had an opportunity
to communicate their preferences to other voters. Thus, while perhaps dubious as an
equilibrium prediction for these environements, the sophisticated voting outcome is a
natural benchmark.
Here is an example of the kind of agenda they consider, which one might call a divide-
the-question agenda. Suppose three economists are trying to decide which restaurant to
go to, and there are four possibilities, one is expensive and serves Italian food (EI), one
is cheap and serves American food (CA), one is cheap and serves Italian food (CI) and
the fourth is expensive and serves American food (EA). The restaurants di¤er along two
di¤erent dimensions, and one can consider "dividing the question" by voting rst on one
dimension (E vs. C) and next on the second dimension (A vs. I). This is equivalent
to a two stage agenda where the rst vote is between the sets fEI;EAg and fCI;CAg
and the second stage is a vote between the two alternatives of the pair that won in
the rst round. Note that this is not equivalent to a binary amendment procedure. For
example, a binary amendment procedure with the alternatives ordered fEI;EA;CI; CAg
would imply a three stage agenda, where (in set notation), the rst vote is between
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fEI;CI; CAg and fEA;CI; CAg, and so forth. In all agendas considered in these three
papers, all players have strict preferences, and there is an odd number of voters, so if one
analyzes the games as if the players had complete information about ordinal preferences
over the alternative set, then the games are dominance solvable by the Farquharson-
Niemi-McKelvey sophisticated voting algorithm.
The experiments were conducted with two RAs in the room, one to chair the discussion
and another to record the proceedings. Discussion was limited in several ways: promises
of side payments were not allowed; threats were not permitted; subjects could only make
qualitative statements about their preferences, not quantitative statements about their
exact payo¤s from di¤erent alternatives; straw votes "down the agenda" were not per-
mitted. There were 21 di¤erent voters in the committee, which had to decide which
one of ve possible alternatives, fA;B;C;D;Eg, to select via a majority rule agenda.
The preference orders of the 21 voters implied a majority rule relation in which A was a
Condorcet winner, E was a Condorcet loser32, and the middle three alternatives cycled:
B >m C >m D >m B. They conduct a number of three stage agendas, an example of
which is shown in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Caption : Figure 4. Sample agenda from Plott and Levine (1978).
Under sophisticated voting, A should be the outcome in all agendas. In the agenda
illustrated in Figure 4, for example, the rst stage is a vote between fA;Bg and fC;D;Eg.
If the outcome is fA;Bg, then a nal vote is conducted between A and B. If the outcome
is fC;D;Eg then a vote is conducted between fD;Eg and fCg, with a nal third stage
needed only if the outcome of the second stage is fD;Eg. Working from the last stage
back to the beginning of the agenda it is easy to see that the sophisticated equivalent of
fD;Eg is D, and hence the sophisticated equivalent of fC;D;Eg is C. The sophisticated
equivalent of fA;Bg is A. Therefore fA;Bg defeats fC;D;Eg in the rst stage under
sophisticated voting, then A defeats B in the second stage. The other agendas in the
paper are solved by similar logic.
The design of the experiments and the analysis of the data was not motivated by a
desire to test the Farquharson-Niemi-McKelvey theory of rational sophisticated voting.33
Indeed the game-theoretic predictions are barely alluded to in the paper. Instead they
32A Condorecet loser is an alternative that is defeated in a pairwise vote with any of the other alter-
natives.
33This was in part due to the presence of incomplete information in these experiments.
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propose a mixture of types model where there are three di¤erent possible behavioral
decision rules. The rst decision rule is called sincere voting. Because sincere voting
is not well-dened over subsets, they dene it as simply voting between the top (i.e.,
most preferred) elements of the two subsets. Hence this decision rule can be thought
of as "optimistic" or hope-for-the-best behavior. The second decision rule is the exact
opposite, where players behave pessimistically and is called the avoid-the-worst decision
rule. In this case a voter would compare the least preferred alternative from each subset
and vote for whichever set has the better worst alternative. The third decision rule strikes
a balance between the optimistic and pessimistic rules, and is called the average value
decision rule. In this case, the individual evaluates each subset in terms of the expected
utility of a uniformly distributed lottery over the alternatives in the subset, and votes for
the subset with the highest expected utility under this assumption. Thus, unlike the rst
two decision rules, the average value decision rule depends on more than just the ordinal
ranking of the (pure) alternatives. Individuals are then considered to be random variables
with respect to following one of these three decision rules, and the theory is eshed out
with a number of parameters governing the relative frequency of these decision rules in
the subject population.
The authors rst conducted several pilot studies that are not reported in the paper.
The main value of the pilot studies, in addition to ne tuning the instructions and pro-
cedures, is that the data from those studies could be used to estimate the parameters of
their decision rule model. Using these parameters, they design the agendas used in the
experiment reported in the paper ("series 4 data"). In most of these agendas, the sophis-
ticated outcome was di¤erent from the predicted outcome based on their model. Except
for only one agenda, their model was generally successful. In the single agenda where the
model failed to correctly predict the outcome, the outcome achieved by the committee was
the sophisticated outcome (and the Condorcet winner).34 That committee was the only
committee that was allowed to conduct a down-the-agenda straw vote, which essentially
converted the agenda voting game to one of complete information.
These results are not easy to interpret. Clearly they are not a rejection of sophisti-
cated voting theory, which either implicitly or explicitly requires complete information
(or nearly complete information) in order for the dominance solvability argument to make
any sense. In these experiments, voters had only private information about their own
preferences and were not even given probabilistic information about other memberspref-
erences. It is really an environment with decision making under conditions of (nearly)
34The authors also identify another deviation from their model predictions. Their model tends to
under-predict the margin of victory.
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complete ignorance. Thus it is not surprising that the data can be mostly explained in
terms of theories of decision making under ignorance, such as the principles of insu¢ -
cient reason (decision rule 3) or maximin (decision rule 2). The allowance for discussion
was apparently insu¢ cient to produce meaningful information transmission, with the one
exception arising when the discussion was allowed to include straw votes.
The Levine-Plott (1977) paper reports a similar exercise in predicting agenda outcomes
from a eld application of the agenda model. The authors belonged to a ying club that
was deciding on the composition of a new eet of planes. There were many possible
options and the authors were asked by the club to devise an orderly voting procedure
to produce an outcome. The authors obtained rough preference information from the
other members via discussion at earlier meetings and personal knowledge of the other
members35, and then applied their model to construct an agenda designed to produce one
particular outcome.36 Indeed, the agenda did succeed in producing the targeted outcome,
even though one of the other options was a Condorcet winner. Cohen et al (1978) reports
the results of some further series of divide-the-question agenda experiments, and results
that are mostly in line with the ndings of Levine and Plott (1977) and Plott and Levine
(1978).
There have been only three subsequent experiments to study sophisticated voting
with xed binary agendas. Herzberg and Wilson (1988) note that the lack of support for
sophisticated voting in the earlier studies was probably at least partly due to the di¢ culty
or impossibility of calculating optimal sophisticated strategies because preferences were
not common knowledge. Besides this, even if preferences were common knowledge, the
strategies used by other voters may be di¢ cult to predict as well. Furthermore, all these
di¢ culties would presumably be even more di¢ cult in longer agendas. In an attempt to
create a laboratory environment that minimized these informational complexities, they
consider small 5-voter committees, in which only one of the voters is a human subject. The
remaining voters are computerized and subjects are provided with su¢ cient information
to infer exactly how the computers will vote at each stage of the agenda.37
There are two main ndings. First, the hypothesized relationship between agenda
complexity (measured by agenda length and number of feasible alternatives) nds little
support in the data. The 6-alternative agenda has the highest frequency of sophisticated
35After the decision, the authors sent out a questionnaire to get more complete preference information
from the members.
36The target outcome coincided with the ideal point of the authors, as explained in the article.
37Specically, the agendas are all binary amendment voting procedures, subjects are given the ordinal
preferences of the computerized voters, and are told that the computerized voter will vote sincerely at
every stage.
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outcomes. More supportive of this hypothesis is the nding that longer agendas produce
more "stray" outcomes (i.e., neither sophisticated voting outcomes nor sincere voting
outcomes). Second, sincere voting outcomes occur more frequently than sophisticated
voting outcomes in all three agendas. The agendas are all fairly long, as there are either
4, 6, or 8 alternatives and the agendas are, respectively 3, 5, and 7 stages long. Like
the agenda experiments described earlier, subjects are naive and inexperienced, vote over
only one of the agendas, and play that game exactly once.38
The paper leaves open a number of questions about both design, e.g. the use of
sincere computerized voters and inexperienced human voters, as well as substance, e.g.,
how voters formulate their voting strategies in an agenda under conditions of complete
information. Regarding the latter, there are many ndings from bargaining games39 and
other multistage games40 where players have to make multiple sequential decisions and do
not follow backward induction solutions. This is even true in cases where the backward
induction solution is e¢ cient and perfectly equitable (Fey et al. 2000), although with
repetition there is convergence in the direction of the backward induction solution.41
There is also a concern about the use of computerized subjects and the possibility that
telling subjects the computers vote sincerely may lead subjects to adopt a similar rule of
thumb.
Eckel and Holt (1989) take a somewhat di¤erent avenue to extend these earlier ndings.
In particular, they choose to look at extremely simple two-stage agendas and run di¤erent
treatments that combine and extend some of the features of the Plott et al. and Herzberg-
Wilson studies. First, they run sessions both with complete preference information and
with private information. Second, they repeat the task for the subjects 10 times. They
have a second treatment concerning how often the preference assignments were changed
during the 10 rounds. In one case (call it "random"), they are changed every round, and
in the other case (call it "xed") they remain unchanged until the sophisticated voting
outcome is achieved, at which point they change. In the latter case, subjects are not
informed about the rule for changing assignments. For the private information treatments,
38Subjects are allowed extensive practice in an unpaid agenda game, which they can repeat as many
times as they wish. On average, each subject practices the task approximately 5 times, and they nd no
correlation between the number of practices by a subject and their tendency to vote sophisticatedly.
39See Roth (1996) for a discussion of several of these studies.
40See, for example, the centipede game study by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) and subsequent studies
of that game. Morton (2007) has an insightful discussion about why the centipede game is important for
political science, particularly as it relates to legislative bargaining.
41The ndings about convergence and learning are mixed. See, for example, Nagel and Tang (1998).
Pontis (2000) theoretical adaptive learning model that generates cyclic dynamics in centipede games
o¤ers one possible explanation for these mixed ndings.
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partial leakage of this private information can take place in two ways: a restricted form
of pre-vote discussion similar to the Plott et al. procedures is allowed; through task
repetition voters have an opportunity to learn how to forecast voting behavior in the
second stage of the agenda.42
In all their sessions, there were three alternatives fA;B;Cg, and three preference
types, A > C > B; C > B > A; and B > A > C, so the preference prole produced a
majority rule cycle. There were 9 subjects and three of each preference type and 8 sessions
were conducted. The two stage agenda was always to vote rst between alternatives A
and C, and second to vote the winner of the rst stage against B. The only di¤erence
between sophisticated and sincere voting arises in the rst round, where the three A >
C > B voters should vote for C, because B will defeat A in the second round (6 to
3), but C defeats B. A clever aspect of their design is that all three of the Plott et
al. decision rules (sincere, avoid-the-worst, and average-value) predict sincere voting by
all types at both stages. This provides a very clean test of the decision-type mixture
model, against a clear alternative hypothesis: sophisticated voting. There are three main
ndings. First, repetition is necessary and su¢ cient for the committees to converge to
the sophisticated voting outcomes. In all 8 sessions, not one single subject (i.e., 0 out of
24) voted sophisticatedly on the rst meeting (play of the game). Across the ve sessions
using the "xed" preference assignments there are ten subsequences where the preferences
are the same in at least 2 consecutive rounds. In all ten cases, the committees converge
to the sophisticated outcome regardless of whether the preference proles are public or
private information. Second, the xed repetition protocol is not a necessary condition
for sophisticated outcomes to obtain, but it is considerably more di¢ cult with random
repetition, and such outcomes are only observed in the public information treatments.
In particular, the proportion of voters who vote sophisticatedly is signicantly less with
random repetition compared to xed repetition.43 Third, there are signicant di¤erences
across individuals. Some subjects learn to vote sophisticatedly and some do not. While
sophisticated voting becomes widespread with xed repetition, it is by no means universal.
Principal ndings
1. If voters have little or no information about other voters preferences, they do not
behave according to the backward induction logic of sophisticated voting. Instead,
42Learning through repetition is also facilitated by their design, where the distribution of preference
orders was xed for all 10 rounds; only the assignments of preferences changed.
43The likelihood voters vote sophisticatedly is also higher in the pubic information treatment than the
private information treatment, but signicance (11%) fails conventional tests.
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their behavior is best described by a combination of simple rules of thumb for
decision making under complete ignorance.
2. If voters have an opportunity to learn about the preferences of other voters, behavior
is largely consistent with sophisticated voting, at least in relatively simple agendas.
2.5.3 Dynamic bargaining in the shadow of a voting rule.
The Baron-Ferejohn (BF) Bargaining Model The Baron-Ferejohn (BF, 1986) bar-
gaining model is a blend between the Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game and the Romer-
Rosenthal monopoly agenda setter model. The Romer-Rosenthal setter model is the po-
litical science version of the ultimatum game, but in a political model with single peaked
preferences and a voting rule. The Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining model is the innite hori-
zon limit of alternating o¤er games, of which the ultimatum game is the shortest possible.
In Romer-Rosenthal, the game ends with a status quo outcome if the setters proposal is
voted down.44 But in models of the BF tradition, the process of o¤er and accept/reject
may continue indenitely, with the proposer typically changing over time in the event the
proposal is rejected. In this repeated version of bargaining a much richer set of strategic
possibilities emerge.
In the setter model, there are four critical factors that determine the equilibrium:
the set of feasible alternatives; the policy preferences of the setter; the voting rule; and
the policy preferences of the voter who is pivotal under that voting rule. In moving
from the one shot setting to a repeated version of committee bargaining some additional
structure is required to capture several new factors that come into play. These additional
factors include: the time preferences of the voters; the recognition rule that determines
the proposer at each stage, as a function of the history of play; and the amendment
procedure.
The "standard" BF model is limited to purely redistributive policy spaces. In the
simplest version of the model, a committee of size n (odd) must decide how to divide a
dollar among its members. One of the members is selected at random ("recognized") to
propose a division, d1 = (d11; :::; d1n). An up-down vote is taken on the proposal. If a
majority votes in favor of d1, it is implemented, the bargaining game ends, and payo¤s
accrue (players are assumed to have linear von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
over their share of the dollar). On the other hand, if the proposal does not win a majority
of votes, the process repeats itself: one of the members is selected at random (possibly
44There are some extensions of this where the setter can have a second shot if the rst proposal fails.
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the same one) to propose a division d2 = (d21; :::; d2n). Another up-down vote is taken,
and if a majority votes for d2, the game ends and payo¤s accrue, with utilities for member
i being discounted by a factor i 2 [0; 1]. This process repeats itself until some proposal
eventually wins a majority. Payo¤s are 0 if no proposal ever wins. One can obtain many
variations of this basic game by changing the recognition rule (time dependence, unequal
recognition probabilities), the time preferences of the players, the voting rule (weighted
voting, super-majority rule, veto players, etc.), allowing for amendments before the vote,
having a terminal period T , specifying a status quo in the event no proposal wins, concave
utilities, more general feasible sets, and so forth.
While BF games have many similarities to discounted Rubinstein bargaining, they are
di¤erent in several important ways. First, there are typically an innite number of sub-
game perfect equilibria. These arise for the following reason. Equilibrium proposals will
o¤er positive shares of the pie to just enough members to obtain a bare winning majority,
because buying o¤ additional members is costly but does not change the probability the
proposal wins. Therefore, the choice of which members the proposer excludes can, in
equilibrium, favor some members over others. In turn, this favoritism (or retaliation) can
depend on the history of prior proposals and votes. This allows a huge degree of freedom
in the construction of equilibria, which was not available in the simple two-person alter-
nating o¤er game. This suggests that laboratory testing of the theory may be especially
important in establishing an empirical basis for ruling out at least some of these alter-
native equilibria. Theoretical selections have been proposed. Baron and Kalai (1992) in
particular prove that the simplest equilibrium corresponds to the one that is the natural
extension of the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in Rubinsteins game. It is very easy
to describe for the standard BF model if recognition probabilities are uniform and all
voters are risk neutral and have the same discount factor, and the voting rule is majority
rule. In that case, the equilibrium reduces to one in which the proposer o¤ers just a large
enough share of the pie to a randomly selected coalition of n 1
2
other members so that
each of the members of the coalition is exactly indi¤erent between voting for or against
the proposal. The remaining share of the pie is kept by the proposer. All members out
of the coalition vote against the proposal and all members in the coalition vote for the
proposal. If a proposal fails, then the next randomly selected proposer makes a similar
proposal, and so on. By the symmetry of the game, and since there is no delay in this
equilibrium the value of the game to each member of the committee is just 1
n
. Hence, the
proposer must o¤er 
n
to each member of his coalition in equilibrium, and keeps a share
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equal to 1   n 1
2

n
.45 A second di¤erence one that can be convenient for laboratory
testing is that the stationary equilibrium solution is typically well-dened even in the
limit where the future is not discounted at all ( = 1). For example, if n = 3 and  = 1
the proposer o¤ers one of the other members a share of 1
3
and keeps a share equal to 2
3
.
BF Experiments There have been several laboratory studies of the Baron-Ferejohn
bargaining model and variations of it. In all versions of these studies, the equilibrium of
the standard BF game has had four main properties. First, there is a proposer advantage,
in the sense that a player is better o¤ being the proposer than not being the proposer.
Second, there is no delay in the equilibrium, so proposals should always pass. Third there
is full rent extraction, in the sense that the members of the proposers coalition are exactly
indi¤erent between voting for or voting against the equilibrium proposal. Fourth, only
minimum winning coalitions arise. That is, the proposer only o¤ers shares to enough other
members to get a bare majority (or, in the case of a super-majority, only the minimum
number of votes to pass).
These four properties are also properties of most of the alternating o¤er bargaining
games that have been studied in the laboratory, and the rst and third properties are
also properties of the Romer-Rosenthal setter model that was studied in the Eavey-Miller
experiment. Thus it should come as no surprise that many of the ndings of those
experiments nd parallels to results from BF experiments. Three parallels are particularly
important. First, there is a proposer advantage, but it is less than what the theory
predicts. Second, there is sometimes delay. Third, there is not full rent extraction.
Clearly, models that predict full rent extraction by proposers fare poorly if responders are
allowed to veto the outcome, either individually, or as part of a blocking coalition. Just
like in the ultimatum game or more complicated alternating o¤er games, this means the
proposer in all of these settings must trade o¤ the value of better proposal against the risk
of having it voted down. There is indeed strategic risk in these environments. Whether it
is due to social preferences or some other source is still an open question and has been an
area of intense study in behavioral economics. For whatever reason, such risk exists and
it implies unpredictability about what responders will or will not vote for. Given that
di¤erent proposers will tolerate di¤erent amounts of risk and presumably have di¤erent
priors about the respondersrange of acceptable o¤ers, this will necessarily lead to some
delay. However, while this implies failure of the second and third theoretical properties
45This does not reduce to exactly the equilibrium of the Rubinstein bargaining game if n = 2 and the
voting rule is strict majority rule. The di¤erence is due to the fact that in the standard Rubinstein game,
the proposers alternate rather than being chosen at random.
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of equilibrium, the rst observation should still be true: a proposer advantage should still
be observed. And indeed that is the case, although it is diminished somewhat because of
the blocking threat.
The rst laboratory study of BF The pioneering laboratory study of BF models
was McKelvey (1991), which provides a simple test of whether the stationary equilibrium
is a good predictor of behavior and outcomes. That paper does not investigate a divide-
the-dollar environment, but instead investigates what is essentially the simplest possible
BF environment: 3 alternatives {A,B,C} and 3 voters {1,2,3}. Voter preferences over
the three alternatives lead to a Condorcet cycle. The von Neumann-Morgenstern utilties
for voter 1 are (1; 0; v3) for alternatives A, B, and C respectively; the corresponding
payo¤s for voters 2 and 3 are (v1; 1; 0) and (0; v2; 1), where vi 2 (0; 1) for i = 1; 2; 3. The
unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium has proposers always proposing their most
preferred outcome (1 proposes A, 2 proposes B and 3 proposes C). However, in contrast
to the "no delay" property in subsequent BF experiments, there is mixing at the voting
stage and thus there can be delay in equilibrium. The stationary equilibrium makes
sharp predictions about the distribution of proposals, nal outcomes, expected delay, and
so forth, which are tested using data from his experiment. The design of the experiment
varies (v1; v2; v3) and also looks at a 4-alternative game where three of the alternatives
cycle, exactly as in the rst part of the design, and the fourth alternative is "fair" in the
sense that it gives everyone the same payo¤. In all treatments the discount factor is .95
and subjects are paid in lottery tickets to induce risk neutrality.
There are four main ndings. The sharpest of these ndings is in the 4-alternative
committees, where unfair outcomes are predicted to arise 100% of the time. Indeed, unfair
outcomes are observed over 95% of the time, lending strong support for the stationary
equilibrium.
In contrast, with the 3-alternative committees, there are three features of the data that
clearly contradict the predictions of the stationary equilibrium. First, committee members
almost never propose the alternative corresponding to minfv1; v2; v3g if that minimum is
very low (which it is for most of the 3-alternative committees). In other words, one
of the subjects consistently proposes his second-ranked alternative, thereby avoiding the
lowball "o¤er" to a coalition partner that would result from proposing his top-ranked
alternative.46 Because such a proposers second-ranked alternative corresponds to one
of the other members top-ranked alternative, this virtually guarantees the proposal will
46This nding is similar to the phenomenon of incomplete rent extraction in bargaining games with
side payments, and in the Eavey-Miller experiment.
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pass, so this is the "safe" strategy for such a proposer. Second, proposals are accepted
with higher probability than theory predicts (partly because safe strategies are used).
Third, there is signicantly less delay than predicted by the theory. McKelvey suggests
that these three departures from the stationary equilibrium could be due to risk aversion 
i.e., a failure of the lottery procedure to induce risk neutral preferences, a failure that has
been documented elsewhere.47 The ndings are also consistent with subjects maximizing
an objective function that includes a preference for bilateral fairness (outcomes that are
fair to ones coalition partner), or a preference for e¢ cient outcomes (i.e., outcomes that
maximize the total payo¤ to the group).
Divide-the-Dollar BF experiments In the remaining versions of BF games that
have been conducted in the laboratory, the theoretical equilibrium has the four properties
of proposer advantage, no delay, full rent extraction, and minimum winning coalitions.
The rst48 of these experiments (Frechette et al. 2003) compares open vs. closed rules
in the proposal/amendment process. The closed rule is what was described earlier as the
"standard" BFmodel. The open rule di¤ers by giving a second randomly selected proposer
the option of either seconding the proposal (i.e., forcing a vote on the rst proposal), or
o¤ering a substitute proposal. In case of a substitution, there is a vote between the
original proposal and the substitute. The winner becomes the standing proposal, the
discount factor is applied to payo¤s, and another randomly selected proposal is chosen
to either move the question or o¤er a substitute. The procedure continues until there
are no further substitutions and a proposal is passed. There are two di¤erences in the
equilibrium of the two games. First, the open rule dilutes proposer power. For, example,
in their 5-member closed-rule committees with  = :8, the proposers equilibrium share
is .68, and his two coalition partners each receive .16; but with open-rule the shares are
.52 and .24, respectively. The second di¤erence is that the open rule equilibrium can lead
to delay. This occurs if a non-coalition partner (i.e., someone whose proposed allocation
equals zero) is selected as the second proposer, which happens with probability 1
2
. In that
case, a substitute amendment will be o¤ered, forcing delay.
A number of ndings are reported. As in the earlier McKelvey study, they observe 
in both open and closed rule committees a proposer advantage, but less than would be
predicted by theory; i.e., full rent extraction does not occur. Second, the proposer advan-
47Rietz (1993) studies the use of the risk neutralizing lottery procedure in the context of rst price
auctions. See also Cox and Oaxaca (1995) and Walker et al. (1990).
48The experiments reported in Diermeier and Morton (2009) were conducted around the same time,
perhaps slightly earlier. They employed a di¤erent design and explored somewhat di¤erent questions.
See below.
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tage is greater under a closed rule, and this gap widens with experience. Third, the closed
rule produces no delay, and the open rule produces considerable delay. Regarding the
latter, they nd less delay than predicted (as in the McKelvey study). Fourth, proposals
converge with experience to ones with minimum winning coalitions.49
Frechette (2009) looks more deeply into the dynamics of behavior across the 15 rounds.
He observes that initially proposers demanded approximately the same shares in both
the open and closed rules, and it is only after time that the gap appears, as closed-
rule proposers increased their demands and open-rule proposers decreased their demands.
Second, while minimum winning coalitions are predominant by the later rounds, they are
less common in the early rounds. He shows that a belief-based learning model based on
Friedman and Cheung (1997) can account for these trends.
Frechette et al. (2005a, 2005b) report results from an experiment designed to test the
separate e¤ects of bargaining power and recognition power, in a legislature with di¤erent
sized parties who have strong party discipline (i.e., always vote as a block). Bargaining
power is measured directly in terms of the size of the voting block. Recognition power
is measured by the probability of being the proposer in any stage of the BF game. The
analysis focuses on three parameter congurations. The rst (baseline) is the standard BF
model with three member committees. In this case all voters have equal voting weights
and equal recognition probabilities. The second treatment has two large parties, each with
a voting block weight of 5/11, and one small party with a voting block weight of 1/11,
and all parties have recognition probabilities equal to 1/3. The equilibrium strategies are
identical to the rst treatment: all proposers receive a share of .67, regardless of whether
they are one of the large parties or the small party, and they choose their coalition partner
randomly. The third treatment is the same as the second treatment, except the recognition
probabilities are proportional to the voting block size. Again, the equilibrium solution
is the same. While these three treatments produce no e¤ects under the BF model, they
do produce large e¤ects under a competing model of coalition formation that has had
a signicant impact in political science: "Gamsons Law". Gamsons law predicts that
political spoils will be divided in a coalition in proportion to the voting blocks of its
constituent members, and that the proposer will always choose the "cheapest" coalition
partners (the latter also being true for BF). Thus, in treatments two and three with
unequal voting weights, Gamsons law predicts that only coalitions consisting of one large
49In each session, subjects repeated the task 15 times. There were exactly 5 subjects in each session, so
these were "repeated-repeated games". To mitigate supergame e¤ects, subject id numbers were relabeled
after each election was nished (i.e., a proposal passed). Subjects received payment for a randomly
selected 4 out of the 15 elections. Sessions were conducted manually using a blackboard and pencil and
paper, rather than computers.
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and one small party will ever form, and the spoils will always be divided such that 5/6
goes to the large party coalition member regardless of who the proposer is.50 While the
results do not conform exactly to the BF equilibrium predictions (for largely the same
reasons as in Frechette et al. 2003), the ndings are nowhere close to the predictions of
Gamsons law, except for the baseline treatment. However, there is signicant proposer
power with experienced subjects even in the baseline session, contradicting Gamsons law.
One nal treatment was conducted with equal voting weights, but a discount factor
 = :5. This change in the discount factor predicts no change in outcomes under Gamsons
law, but predicts greater proposer power under the BF hypothesis. They nd that with
the lower discount factor, coalition partners are willing to accept less generous proposals
resulting in an increase in proposer power, at least for experienced subjects. However,
the e¤ect is considerably smaller than the predicted equilibrium change.
The class of bargaining protocols laid out in BF is obviously only one of many possi-
bilities. In "real" political bargaining, the structure is not always that clear, and we know
from theoretical work on noncooperative bargaining in economics that the exact details
of the bargaining protocol can greatly a¤ect outcomes. To the extent that we hope these
models (and experiments) can tell us something useful about legislative politics, there is
(1) an argument for considering other plausible models of the political bargaining process
and (2) trying to compare ndings from experiments to eld observations of political
bargaining outcomes in governments. Morelli (1999) proposes an alternative bargaining
format, "demand bargaining" (DB), whereby voters are randomly ordered, and then make
sequential demands following that order until there is a collection of feasible demands
(i.e., sum to less than or equal to 1) from a coalition that holds a majority share of the
votes. If, after everyone has made their respective demands, there is no feasible winning
coalition, then the process starts all over again with discounted payo¤s. The equilibrium
allocations are indeed a¤ected by the bargaining rules, with BF alternating o¤er rules
generating greater proposer power, and the demand bargaining rules producing equilib-
rium allocations that are proportional to voting weights, with no rst mover advantage.
Frechette et al. (2005c) design an experiment to compare outcomes under the two pro-
tocols.51 They run sessions with ve member committees and no discounting, with two
di¤erent sets of parameters, one where all voters have equal weights and another where
there is one powerful "apex" voter (with three times the voting weight of the smaller,
"base" voters). Several sessions used experienced subjects and all sessions consisted of
10 elections, using a random matching protocol. Subject payments were based on one
50In the baseline treatment, Gamsons law predicts an equal split between the two coalition members.
51Frechette et al. (2005b) also run a DB treatment, and report similar ndings.
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randomly selected election.
One di¤erence they observe that is not predicted by the theory is a signicant di¤erence
in the frequency of delay between BF and DB. There is almost never delay with DB (less
than 5% of the elections), but delay is frequent with BF (about 40%), with essentially
no experience e¤ects.52 Some of the BF elections with experienced subjects required as
many as seven rounds to reach agreement.53 Minimum winning coalitions are generally
observed in both treatments, with increasing frequency with experience.
Concerning allocations, consistent with past ndings, most proposers in the BF com-
mittees have some proposal power (receive higher shares than their voting share in a
coalition) with the exception being the apex proposers, who receive less than their vot-
ing share as proposer. Also consistent with past ndings, all the BF proposers have
less proposal power than predicted by the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium; corre-
spondingly, coalition partners in the BF committees receive more than their equilibrium
allocations.
In contrast, proposers in the DB committees earn more than their equilibrium shares
(signicantly more when experienced). That is, the rst movers have proposer power,
while the theory predicts they should receive allocations equal to their voting weights.54
This leads to a central conclusion of the experiment: There is signicantly less di¤erence
in outcomes between the two bargaining protocols than is predicted by theory. The authors
then consider the implication of this main nding for the interpretation of regression
results from eld data. Conducting regressions with their laboratory data, similar to
those used with eld data to compare DB and BF protocols (Ansolobehere et al. 2005,
Warwick and Druckman 2001), they nd that such regressions fail to distinguish between
the models. On the one hand this casts doubt on the empirical exercise of trying to
nd out which model corresponds most closely to political bargaining phenomena; on the
other hand, the overall nding suggests that perhaps some better intermediate model is
lurking in the shadows waiting to be discovered.
52These delay rates were higher than was observed in the 3-voter BF bargaining games reported in
Frechette et al. (2005a) and lower than the 3-person DB committees with no discounting in Frechette et
al. (2005a). Experience also signicantly reduced delay in the 3-voter games.
53These experiments had no discounting built into the payo¤s, so there is no direct e¢ ciency loss from
delay. However, if subjectstime is valuable, then these delays did create ine¢ ciencies.
54Unfortunately, for the allocation data analysis a large chunk of the data is discarded, as only passed
allocations with minimum winning coalitions are considered.
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Finite Horizon experiments Diermeier and Morton (2009)55 and Diermeier and
Gailmard (2006) also report a lack of proposer power in their studies of legislative bargain-
ing with asymmetric voting weights and recognition probabilities. Both of these studies
employ a much di¤erent experimental protocol. The former looks at nite horizon bar-
gaining games (maximum of 5-rounds); the latter allows only one round, and varies the
continuation payo¤s to committee members in the event the proposal fails. Because they
are only one round, the Diermeier and Gailmard study is more closely related to the ulti-
matum game literature.56 The former paper examines how proposal and voting behavior
changes when the outside option (status quo) payo¤ to the proposer is varied, and nd
strong e¤ects that dont seem to be consistent with social preference models. The latter
paper changes all three status quo payo¤s simultaneously and investigates how behavior
changes as the sum of the payo¤s in the status quo changes. They nd that the standard
equilibrium model works better when the status quo payo¤s are relatively high.
Legislative Bargaining with Public Goods Frechette et al. (2012) investigate
the e¤ect of adding a public good dimension to the static BF divide-the-dollar game, fol-
lowing very closely the model of Volden and Wiseman (2007, 2008). In their experiment, a
5-member legislature is faced with an exogenous budget which is to be allocated between
investment in the public good and private good transfers to the members of the legisla-
ture. Production technology is linear: each unit invested in the public good yields :7 units
of the public good. Preferences are linear in the public and private goods and identical
across agents. The marginal rate of substitution between private and public good is 
1  ,
so higher values of  indicate a lower preference for public good production. The BF bar-
gaining model using a closed rule, majority voting, and uniformly random recognition rule
is followed, and the discount factor is  = 0:8. Because of the linearity of the environment,
the predictions of the model are straightforward. For low values of  the equilibrium pro-
posal is to invest everything, with no private transfers. For su¢ ciently high values of 
the equilibrium proposal is to invest nothing, with minimum winning coalition transfers
equal to the standard BF solution in the divide-the-dollar game. For intermediate values
of  the equilibrium allocation involves both positive amount of public good and positive
transfers to a minimum winning coalition. In this intermediate range, the investment in
public good increases in , which is somewhat counterintuitive. For similar reasons, the
55Their main nding is very high rejection rates in early rounds, compared to innite horizon bargaining
experiments.
56See also Hsu et al. (2008). They are particularly close to the experimental studies of n-person
ultimatum games. See for example, Guth and Van Damme (1998), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Knez
and Camerer (1995) and Kagel and Wolfe (2001).
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equilibrium private good allocation to the proposer is non-monotonic. Figure 5 illustrates
the non-monotonic relationship between  and the equilibrium investment in public good.
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Figure 5. Equilibrium public good investment as a function of .
Their design was organized in a way to provide a simple test of this non-monotonic
relationship between  and both the level of public good investment and the private good
allocation to the proposer. The main nding is that the non-monotonic relationship is
not observed. Contrary to the equilibrium, the observed public good levels are monotone
decreasing in  and the proposer shares are monotone decreasing in . The proposer
shares are also much less than predicted by theory, and the public good levels are generally
higher than the equilibrium prediction. In fact, the lowest three treatments are nearly
indistinguishable from each other with nearly all the allocation in the public good and
proposer private allocations less than 10%. The authors nd some evidence of learning
in the direction of the theory for the  = 0:55 and  = 0:65, but no such evidence in
the  = 0:45 treatment.57 It is likely that there is no learning in the  = 0:45 treatment
because full investment in the public good is almost an equilibrium. The proposer has
little to lose by proposing full investment; in fact, investing everything is the stationary
equilibrium for   0:42. This suggests that a quantal response equilibrium analysis of
the model might account for this departure from the theory.58 Another possible factor,
perhaps related, is that the equilibrium is "weak" in the middle region in the sense that
voters are indi¤erent between voting for and against the equilibrium proposal. We know
from ultimatum games and previous BF experiments that such indi¤erence is a problem
in the theory: an o¤er must leave something on the table or there is a high probability
it will get rejected, which is also consistent with quantal response models. In the middle
region, as long as  is relatively small, say, 0.45 or 0.55, the obvious (and cheap) way
to leave money on the table is to invest more than the equilibrium amount in the public
good, which is consistent with the data. In the middle region, if  is relatively large, say,
0.65, the obvious (and cheap) way to leave money on the table is to give away a larger
share of the private good, which is also consistent with the data.
Other ndings from the experiment mirror results from divide-the-dollar BF experi-
57In most sessions, the task was repeated with random matching for 12 repetitions to allow for learning.
58Quantal response equilibrium relaxes the best response assumption of Nash equilibrium with noisy
best response, but retains the assumption of rational expectations. See McKelvey and Palfrey (1995,1998)
and Goeree et al. (2005). It will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.
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ments. Delay is infrequent; proposers have some power, but less than equilibrium; and
minimal winning coalitions are commonly observed. The concept of minimum winning
coalition here is a bit di¤erent from divide-the-dollar games. For low values of  there
are no private allocations. In the middle range of  where the equilibrium public good
allocation is strictly between 0 and 1, only the proposer should receive a positive pri-
vate allocation. For high values of  the minimum winning coalition is the usual simple
majority.59
Principal ndings from BF experiments
1. There is signicant proposer power, which is diminished by having more competitive
agenda protocols, such as allowing amendments or following a demand bargaining
game form.
2. While proposal power is signicant, it is less than predicted by theory. As in ulti-
matum games, proposers leave some money on the table in order for their proposals
to be accepted.
3. There is some delay, but this becomes infrequent with experience, suggesting con-
vergence to the no delay solution. The amount of delay is a¤ected by the agenda
protocol.
4. Minimum winning coalitions are most frequently observed, and increasing with ex-
perience.
Legislative bargaining in dynamic environments All of the legislative bargaining
experiments described above involve purely static allocation problems. While the bar-
gaining protocols are multistage games, there is a simple once-and-for-all allocation that
is decided by the committee. As noted before, this approach mirrors traditional mod-
els of bargaining in economics in static environments, such as the ultimatum game and
o¤er-countero¤er bargaining games. The theoretical literature in political science has re-
cently applied some of the ideas and insights of the static BF model to truly dynamic
environments, where the outcome of the bargaining game at one point in time a¤ects the
structure of the bargaining problem in later points in time.
59Christensen (2010) extends the design of this experiment by allowing for heterogeneity of public good
preferences.
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Dynamic Divide-the-Dollar games with endogenous status quos The sim-
plest way to introduce dynamics is the case where the committee bargaining takes place in
the shadow of a status quo, and the status quo is determined endogenously by outcomes
of the bargaining game in earlier periods. Battaglini and Palfrey (2012) report the results
of an experiment with exactly this kind of environment, following a game similar to the
dynamic divide-the-dollar game rst studied by Kalandrakis (2004). In that model, a leg-
islature or committee of n members must decide in each of an innite number of periods,
how to divide a xed pie into n parts, operating under majority rule. If we denote the
allocation in period t by xt, and the proposed allocation in period t+ 1 by yt+1, then the
outcome in period t+ 1 is given by:
xt+1 = yt+1 if at least
n+ 1
2
members vote for yt+1
= xt if fewer than
n+ 1
2
members vote for yt+1
That is, xt is the status quo in period t + 1. Thus, xt can a¤ect the payo¤s in all future
periods, for given proposal and voting strategies in future periods. Payo¤s are assumed
to be given by the innitely discounted sum of the shares of the pie received by an agent.
The recognition rule is assumed to be random with equal probabilities.
A stationary Markov equilibrium for such a game is dened in terms of proposal and
voting strategies that depend only on the current status quo, and not on payo¤ irrelevant
variables in the history of play (such as exactly how many votes a proposal received).
Kalandrakis shows that in this model, there is a Markov equilibrium in undominated
strategies with the property that, regardless of the initial status quo, x0, the trajectory of
the outcomes quickly converges to a rotating dictatorship: whoever is the current proposer
in period t proposes to have a share of 1 and to everyone else 0, and the proposal always
passes.
Battaglini and Palfrey (2012) study several variations of this game in the laboratory,
inducing the discounted innite horizon with a constant random stopping rule, . In the
equilibrium they analyze, voters mix 50/50 if they are indi¤erent between the proposal
and the status quo, and proposers who are indi¤erent between o¤ering two proposals,
propose them with equal probabilities. The rst two variations limit the set of possible
allocations to only four, which simplies the theoretical analysis and also simplies the
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decision problem for the subjects. The four possible allocations in variation 1 are:
a = (
1
3
;
1
3
;
1
3
)
b = (
1
2
;
1
4
;
1
4
)
c = (
1
4
;
1
2
;
1
4
)
d = (
1
4
;
1
4
;
1
2
)
Thus, variation 1 has one egalitarian allocation, a, and three unequal allocations, b; c; d,
in which one of the members receives half the pie and the other two split the remaining
half. In this variation the egalitarian allocation is a Condorcet winner, and there is a
unique equilibrium the trajectory of which depends on the initial status quo. If the initial
status quo is equal to a, then in this equilibrium a will always win in every future period.
In other words, a is an absorbing state. However, if the initial status quo is b; c; or d,
then the trajectory is similar to the equilibrium identied by Kalandrakis - it randomly
rotates between the three unequal allocations forever, never reaching the absorbing state
of a.
In variation 2, the four feasible allocations are:
a = (
1
3
;
1
3
;
1
3
)
b = (
1
2
;
1
2
; 0)
c = (0;
1
2
;
1
2
)
d = (
1
2
; 0;
1
2
)
The only change here is that the unequal allocations are now split between two members
of a minimal winning coalition. This seemingly minor change in payo¤s has a huge e¤ect
on the equilibrium. In this case, there is no longer a Condorcet winner. Indeed, now a
is a Condorcet loser. As a result, it can be shown that the equilibrium involves randomly
alternating between allocations b; c; d.
Two sessions were conducted for each of variations 1 and 2. In each session subjects
played one of the variations ten times with random rematching and a discount factor of
 = 0:75. The variation 2 ndings were largely consistent with the theory. Looking at the
empirical transition frequencies, if the current status quo was a majoritarian allocation
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(b; c;or d) then the outcome in that round was nearly always (98% of the time) majori-
tarian. In contrast, the egalitarian status quo was unstable, with outcomes moving from
a to a minimum winning coalition half the time. In fact 70% of the proposals were for
minimum winning coalitions when the status quo was a.
The results for variation 1, where a is a Condorcet winner, were somewhat further
from the equilibrium. On the one hand, a was a very stable outcome, as predicted.
When a was the status quo in period t, the outcome was nearly always a (94% of the
time). However, the non-egalitarian outcomes were less stable. When the status quo
was b, c or d, the outcome was an unequal allocation 62% of the time. Thus, what is
observed in the long run when there was a Condorcet winner is that if the status quo is an
unequal allocation, then with fairly high probability it will bounce to a, in contrast to the
theoretical prediction that there are two absorbing sets of allocations, fag and fb; c; dg.
Nearly any model that introduces some error or "noise" into the proposal and voting
strategies in the game would predict transitions of this kind. With this in mind, the
authors dene a generalization of Quantal Response Equilibrium that applies to Markov
equilibria in innite horizon games such as the ones studied in the paper. This equilibrium,
called Markov Logit Equilibrium (MLE) applies the framework of the Agent Quantal
Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1998), so it combines sequential (quantal)
rationality and stationarity of strategies and the Logit specication of stochastic choice.
They solve numerically for the MLE value function, and players Logit-best-respond given
the MLE value function. For any value of the Logit noise parameter, , the model
predicts a stochastic long run alternation between the absorbing regions in variation 1,
qualitatively similar to the one observed in the data; and it predicts relative stability of
the fb; c; dg region in variation 2. They estimate the value of  that best ts the data and
report a close match between MLE and data.
The third variation was much closer to the Kalandrakis model of divide-the-dollar,
as proposals were not constrained to be one of four proposals, but could be essentially
any 3-way split of the dollar, using a relatively ne discrete grid.60 The equilibrium of
this game is similar, but not identical to Kalandrakis, partly because of the discrete grid
on allocations. Recall that in the Kalandrakis equilibrium, the prediction is to rotate
between the vertices of the simplex, corresponding to one member receiving the entire
dollar. In the equilibrium for the discretized version of the game, the equilibrium involves
rotations between regions close to the vertices, but not exactly at the vertices.
Three sessions were conducted for this divisible variation, two with  = 0:75 and one
60In the experiment, the "dollar" was divisible into 60 pieces. If anything the grid used in the laboratory
version was ne than necessary: over 90% of proposals were for allocations that were divisible by 5.
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with  = 0:83. In both cases, there was a lot of clustering and stability to allocations
far away from the vertices, in contrast to the theory. In fact, outcomes close to the
vertices were quite rare (less than 20% of the time). Outcomes were either perfectly or
nearly egalitarian more often than that, and over 60% of the allocations were approxi-
mately minimum winning coalition allocations where two of the members received large
allocations, and the third member received a zero or token allocation. Using numerical
computations to characterize neutral solutions when utilities are concave rather than lin-
ear, the authors are able to show that as concavity increases the long run distribution of
allocations becomes more equitable. Figure 6 shows the expected long run distribution
of allocations when voters have CRRA utility functions with parameter , where linear
utility corresponds to  = 0.
Figure 6 about here.
Caption: Figure 6. Long run distribution of allocation for low (top panel) and high (bottom panel) levels of convavity.
In this sense the data suggest that perhaps the linear utility assumption is too strong.
Using MLE as an error structure the authors estimate the degree of concavity assuming
constant relative risk aversion. Their risk aversion estimate (approximately a square root
utility function) is close to what has been found across a broad range of other experimental
studies. Concavity is also consistent with the nding in variation 1, that the egalitarian
regime is much more stable than the regime corresponding to rotation between unequal
allocations. One nal note about the behavior in these experiments is that behavior is
largely consistent with a model of perfectly selsh players, with little indication of other-
regarding preferences. Voting behavior in particular can be explained quite well by a
model of pure self interest.
Principal ndings for dynamic divide-the-dollar games
1. Allocations over time are "smoother" than predicted by the theory. This is consis-
tent with voters having concave utility functions.
2. Minimum winning coalitions are observed about as much as in BF bargaining games.
3. Proposals are usually accepted. Egalitarian proposals are fairly common and are
virtually always accepted.
Dynamic Legislative Bargaining with durable public goods Battaglini et al.
(2012) proposes a framework for studying the political economy of durable public good
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production along the lines of models of economic growth. They establish some basic
theoretical results about the e¤ect of the voting rule on the investment path of the public
good when the path is chosen over a sequence of periods with a legislative bargaining
game. Specically, the environment consists of many citizens divided into n equally sized
districts, each with a single representative in the legislature. All citizens have the same
per-period utility function which is linear in the private good with an additively separable
concave utility, u(yt), for the current stock, yt of the durable public good. There is an
innite horizon and a discount factor . In each period, there is an endowment equal toW
and a policy in period t is an n+1 vector, where the rst component equals the investment
in the durable public good, It, and the last n components, xt = (x1t; :::; xnt) are the private
good transfers to each district. The investment increases the stock of the durable public
good, and the durable public good depreciates at rate d in each period. Hence, the stock
of public good in period t is equal to yt = (1  d)yt 1 + It, and an allocation sequence is
fxt; ytg1t=1. Feasibility requires xt  0, yt  0, and yt +
Pn
i=1 xit = W , for all t. Voter i
values an allocation sequence as the discounted sum of per-period utility of the sequence,
i.e.,
P1
t=1 
t 1 [xit + u(yt)].
The bargaining game is simple. In each period one of the n legislators is randomly
selected to make a proposed allocation (yt; xt) and an up-down vote is conducted in the
legislature under a closed rule. Voting follows a q-rule where the proposal passes if
and only if it receives at least q votes in favor. If it fails, then a status quo outcome
occurs. They consider a simple exogenous status quo outcome, (y0; x0) where y0 = 0 and
xit = W=n for all i.
There are several theoretical properties of the model that can be examined by a lab-
oratory experiment. First, for all values of q and other parameters in the model, the
symmetric continuous Markov perfect equilibrium investment paths are ine¢ cient. Sec-
ond, this ine¢ ciency decreases with q.61 In the case of unanimity rule, the steady state
level of the stock of public good is actually equal to the optimal level, although the speed
of approach to the steady state is too slow, as proposers skim o¤some resources for private
consumption in each period.
The article reports results from an experiment with legislatures of size n = 5 and
three di¤erent voting rules: simple majority rule (q = 3), unanimity rule (q = 5), and
dictatorship (q = 1). In all the treatments, there is zero depreciation (d = 0), square root
61The Markov perfect equilibrium pins down predictions in these games. The entire set of subgame
perfect equilibria is of course much larger, following folk theorem types of arguments. In fact, the e¢ cient
path can even be supported in a subgame perfect equilibrium for large enough discount factors, including
the parameters used in the experiments. The formal argument is in Battaglini et al. (2011a).
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utility functions, and a discount factor of 0.75 is implemented using a random stopping
rule with constant probability of 1/4. Figure 7 shows the median time paths of yt for the
rst 10 periods, for each of the three q rules. The theoretical equilibrium levels of yt are
marked in the gure.
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Figure 7: Comparison of theoretical and median observed time paths of yt for di¤erent voting rules.
There are several main ndings. First, consistent with the Markov perfect equilibrium,
the level of investment is far below the e¢ cient level, and converges over time to levels
much closer to the steady state of the Markov perfect equilibrium.62 Second, unanimity
rule produces the most e¢ cient outcomes, dictatorship the least e¢ cient, and majority
rule in between, as predicted. Investment with q = 3 (majority) levels o¤ at nearly
triple the size compared to q = 1 (dictatorship). Investment with q = 5 (unanimity)
converges to approximately six times the size compared to q = 1.Third, the path of
convergence to a steady state is di¤erent from the theory. There is overshooting. That
is, the legislatures overinvest in early rounds and then disinvest in later rounds. In all
three q treatments, the trajectory has the same pattern of early overinvestment followed
by later disinvestment. Fourth, most proposals pass, as is consistent with the ndings in
the static games discussed earlier. Fifth, approximately minimum winning coalitions are
the norm. While the proposals observed often have positive transfers to all districts, most
of the transfers are concentrated in a minimum winning coalition.
Battaglini et al. (2011a,2011b) consider a variation of the model in which the invest-
ment in public good in each period is made in a completely decentralized way, with each
district deciding independently how much of their (equal) share of the endowment (W=n)
to invest in the public good. This produces an economic environoment that is a dynamic
voluntary contribution game, where the public good is durable rather than the standard
static model where the public good is nondurable. The voluntary contributions mecha-
nism is similar to many of the more traditional static public goods games, as surveyed in
Ledyard (1995). The main di¤erence is that with a durable public good, the public good
level increases over time, and current contributions add to the stock of the public good,
which produces a stream of public benets over time. In the traditional static public
goods experiments, public good contributions only produce benets in the current period.
Often those traditional public goods experiments are repeated several times in order to
study learning dynamics, but there is no accumulation of stock; the level of public good
62The e¢ cient level of investment required investing 100% of the endowment in all of the rst 10
periods.
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is zeroed out at the start of each period.
The durable public goods experiment with decentrailized public good investments is
reported in Battaglini et al. (2011b), and the design is organized in a way to examing the
theoretical results reported in Battaglini et al. (2011a). The latter paper characterizes
the symmetric continuous Markov perfect equilibria of the game and obtains comparative
static results with respect to the discount factor, the rate of depreciation, the group size,
and the concavity of the utility function. It also considers two separated technologies
of public good production, depending on whether investments in the public good are
rerversible. In particular they show that the reversible case leads to lower public good
contribution than the irreversible case. This conparison is especially stark in the case of
no depreciation, so the experiments focus on that case.
An experiment reported in Battaglini et al. (2011b) varies the group size between 3
and 5 and includes both reversible and irreversible investment treatments. The discount
factor of  = 0:75 is used in all treatments. The basic procedures are similar to the leg-
islative bargaining, with the only di¤erence being the voluntary contribution mechanism
instead of the legislative bargaining mechanism.The two main ndings are that (a) there
is signicantly more contribution with irreversible investments than in the reversible case;
and (2) there is also greater contribution with n=5 than with n=3, but the di¤erence is
small and not signicant. Figure 8 shows the median time paths of yt for the rst 10
periods. The theoretical equilibrium levels of yt are marked in the gures.
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Figure 8: Comparison of theoretical and median observed time paths of yt in dynamic free riding experiment.
The experiment generally nds support for the predictions of the Markov perfect equilib-
rium, but with similar caveats as describe above for the Battaglini et al. (2012) experi-
ment.
Principal ndings for durable public goods experiments
1. Most proposals are for (approximately) minimum winning coalitions and most pro-
posals pass.
2. The proposer has signicant proposer power.
3. E¢ ciency is increasing in the q rule, as predicted by the Markov perfect equilibrium,
and much less than the optimal solution.
43
4. The public good level converges to approximately the long run steady state of the
Markov perfect equilibrium.
5. The dynamics of convergence is characterized by overshooting the steady state in
early periods, and then either leveling out (if investments are irreversible) or drifting
back down through disinvestment toward the equilibrium steady state.
6. Voting behavior is generally consistent with long run optimal behavior, in the sense
of the Markov perfect equilibrium value function.
7. Contributions are higher when investments in the public good are irreversible.
3 Elections and Candidate Competition
While the rst wave of experiments in positive political economy centered around coop-
erative game theory and unstructured bargaining in committees under majority rule, a
second wave of political science experiments followed quickly on the heels of the rst, and
investigated the question of Condorcet winners and the majority rule core in the context
of competitive elections rather than small committees. These studies address many of the
same questions that have received the attention of empirical political scientists. The key
questions we will focus on here are: (1) spatial convergence of candidate platforms in com-
petitive elections; (2) retrospective voting; and (3) the importance of polls in transmitting
information to voters and coordinating voting behavior in multicandidate elections.
3.1 Competitive elections and the Median Voter Theorem
3.1.1 Two candidate elections with complete information
The median voter theorem says that under certain conditions, in two-candidate winner-
take-all elections, candidate platforms will converge to the ideal point of the median voter.
The theorem applies under fairly general conditions in one-dimensional policy spaces with
single-peaked preferences, and under more stringent conditions in multidimensional pol-
icy spaces. Basically, if Condorcet winners exist, they correspond to the symmetric pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of the game between two o¢ ce-motivated candidates. Casual
observation indicates signicant divergence of candidate and party platforms, even in
winner take all elections. Laboratory experiments can help us understand why this may
happen by providing some empirical evidence about the conditions required for conver-
gence.
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There has been extensive work on candidate competition where voters have Euclidean
preferences and a Condorcet winner exists. The early contributions to this e¤ort are
mostly by McKelvey and Ordeshook, and much of this is detailed in their 1990 survey.
The focus of this work has been on questions about the informational conditions that
are needed for convergence to equilibrium in candidate competition games. The simplest
and least challenging environment is one where the candidates have complete information
about voter preferences, so the existence and location of the Condorcet winning platform
is common knowledge.63 This is the environment used in their initial study (McKelvey
and Ordeshook 1982), which was further simplied by having only candidates as subjects,
with the behavior of ve voters implemented by automatically voting for the closest
candidate. There were 10 repetitions of the candidate competition game. In each play
of the game the candidates simultaneously chose locations in a two-dimensional space,
and were then told the electoral outcome and the location chosen by the other candidate.
A candidate received a positive payo¤ whenever they won an election, with ties broken
randomly if they chose the same location. Outomces converged to the Condorcet point.64
The distribution of outcomes in the last ve repetitions is shown in Figure 9. More than
half of the observations are exactly at the majority rule core point.
FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Figure 9. Election outcomes in last 5 repetitions. xi denotes the ideal point of voter i.
More challenging environments involve relaxing the assumption that candidates have
complete information and implementing voting behavior with human subjects rather than
by articial actors.
Principal nding for competitive elections with a core
 When a majority rule core point exists, with enough repetition and learning, the
outcomes of an election game between two candidates converges to the Condorcet
winner. If a majority rule core point fails to exist, outcomes are concentrated in a
central region of the Pareto set, as if generated by the distribution of locations in a
mixed strategy equilibrium.
63There were ve voters in a two-dimensional space, with Euclidean preferences. Voter ideal points
were the same as in some of their committee experiments.
64McKelvey and Ordeshook (1982) also includes results from a series of elections with similar proce-
dures, but where a Condorcet winner did not exist. In this case, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
They nd that the candidate locations converge to a central area in the Pareto set, and conjecture that
behavior is close to the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game.
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3.1.2 Information aggregation by pre-election polling
The rst experiment where polls are used to aggregate information were conducted by
Plott in the mid-1970s, with the results later published in Plott (1991). In these experi-
ments, there were between 19 and 41 voters (human subjects) with ideal points in a two
dimensional space, congured so that there was a Condorcet winning point. There were
two o¢ ce-motivated candidates65 who were uninformed of the voters ideal points. All
they knew was that the policy space was a specic rectangle in two-dimensional space. In
each election, candidate positions were initialized near the edge of the policy space, far
from the Condorcet winner. At any time, either candidate could revise their platforms
by announcing a new (tentative) location. Candidates could also query voters about how
many would prefer them to move in some direction. In addition, public straw votes were
conducted periodically by the experimenter, based on the current (tentative) platforms of
the two candidates. At the end of a prespecied time period, each candidate announced
his or her nal position, which could not be changed. The election was then held, with
the winner receiving $10 and the loser $1. The data include 10 such elections with two
candidates. In 7 of 10 elections, the outcome was exactly the Condorcet point. The other
three elections resulted in outcomes very close to the Condorcet point.
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985a, 1985b) push the information question further, but
studying elections where voters have poor information about the candidate locations. In
these studies, they pursue a variety of issues, mostly related to the question of how much
information was required of voters and candidates in order for competitive elections to
converge to the Condorcet winner. Perhaps the most striking experiment was reported in
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985b) study of candidate competition in a one-dimensional
policy space. In this experiment not only did candidates have no information at all
about voters, but only half of the voters in the experiment knew where the candidates
were located. The rest of the voters were only informed about the left-right ordering of
the candidates. The key information transmission devices they explored were polls and
interest group endorsements. In a theoretical model of information aggregation adapted
from the rational expectations theory of markets, they proved that this information alone
is su¢ cient to reveal enough to voters that even the uninformed voters behave optimally,
i.e., as if they were fully informed.66 A corollary of this is that the candidates would
converge to the location of the median voter. Two sessions were conducted, each with
65There were also some three candidate elections, which are disucssed later in this survey.
66Voters also are assumed to know approximately where they stand relative to rest of the electorate on
a left right scale.
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two candidates and between 40 and 50 voters. The game was repeated eight times to
allow for learning and convergence. The experiment nds strong support for candidate
convergence as of full revelation to voters, and also nd even more surprisingly, they
converge very close to the median voter. Figure 10 shows the time path of locations of
the candidates for each of the two sessions, withMT denoting the ideal point of the median
voter, MI denoting the ideal point of the median informed voter, and MU denoting the
ideal point of the median uninformed voter.
Figure 10 here, from p. 84 of JET paper
However, in an extension of this experiment to two dimensions, candidate convergence is
much slower; only half the candidates converge to the Condorcet winner with replication.
A number of studies have followed up on this theme of limited information elections.
Dasgupta and Williams (2002) also explore the information transmission properties of
polls when some voters are informed and others are not. Their setup di¤ers in a number
of ways. First, candidates di¤er along a quality, or valence, dimension as well as a policy
dimension. The policy positions of the candidates are assigned by the computer and
publicly known. One is assigned the left-most position on a one-dimensional scale, and
the other is assigned the right-most position. Second, the quality type of each candidate is
unknown to voters at the time of election, but a subset of voters receive some information
about the quality of one of the candidates, who has an opportunity to take a costly action
to increase voter beliefs about his quality.67 A sequence of three opinion polls (straw votes)
is then conducted with all voters participating in the poll, with the outcomes publicly
observed. Then the actual election occurs and payo¤s accrue based on the outcome. In a
manner similar to McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985b), they develop a rational expectations
equilibrium model adapted to this environment, in which information of the informed
voters is transmitted to the other voters as a result of the polls. The ndings are broadly
supportive of the information aggregation properties of polls.68
67This is done by having the active candidate investing in e¤ort, before knowing his own quality level.
This produces a signal equal to the sum of the e¤ort choice and his realized quality level. The signal is
then revealed to a subset of the voters. The motivation behind this signal structure is that the active
candidate is an incumbent coming up for re-election and the signal is some measure of his performance
in o¢ ce during his rst term.
68In a related study, Lupia (1994) investigates a di¤erent mechanism for information revelation in direct
legislation elections. His experiment demonstrates that when incompletely informed voters have informa-
tion about the incentives of the author of ballot initiatives, they can use this information to increase the
likelihood they cast the same votes they would have cast had they possessed perfect information about
initiative.
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Principal ndings for information aggregation by pre-election polling
1. Poll information and interest group endorsements successfully aggregate information
even when most voters have very little information a priori.
2. This kind of public information is su¢ cient to lead to convergence of candidates to
the majority rule core point with su¢ cient repetition.
3. The convergence to the core point is much slower in two dimensional policy spaces.
4. The information aggregation properties of polls extends to aggregating information
about candidate quality.
3.1.3 Retrospective Voting
Political scientists have often wondered whether competitive electoral outcomes can arise
purely from retrospective voting. The earlier set of experiments with rational expecta-
tions and polls was entirely forward-looking and evaluation of candidates was prospective,
very much in the Downsian view of electoral competition. But many leading gures in
political science have argued that voter evaluations of candidates are backward-looking
and individual voting decisions depend largely on past records of candidates or current
economic conditions.69 Collier et al. (1987) and McKelvey and Ordeshook (1990)70, study
two-candidate elections where voters observe only the payo¤ they receive from the win-
ning candidate not even the policy adopted by the winning candidate, nor the proposed
policy (or payo¤) of the losing candidate. There are no campaigns or polls. Voters either
re-elect the incumbent or vote him/her out of o¢ ce, in which case the other candidate
becomes the new incumbent. "Voters observe historical information about their payo¤s
(real income) derived from the policies (spatial positions) of previous incumbents, but
they do not observe these policies directly. Further, to model the situation in which vot-
ers do not even conceptualize elections in terms of issues, the voters in our experiments
are uninformed about the specic relationship (payo¤ function) between an incumbents
policy and their welfare. Nor do they know that an incumbents strategy concerns the
selection of positions in some policy space." (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1990, p. 283)
Candidates are somewhat better informed, in that they know what the policy space is,
and they observe all the platforms that their opponent has adopted in the past when in
o¢ ce, as well as the past election results. However, candidates are given no information
69See Key (1966) and Fiorina (1981).
70The latter article also summarizes results from the experiments on contemporaneous information
such as poll results or endorsements.
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about the distribution of voter ideal points nor how each voter has voted in past elec-
tions. The main nding is that on average candidates converge to the median, even in
this information-poor environment (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1990b).
In the baseline treatments, candidates receive a dollar each period they are the incum-
bent. Approximate convergence of candidate platforms is not immediate but generally is
achieved by the end of the session, after many repetitions. Figure 11 illustrates platform
convergence for three di¤erent session lasting between 30 and 45 periods.
Figure 11a here. Figure 11b here Figure 11c here from Collier et al pp. 106-107 (gs 1,2,4)
This gure should be arranged as three horizontal panels, and the whole thing called "gure 11".
In the igures, the median voters ideal point is marked by the dashed line, and the points
connected by the solid line represent the winning platforms in each round (which voters of
course do not see). Platforms converged almost perfectly to the median voters ideal point
in the session illustrated in the left panel of the gure, after a brief period of volatility
at the beginning when candidates were still learning. There were several variations on
this baseline design to explore the robustness of this convergence. In the rst extension,
candidates have policy preferences. Rather than earning a xed amount when elected,
the incumbent receives a payo¤ that is a linearly increasing function of the location they
choose in the [0; 100] interval. Convergence is still achieved, although more slowly. In
the next variation, the two candidates have opposing policy preferences, one candidates
payo¤ function is linearly increasing on the [0; 100] interval, but the others is linearly
decreasing. Again, convergence is achieved, but with a clear alternation of policies. See
the middle panel of gure 11. Finally, they conducted a variation where the location of
the median voter was shifted after period 21, without informing the candidates of this
shift. Although there is a slight lag, candidates converge surprisingly fast to the new
median location. See the right panel of gure 11.
One of the collective implications of these results about elections with limited infor-
mation is that it appears to be irrational for voters to gather costly information, if other
sources of information such as polls, endorsements, incumbent past performance, and
word-of-mouth are virtually free. This point is made explicitly in Collier et al. (1989)
which explores the question with 24 laboratory elections where voters are given an oppor-
tunity to purchase information about challengers policy if elected, in addition to the free
retrospective information that all voters receive about the past performance of the incum-
bent. That paper and Williams (1991) explore voter behavior and candidate convergence
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by giving voters the option to gather costly information about candidates. They nd that
the amount of information purchased by voters is correlated in the expected (negative)
way with the stability of candidate strategies, the imprecision of the information, and the
probability of casting a pivotal vote.
While this research does not resolve long standing questions about the responsiveness
of democratic institutions, it does add to what we understand about responsiveness by
demonstrating conditions under which incompletely informed voters can generate the
electoral outcomes that they would have if better informed. This research also informs
the debate about the use of the referendum and initiative to determine policy. One answer
to the question, "Is direct legislation a useful mechanism for obtaining policy outcomes
that correspond to the will of the majority or is it a way for small, wealthy interest groups
to subvert the popular will?" is that direct legislation can be both. When voters are poorly
informed (or the electoral alternatives are reasonably complex), and there are no e¤ective
information cues available, small groups who have enough resources to obtain agenda
control can use direct legislation to obtain preferred outcomes. When meaningful cues
are available (or the e¤ect of electoral alternatives are easy to understand), then direct
legislation can be a useful tool for the implementation of majority-preferred policies.
These experiments establish two important facts. First, even in laboratory elections
where the stakes are low, election outcomes are well-approximated by median voter theory.
The Condorcet winner (core) is an excellent predictor of competitive election outcomes.
Second, this result is robust with respect to the information voters have about candidates
and the information candidates have about voters. Precious little information is needed
a result that mirrors laboratory demonstrations that markets converge quickly to com-
petitive equilibrium prices and quantities, even with poor information and few traders.
In the discipline of political science, there has been great concern about how uninformed
most of the electorate is about candidates and policy issues. One reason for this con-
cern was a widely shared belief that these information failures could doom competitive
democratic processes. The McKelvey and Ordeshook series of experiments casts doubt
on this doomsday view. Just as nancial markets can operate e¢ ciently with relatively
few uninformed traders, or with many slightly informed traders, the forces of competition
can lead to election outcomes that accurately reect public opinion, even if voters know
very little about the candidates and vice versa.71
71Of course, these experiments explore relatively simple envioronments and focus only on the main
driving force of candidate competition. Future research will need to address the role of other factors
such as voter turnout, campaign contributions, advertising, the role of parties and primaries, valence
dimensions, and so forth.
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Principal ndings for information aggregation by retrospective voting
1. Historical information about past performance of candidates is su¢ cient to lead to
convergence of candidates to the majority rule core point with su¢ cient repetition
in simple environments.
2. The ndings are robust with respect to a variety of modications of the environment,
including unannounced shifts of the median voter location and extreme candidate
policy preferences.
3. All the ndings of this section are broadly supportive of the hypothesis that com-
petitive elections can lead to Condorcet outcomes even when voters have very poor
information, in su¢ ciently simple environments.
3.2 Multicandidate elections
In many elections, more than two candidates are competing for a single position using
plurality rule. In these multicandidate elections, there is a natural ambiguity facing
voters in the form of a coordination game, and equilibrium places few restrictions on
outcomes: i.e., there are multiple Nash equilibria. To illustrate this, consider a three-
candidate election, with the candidates, A;B; and C having three distinct positions on a
one-dimensional issue scale, say the interval [ 1; 1]. Suppose there is a large number of
voters with ideal points scattered along the interval. Voters know their own ideal point,
but have only probabilistic information about the other voters. Then, in a winner-take-all
election, for any pair of candidates, fi; jg there is a Bayesian equilibrium in which only
these two candidates receive any votes, with each voter voting for whichever of the two is
closer to their ideal point. This is an equilibrium because it never (instrumentally) pays
to vote for a candidate who nobody else is voting for. Indeed there can be some other
equilibria, too (Palfrey 1989, Myerson and Weber 1995), but 2-candidate equilibria are
the only ones that are stable (Fey 2000). Voters face a coordination problem. Which
two candidates are going to be receiving votes? Will a Condorcet winner be chosen if it
exists?
Forsythe et al. (1993, 1996) explore these and other questions in a series of exper-
iments. Their laboratory elections had three categories of voters dened by di¤erent
preference orders over the three candidates. One group preferred A to B to C. The sec-
ond group preferred B to A to C, and the third group ranked C rst and was indi¤erent
between A and B. The third group was the largest, but was less than half the popula-
tion. Groups one and two were the same size. The actual payo¤ tables and preference
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congurations are given in Table 1.
Preference type Winner #Voters
A B C
1 $1.20 $0.90 $0.20 4
2 $0.90 $1.20 $0.20 4
3 $0.40 $0.40 $1.40 6
Table 1. Voter preferences in Forsythe et al. (1993,1996).
Hence, if voters voted for their rst choice, C will win, but C is a Condorcet loser, since
it is defeated by both A and B in pairwise votes. There are several equilibria, including
the two where type 1 and 2 voters coordinate on either A or B. However, because of the
special conguration of preferences and because there is complete information, sincere
voting is also an equilibrium, resulting in the Condorcet loser, C, winning.
The procedures were carefully designed to avoid repeated game e¤ects, to minimize
possible e¤ects of extraneous coordination devices, and at the same time allow subjects to
gain experience at the task.72 Each experimental session was conducted with 28 subjects
divided into 14-member voting groups, and repeated over a series of 24 periods. Thus
each session generated data for 48 elections, with 14 voters in each election. Voting groups
and preference types were randomly reshu­ ed after every election.73
First, the authors note that without any coordinating device, there is coordination
failure. Some voters in groups one and two vote strategically (i.e., for their second choice,
trying to avoid C) but many dont, and the strategic behavior is poorly coordinated, so
as a result the Condorcet loser wins 90% of the elections.
Second, they look at three kinds of coordinating devices: polls, past elections, and
ballot position. Polls allow the voters in groups 1 and 2 to coordinate their votes behind
either candidate A or candidate B. This is indeed what usually happens. The Condorcet
loser wins only 33 percent of the elections. Moreover, when either A or B is rst ranked in
the poll, the Condorcet loser wins only 16 percent of the time. Election history also helped
with coordination. There was a small bandwagon e¤ect between A and B. Whichever was
winning in past elections tended to win in future polls. Ballot position had an e¤ect on
voting strategies, but the e¤ect was too small to inuence election outcomes.
Their second paper looks at alternative voting procedures, comparing plurality rule
72For example the alternatives were labeled Orange (A), Green (B), and Blue (C) to avoid alphabetical
order as a coordinating device.
73An exception is Forsythe et al. (1996), where voting groups were reassigned only after every eight
elections.
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to the Borda Count (BC) and Approval Voting (AV). Both procedures worked better
than plurality rule, in the sense that the Condorcet loser was more easily defeated. Both
procedures tended to result in relatively close three-way races with A or B usually winning.
Plurality, in contrast, produced close three-way races, but with C usually winning. A later
study by Bassi (2008) delves more deeply into a comparison of strategic behavior under
these three voting rule. That study di¤ers from the earlier studies in three ways: the
preference prole, the number of voters (5 instead of 14), and the number of alternatives
(4 instead of 3). The two proles employed in the design have the property that iterated
deletion of dominated strategies eliminates all but one equilibrium, so the coordination
problem created by multiple equilibria is not present. The main nding is that voting
is most sophisticated (i.e., most consistent with equilibrium) under plurality and least
sophisticated under Borda count, with approval voting in between.
Rietz et al. (1998) follow up this experiment with a very similar one that explored
whether campaign contributions can have a similar coordination e¤ect. In this variation,
before each election, each voter independently decided on campaign contributions. Each
voter was allowed to contribute (at real expense) up to $0.20 in penny increments. These
contributions could be spread across any subset of candidates, or none at all. The total
contributions for each candidate were then publicly revealed prior to the election stage.
The results were similar to the results from the polling treatment, with the Condorcet
loser winning only 33% of the time. The type 1 and 2 voters generally coordinated on
whichever candidate, A or B, received the most contributions. Moreover, even accounting
for its direct cost, campaign contributions increased coordination enough to lead to higher
overall e¢ ciency compared with no contributions.
Another question is whether the voterscontribution decisions were consistent with
an equilibrium of the two stage game. The paper does not o¤er any model of equilibrium
for the more complicated game, where the rst stage is contribution and the second
stage is voting, but instead argues that the contribution levels do not seem irrational, at
least for the type 1 and 2 voters, in the sense that the marginal benet from an additional
incremental contribution is lower on average than the cost, while the marginal benet from
the last nickel contributed is higher.74 However, this is done as a back-of-the-envelope
calculation rather than a careful statistical analysis, and there is a signicant free rider
dimension in the contribution stage.
There are a number of other papers that conduct experiments on related three-
candidate coordination games. The earliest work is by Plott (1991)75, who investigates
74On the other hand, it seems harder to rationalize the contribution decisions of the type 3 voters.
75The results were obtained much earlier than the publication date, and presented at the 1977 Public
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3-candidate races in a two-dimensional policy space. The setting is di¤erent in the sense
that candidate locations were endogenous, and were sequentially chosen, and mixed in
with occasional straw votes, with the same procedures as described for the 2-candidate
elections reported in the same paper. Thus, candidates were adjusting positions over time,
and there was a majority rule core. Unfortunately, there is little guidance in the way of
useful predictions based on Nash equilibria. Still, winning candidate locations tended to
converge to the core, but with only slightly more more variance than in the 2-candidate
baseline treatment. In the ten 3-candidate elections, three outcomes were exactly at the
Condorcet point and the seven others were close. See Figure 12.
Figure 12 about here.
Caption Winning platforms in three candidate elections. Plott (1991 p. 22)
Felsenthal et al. (1988) and Rapoport et al (1991) examine bloc voting in three can-
didate elections, where all voters with identical preferences vote identically. Their design
considers a variety of preference proles in order to compare the predictions of several
alternative voting models for selecting among the many Nash equilibria of the game. They
propose a model of equilibrium selection based on implicit cooperation between voting
blocs with similar but not identical preferences. For several of the preference proles they
study, coordination is consistent with their model a large fraction of the time.
Gerber et al. (1996) and Morton and Rietz (2008) explore the multicandidate coor-
dination problem with di¤erent electoral institutions. Gerber et al. look at cumulative
voting when two rather than one candidate is to be elected, to see if it can ameliorate
problems of minority under-representation due to miscoordination. Voters are endowed
with two votes. In the baseline treatment they can cast one vote for each of two di¤er-
ent candidates, only one vote for one candidate, or no votes for any candidate. In the
cumulative voting treatment, they have an additional option to cast two votes for one
candidate. The top two vote getters are elected. They use the same preference prole as
in Forsythe et al., and payo¤s are additive with respect to the two winners of an election.
In the baseline treatment, the theoretical prediction is that C will never win, but C should
win under cumulative voting. The data closely matches the theory. Morton and Rietz
consider runo¤ elections where winning requires a clear majority. If there is no majority
winning in the rst round, then the two top candidates engage in a runo¤ election in the
second round. This also helps solve the coordination problem in a similar way to polls:
Choice conference.
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whichever of the two minority candidates is in the runo¤ wins.
To summarize, multicandidate elections are an intriguing and immensely complex
brand of coordination problem. Outcomes are extremely sensitive to the ne details of
the voting institutions as well as the myriad of coordinating devices related to those insti-
tutions (polls, history, party labels, campaign contributions, and even cheap talk). This
would seem to be a rich area for both experimental and theoretical research. An obvious
direction to explore is to look at the endogenous entry of candidates and endogenous pol-
icy positions of candidates. All these experiments x the number of competing candidates,
and even x their policies (except for Plott 1991).
Principal ndings for multicandidate elections
1. In the absence of coordination devices, simple plurality rule can lead to poor out-
comes (Condorcet losers) in multicandidate elections
2. Very simple coordination devices, such as polls, publicly revealed campaign contri-
butions, and past electoral outcomes, can help alleviate coordination problems.
3. If a Condorcet winner exists, competitive elections under plurality rule with three
candidates converges toward the core point, but with more variance than in two
candidate elections.
4. Voting rules other than plurality rule (Borda, approval, runo¤, etc.) can outperform
plurality rule in specic environments.
5. All of the above results are based on a very limited set of environments that have
been studied in the laboratory.
3.3 Candidate competition with valence
In many elections, candidates are asymmetric. A widely cited source of asymmetry is
incumbency. It is generally thought that incumbents have a signicant advantage over
challengers, above and beyond any advantage (or disadvantage) they may have due to spa-
tial location. Other sources of asymmetries include valence characteristics of candidates,
such as a familiar name, movie or athletic star status, height, articulateness, and person-
ality traits. The two key aspects of these valence characteristics are: (1) most voters value
them, independent of the candidate platforms; and (2) they are xed, rather than being
chosen by the candidates. With strategic competition, candidate asymmetries have inter-
esting and systematic implications for equilibrium platforms. These asymmetric contests
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have been studied recently both theoretically and empirically in game theoretic models by
Erikson and Palfrey (2000), Ansolabehere and Snyder (1999), Groseclose (2002), Aragones
and Palfrey (2003, 2005), and others.
Groseclose (2002) and Aragones and Palfrey (2003, 2005) show that valence asymme-
tries lead to candidate divergence, even in one-dimensional spatial models. The equilibria,
which can be either mixed strategy equilibria or pure strategy equilibria (if candidates
have policy preferences and there is enough exogenous uncertainty) have two interesting
features. First, a disadvantaged candidate will tend to locate at more extreme locations
in the policy space than the advantaged candidate.76 Second, the extent to which this
happens depends on the distribution of voters, in a systematic way. As the distribution
of voter ideal points becomes more polarized (e.g., a bimodal distribution), the disadvan-
taged candidate moves toward the center, while the advantaged candidate moves in the
opposite direction, and adopts more extreme positions.
Aragones and Palfrey (2004) report the results of an experiment designed to test
whether these systematic e¤ects can be measured in a simplied spatial competition
environment. Candidates simultaneously choose one of three locations, {L,C,R}. The
location of the median voter is unknown, but they both know the distribution. The
median is located at C with probability , and located at either L or R with probability
(1   )=2. Candidate 1 is the advantaged candidate; he wins if the median voter is
indi¤erent (in policy space) between the two candidates, which happens if the candidates
locate in the same position, or if one chooses L and the other R. Their main treatment
variable is the distribution of the median, , which in di¤erent sessions takes on values
of either 1=5, 1=3, or 3=5. The equilibrium is characterized by a pair of probabilities of
locating at the central location, one for the advantaged candidate (p) and one for the
disadvantaged candidate (q). These equilibrium probabilities are ordered as follows.
0 < q3=5 < q1=3 < q1=5 <
1
3
< p3=5 < p1=3 < p1=5 < 1
The data perfectly reproduce this ordering of candidate locations, for all treatments,
and the results are quantitatively close to the mixed strategy equilibrium choice probabil-
ities. The result appears to be robust, and has been replicated successfully with di¤erent
subject pools and instruction protocols. There are also now a number of theoretical re-
76The intuition is twofold. All else equal, both candidates would like to locate near the center, because
thats where the median voter is. However, the disadvantaged candidate can only win by distancing
himself away from the advantaged candidate, which leads to an incentive to move away from the me-
dian. Mixing occurs because the advantaged candidate can win by matching any pure strategy of the
disadvantaged candidate.
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sults when the policy space is continuous instead of discrete (Aragones and Palfrey 2003,
Hummel 2010), and a natural "next experiment" in this area would be to run a similar
experiment but in an explicitly spatial environment.
Asymmetric contests have also been studied in economics experiments. Perhaps the
best known is the study of tournaments rewards, by Bull and Schotter (1990), and interest
in studying these asymmetric contests has resurfaced recently in studies that look at the
tournament structure of labor markets as a possible reason for gender wage di¤erentials
and glass ceilings (Gneezy et al. 2003). It would be interesting to extend this tournament
approach to study campaign spending in political campaigns. The problem is also closely
related to all-pay auctions, which have received some recent attention by experimental
economists.
Principal ndings for elections with a valence dimension
1. In two way races along one dimension, higher quality candidates tend to adopt more
moderate positions.
2. This e¤ect diminishes with more polarized distributions of voters.
4 Voter Turnout
Fiorina (1978) dubbed it "The paradox that ate rational choice theory." A typical state-
ment of the paradox is the following. In mass elections, if a signicant fraction of voters
were to turn out to vote, the probability any voter is pivotal is nearly zero. But if the
probability of being pivotal is zero, it is irrational to vote because the expected benets
would then be outweighed by any tiny cost associated with voting. Hence the fact that
we see signicant turnout in mass elections is inconsistent with rational choice theory.
Voters must be voting for some other reasons, and rational choice theory is not a useful
approach to understanding political participation.
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) take issue with the logic of the paradox. They point
out that turnout should be modeled as a "participation game", and that zero turnout
is not an equilibrium of the game, even with rather high voting costs. In fact, as the
number of eligible voters becomes large (even in the millions or hundreds of millions),
they prove the existence of Nash equilibria where two-party elections are expected to be
quite close and turnout is approximately twice the fraction of the electorate that prefers
the underdog. Thus, in tight races where there is no clear favorite equilibrium turnout can
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be nearly 100%. These high turnout equilibria also have some other intuitive properties;
for example, supporters of the underdog (who face less of a free rider problem within their
group) turn out at a higher rate than the supporters of the favorite.
Schram and Sonnemans (1996) describe results from an experiment designed to not
only test the Palfrey-Rosenthal theory of turnout, but also to compare turnout in Winner-
take-all (W) elections to turnout in Proportional Representation (PR). They studied 2-
party elections with 12, 14, or 28 voters in each election. Voters were equally split between
the two parties, except in the 14 voter treatment, where there were 6 voters for party A and
8 for party B. In the PR elections, the cost of voting was 70, and the payo¤ to all members
of party j was equal to 222  vj where vj was party js vote share. In the W elections, the
cost of voting was 100 and all members of the winning party received 250, with ties broken
randomly. All of this was made common knowledge by presenting the subjects with a
common set of instructions.77 Each session ran one of these treatments repeatedly, with
feedback, over a sequence of 20 elections. It was not a symmetric experimental design,
with most sessions using W elections. There were also some secondary treatments, and
some additional variations explored in Schram and Sonnemans (1996b). The main ndings
were:
(a) Turnout in the early (inexperienced) W elections started around 50%, and declined
to around 25% by the last election. The decline was steady, and its not clear whether it
would have declined even further with more experience.
(b) Turnout in the early (inexperienced) PR elections started around 30%, and declined
to around 20% in the last two elections. The decline was very gradual in these elections,
and its not clear whether it would have declined even further with more experience.
(c) The e¤ects of electorate size and party size are negligible.
Exactly how to interpret these results is a di¢ cult question. The theoretical predic-
tions of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) for theW elections are somewhat ambiguous because
there are many equilibria, including pure strategy equilibria (except in the 14-voter case),
totally mixed strategy equilibria, and mixed-pure equilibria. In fact, the range of possible
equilibrium turnout rates in each of the W games conducted in the experiment includes
much of the entire [0; 1] interval. The decline of turnout may indicate that behavior is
equilibrating, and might eventually converge to the low turnout totally-mixed equilibrium
(between 2% and 5% in the W games), if the experiments could have lasted long enough.
But this is highly conjectural. The symmetric equilibrium of the PR game was slightly
higher, about 10%. Again, one might conjecture that voter behavior is converging on this
77The instructions used neutral terminology, rather than presenting the task as a voting decision.
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equilibrium, but that is also highly speculative, and can only be answered denitively
with more experienced subjects (longer sequences of elections), or perhaps an alternative
design.
The biggest puzzle in the data is why initial turnout rates in the PR elections were
so much lower than initial turnout rates in the W elections. A possible explanation is
coordination failure and multiple equilibria. While both voting rules can have multiple
equilibria, it is only the W elections for which equilibria exist with high turnout rates
(above 50%). One interpretation of these experiments is that the severe multiple equi-
librium problems identied by the theory present tremendous strategic ambiguity to the
subjects and render the early round data almost useless for evaluating the e¤ect of voting
rules and electorate size on turnout.78
Levine and Palfrey (2007) take a di¤erent approach to addressing comparative statics
questions about the e¤ect of electorate size, relative party size, and voting cost on turnout
in W elections. Their design follows Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), which extended their
1983 game-theoretic analysis of turnout to allow for heterogeneity of voting costs and
asymmetric information. In that model, all voters in a party have the same benet of
winning, but each voter has a privately known voting cost that is an independent draw
from a commonly known distribution of costs. The symmetric equilibrium of these games,
with equal sized parties, is characterized by a simple cutpoint decision rule, where voters
with costs less than a critical cost, c vote and voters with costs greater than c abstain.
For many cost distributions, there is a unique equilibrium cutpoint, so the coordination
problem is completely eliminated. The analysis is extended easily to unequally sized
parties, with the cutpoints typically di¤erent for the two parties.
They conduct an experiment where electorate size can take on values of 3, 9, 27, and
51. Winning pays o¤ 105, losing pays o¤ 5, and a tie pays o¤ 55.79 Neutral instructions
were used, with no mention of voting, winning, or losing. The voting cost was framed
as an opportunity cost, the equivalent of an abstention bonus. For each electorate size,
N , there are two party size treatments, called toss-up (T) and landslide (L). In the T
treatment, the larger party has N+1
2
members and the smaller party has N 1
2
members. In
the L treatment, the larger party has 2N
3
members and the smaller party has N
3
members.
78Despite the problems with multiple equilibria, the experiments provide an interesting source of data
for understanding coordination failure and the dynamics of behavior in coordination games. Below we
also discuss the QRE analysis of these games by Goeree and Holt (2005), which provides a possible
explanation for the early round di¤erences in W and PR turnout rates and the eventual decline and
convergence of the two turnout rates.
79We chose to not to break ties randomly because there were already several random variables in the
design (the assignment of voting costs and the assignment to parties), and this was simpler. Instead, ties
paid the expected value of a random tie break.
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This produces a 4 2 design.80 In all elections, there is a unique Nash equilibrium. The
comparative statics of the equilibrium in the various treatments are simple and intuitive.
Turnout should be decreasing in N for both parties - the size e¤ect. Turnout should
be higher for both parties in the T treatment than in the L treatment - the competition
e¤ect. Turnout should be higher for the smaller party than the larger party - the underdog
e¤ect, with the exception of N = 3, an unusual case where the larger party has higher
equilibrium turnout.
The aggregate results conclusively support the Nash equilibrium comparative statics.
Figure 13 below compares the observed (vertical axis) upset rates81, and close election
rates82 to the Nash equilibrium predictions (horizontal axis) for all the experimental treat-
ments. The observation/prediction pairs line up almost exactly on the 45% line. A simple
linear regression gives an intercept of 0:01, a slope of 1:03, with an R2 = :99:
F igure 13 here. (Fig 2 from APSR p. 150)
Nearly all of the predicted qualitative comparative statics results are observed. In
fact, all the theoretical predictions about the competition e¤ect83 and the underdog e¤ect
were found in the data. All but one size e¤ect prediction was observed.84 The results
are also very close quantitatively to the equilibrium predictions, with one caveat. The
turnout probabilities are slightly less responsive to the treatment parameters than equi-
librium theory predicts. This is particularly noticeable for the largest electorate, where
the turnout probabilities are signicantly greater than the predicted ones.
These attenuated treatment e¤ects are shown to be consistent with the logit version of
regular quantal response equilibrium (QRE). QRE replaces the assumption of perfect best
response to noisy best response. In its most general formulation (McKelvey and Palfrey
1995, 1998) this is modeled by adding privately observed payo¤ disturbances associated
with each strategy of each player, and at QRE is dened as a Bayesian equilbrium of
a game in which the joint distribution of all these additive payo¤ disturbances is com-
mon knowledge. In all applications to date, it is assumed that the disturbances for each
individual are are i.i.d., which implies that response functions are simply smoothed out
80When N = 3, the toss-up and landslide treatments are the same.
81The upset rate equals the probability the minority candidate wins.
82The close election rate is the probability the election is either tied or one away from a tie. That is,
the probability a voter is pivotal.
83The competition e¤ect is also supported in a recent experiment by Grosser and Schram (2010). They
compare turnout in 12 voter elections where the larger party can consist of 6, 7, 8, or 9 voters.
84The size e¤ect is supported with the exception for the tossup races with 27 versus 51 voters, where
turnout was slightly more (less than half a percentage point) in the 51 voter case than the 27 voter case.
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best response functions, with the choice frequencies of strategies by each player monotone
in expected payo¤s.85 A regular QRE is a xed point of these smoothed out monotone
response functions, just as Nash equilibrium is a xed point of best response correspon-
dences. A relatively tractable parametrization uses logit response functions, so the the
probability player i chooses strategy sij, pij is given by:
pij =
eUij(p)P
sij2Si e
Uij(p)
:
where  2 [0;1). Then p is a logit QRE (sometimes called a logit equilibrium) of a
particular game, for a particular value of , if and only if, for all i; j:
pij =
eUij(p
)P
sij2Si e
Uij(p)
Thus, for any game, the logit specication denes a family of quantal response equilibria
parameterized by . When  = 0 players are completely payo¤ unrepsonsive and choose
all strategies with equal probability. Limit points, when  ! 1; are Nash equilbria,
although not all Nash equilibria can be approched by sequence of Logit QRE.86 For this
reason, logit QRE provides a method of selecting among Nash equilibria. In fact, for
almost all games there is a unique selection from the Nash equilibrium, called the Logit
solution of a game, dened as the unique limit point that is connected in the graph to
the  = 0 equilibrium. In many games, the logit equilibria imply denitive comparative
statics or directional biases from Nash equilibrium choice probabilities.
Voter turnout games provide a convenient illustration of how such biases can arise, even
though the payo¤disturbances to the players that underly the Logit model are completely
unbiased. In particular, the Logit QRE of these games predicts higher turnout than the
Nash predictions for large electorates, and lower turnout in the N = 3 treatment. Levine
and Palfrey (2007) use their data to estimate one free parameter of a logit QRE model, ;
based on their entire dataset. Then, based on this estimate, they can extrapolate to what
turnout would be in mass elections with hundreds of millions of potential voters. Such
an exercise implies that, for plausible distributions of voting costs, equilibrium turnout
85The distribution of disturbances can be di¤erent from di¤erent individuals. See Rogers et al. (2010).
With no restrictions on the distribution of disturbances, choice frequencies are not necessarily monotone,
and in fact can be anything. This is a general property of additive random utility models. See Haile et
al. (2008) and Goeree et al. (2005).
86The denition has been generalized to extensive form games (AQRE). Limit points of AQRE as
!1 are sequenial equilibria.
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rates in the logit QRE model are on the same order of magnitude as what we observe
in nation-wide elections in the U.S. Since 1970, turnout in the U.S. national elections as
a percentage of the voting age population has ranged from 49% to 55% in presidential
elections and 36% to 47% in midterm elections. If the voting costs were positive for all
eligible voters and uniformly distributed, and the value of being a dictator in the election
(i.e., the benet of unilaterally changing the election outcome from your least preferred
candidate to your most preferred candidate) is, for the average voter, 100 times the cost of
voting, then QRE expected turnout - based on the logit parameter estimate in the paper
- in large elections is approximately 48%.
Furthermore, the logit specication of stochastic choice also turns out to t the individ-
ual choice data remarkably well. The stochastic choice model species that the probability
a voter votes in a given treatment is a smooth and continuously decreasing function of
voting cost, and is anchored by the treatment-specic equilibrium cutpoint (i.e., the point
where a voter is indi¤erent between voting and abstaining given the other votersturnout
strategies). At such an indi¤erence point, the stochastic choice model predicts that the
voter is equally likely to vote or abstain. Figure 14 shows the turnout rates as a function
of normalized87 voting costs including all treatments pooled together. The points in the
gure indicate the observed turnout frequency for a particular treatment and party at
each normalized voting cost, with horizontal bars indicating the overall average turnout
at 0.03 intervals. The solid decreasing curve is the logit choice probability function at the
QRE, for the estimated value of  = 7.
Figure 14 here. (Fig 4 from APSR p. 152)
Goeree and Holt (2005) apply a QRE analysis of symmetric equilibria for a broad
range of symmetric complete information game theoretic models of participation. They
consider the class of games where N players each have a binary choice (participate or
not), and the expected payo¤ to a player for participating or not, are given by P (p;N)
and NP (p;N), respectively, if all N   1 other players are participating with probability
p.88 Examples of such games include variations on threshold public goods games (van de
Kragt, et al. 1983, Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984, 1988, 1991a, 1991b,1994), the volunteers
dilemma (Murnighan et al. 1993, Diekmann 1985,1986, Franzen 1995), voter turnout
87In order to pool all treatments together, the horizontal axis represents the normalized voting cost,
i.e., the di¤erence between the voting cost and the equilibrium indi¤erence point (which varies across
treatments).
88Their analysis can be extended to studying quasi-symmetric equilibria in asymmetric participation
games.
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(Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983, 1985), congestion games, and strategic entry in markets
(Meyer et al. 1992, Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Fischbacher and Thoni 2001, Sundali et
al. 1995). Goeree and Holts analysis organizes a wide range of observed behavior in
experiments, including some that had been considered anomalous from the standpoint of
traditional Nash equilibrium theory.89
A particularly relevant result for the present survey by Goeree and Holt (2005) is the
application of the QRE approach to the Schram and Sonnemans voter turnout studies
described at the beginning of section 4. First, as in the Levine and Palfrey analysis
with respect to voter turnout games with private information, QRE turnout rates are
biased toward 50%, compared to the Nash equilibria. Goeree and Holt demonstrate this
is also true for complete information voting games, using the low turnout symmetric
equilibrium as the relevant benchmark. For relatively low levels of  (e.g., high error
rates by inexperienced players), they show that turnout will be higher for W elections
than in PR elections, but for higher values of  the di¤erences are smaller and for some
parameter values completely disappears. Moveover, for both voting rules turnout rates
decline monotonically in . All three of these properties are mirrored in the Schram and
Sonnemans study, as noted above.
The approach of modeling turnout as a Bayesian game with privately known voting
costs has recently been extended to compare turnout in PR vs. W electoral systems by
Herrera et al. (2013) and Kartal (2013). Theoretically it can be shown that equilibirium
turnout is generally higher in W if the election is competitive and higher in PR if the
election is a landslide. The intuition is that turnout in W is highly responsive to expected
closeness, while turnout in PR is not. The experiments reported in those papers provide
qualied support for this. This provides yet another alternative explanation for the higher
turnouts in PR elections that were reported in Schram and Sonnemans (1996), although
costs were homogeneous and common knowledge in that experiment.90
Du¤y and Tavits (2008) conduct an experiment based on the complete information
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) model that, in addition to observing turnout decisions by
individual voters, also elicits beliefs from individual voters about the probability of a close
election, using a proper scoring rule. The objective of the design is to have a more direct
test of the pivotal voter hypothesis, and allow one to sort out possible deviations from
equilibrium depending on whether they are due to incorrect beliefs about the probability
89Cason and Mui (2004) independently proposed QRE as an explanation to some results they observe
in participation games.
90Theoretically, there is a parallel between QRE in complete information turnout games with homo-
geneous costs and Bayesian equilibria of the turnout games with privately known costs, because the
privately known costs can be interpreted as additive payo¤ disturbances.
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of being pivotal, or other sources that have been hypothesized such as expressive voting
(discussed below). The former can be measured by comparing the belief about being
pivotal to the empirical distribution of margin of victory; the latter can be measured by
comparing a voters actual turnout choice with the turnout choice that would be optimal
given their beliefs about being pivotal. Regarding the former, they nd that voters
reported beliefs about the probability of a close election are generally higher than the
actual frequencies in the experiment, although the bias in beliefs declines signicantly with
experience. Regarding the latter, they nd that turnout rates are positively correlated
with reported beliefs about pivot probabilities, as one would expect. However, voters
systematically turn out much less frequently than they should given their beliefs. In fact,
they also vote less than what would be optimal if they actually held empirically accurate
beliefs, or even if they had the equilibrium beliefs.
There are a number of possible explanations for these apparently contradictory nd-
ings. On the one hand, if subjects are risk neutral, then either they are clearly not
optimizing given their beliefs, or the belief elicitation procedure failed.91 An alternative
explanation is risk aversion, which would have (at least) two e¤ects in their experiment.
First, risk aversion would bias reported beliefs upward in the direction of .5 under the
Brier scoring rule. Second, risk aversion would lead to reduced turnout, since voting re-
sults in a certain loss in exchange for an uncertain gain. In any case, the data clearly cast
some doubt on the notion that non-negligible turnout rates in mass elections are mainly
due to voters overestimating the probability of being pivotal.
Grosser and Schram (2010) also use the 1983 Palfrey-Rosenthal participation game
model as the basis for their study of the e¤ect of pre-election polling on turnout. In their
design, laboratory electorates of size 12 are divided into two parties of relative sizes 9-3,
8-4, 7-5, 6-6, 5-7, 4-8, or 3-9. The main treatment variable is whether or not voters are
informed about the exact relative sizes of the parties (the "polling" treatment) or only
told the probability distribution of these relative sizes.92 There was no additional private
information beyond a voters knowledge of his own party preference. Benets and costs
were the same for all voters, and this was common knowledge. They nd that many
of their results are well explained by the logit QRE. The two main ndings are (i) that
polling led to higher turnout on average, with the greatest e¤ect being when voters were
informed the party split was 6-6; and (ii) that, with full information, turnout was higher
91Some recent papers have cast doubt on the reliability of elicited beliefs from subjects during the
course of a decision or game theory experiment. See Palfrey and Wang (2010) and several of the papers
they cite.
92Voters were assigned to parties in the following way. First, three voters were assigned to each party.
Then the remaining six voters were each assigned to one or the other party by independent coin tosses.
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in more competitive elections. The second e¤ect was not just due to higher turnout in
the 6-6 cases. However, the rst e¤ect is entirely driven by the 6-6 cases. This could be
due to multiple equilibria, as 100% turnout is a second symmetric Nash equilibrium in
the 6-6 elections.
In a second study of informational e¤ects on turnout, Grosser and Schram (2006) study
the role of information about other votersturnout decisions.93 In particular, they are
interested in identifying whether knowledge of other votersturnout decision can a¤ect a
voters turnout decision. This could have potentially important ramications for election
policies such as early voting and news delays on exit polls and election day returns. They
do so in a similar complete information 6-6 voter turnout game, but half of the voters in
each party are "early" voters, and the remaining late voters can observe some information
about the early voting before deciding whether or not to vote.94 There are three di¤erent
information treatments. In the baseline, late voters are given no information. In the
second treatment, late voters are told the turnout decision of exactly one of the early voters
but are not told which party that voter belonged to. In the third treatment late voters
are told the turnout decision of exactly one of the early voters and also told which party
that voter belonged to. In the last treatment, the early voters are told in advance whether
their vote would be observed by a member of the same party or a di¤erent party. Each
late voter is told about one early voters turnout decision. Cases are distinguished where
the voters are allies (support the same group) or adversaries (with opposing preferences)
and where they are uncertain about each others preferences. From the quasi-symmetric
equilibrium Grosser and Schram solve for, two key hypotheses emerge. First, information
of this kind is predicted to increase overall turnout. Second, turnout rates for early voters
are higher than for late voters, largely because early voters may vote in either stage.95
Both comparative static predictions are borne out in the data; however the turnout rates
for either kind of voter in nearly all the treatments is very far from the equilibrium levels.
This is probably due to the fact that the game is plagued by multiple equilibria.96 Even
the no-information game has two quasi-symmetric equilibria ranging in turnout from 10%
93There is a large and growing literature in political science that uses eld experiments and natural
experiments to study various informational e¤ects on voter turnout. See for example Gerber and Green
(2000) and Lassen (2005).
94Early voters can vote in the second stage if they abstain in the rst stage.
95Surprisingly, turnout rates are 50% higher for early voters than late voters in the no information
treatment, contrary to the symmetric equilibrium turnout rates. This huge asymmetry suggests that the
labeling of early voters and late voters may allow groups to coordinate on asymmetric turnout equilibria.
96In the positive information treatments, the game is a signaling game, which introduces additional
possible equilibria, and may even enable subjects to coordinate on asymmetric equilibria. They also
conduct a "partners" treatment, with 99 repetitions, so the data may reect a mixture of asymmetric
equilibria.
65
to 90%.97
Finally, there is a small literature designed to test the hypothesis that some voters
vote expressively. That is, rather than voting to a¤ect the outcome, they vote as an
expression of what is "the right thing to do". These are in fact, complicated public goods
problems. In all of these experiments, one of the two outcomes is socially benecial, while
the other outcome maximizes private benets. As in public goods experiments, the private
monetary benets, but the social utility of subjects from the outcomes is not controlled.
Costs are controlled indirectly by implementing treatments that di¤er in the probability
a vote will be pivotal. However, just as in standard turnout models, the probability a
vote will be pivotal is endogenous and depends on other playerssocial utility as well as
other playersexpectations about other players, etc.
The basic idea, due to Tullock (1971), is that some people who would prefer not to
contribute to the public good, may indeed by willing to vote (expressively) in favor of the
socially good outcome if they believe their vote is unlikely to be decisive. By doing so,
they can express a socially good view at low expected cost, the "low cost hypothesis".
The comparative static of interest is whether the probability of voting for the socially
good outcome decreases in the pivot probability.98 Various experimental designs have
been exploited with mixed results.
Several studies have looked at quorum elections, where everyone in the group is forced to
contribute and the proceeds donated to a charity, if and only if the number of "yes" votes
exceeds the specied quorum.99 The initial study was by Carter and Guerette (1992),
and they found weak support for expressive voting with one parameter set and no sup-
port for their other treatment, using an individual choice design where the experimenter
manipulated beliefs about pivot probabilities. Tyran (2004) conducted experiments with
a large numbers of subjects (220) and di¤erent voting thresholds (quorums) and elicited
beliefs about subjectsexpectations that the quota would be met or exceeded rather than
directly manipulating pivot probabilities.100 He nds a lot of heterogeneity across the
voters. Approximately 60% of the voters are purely instrumental, and either always vote
yes or always vote no for all quora. The remaining voters, however, mostly do not exhibit
behavior that is consistent with the low cost hypothesis. The authors suggest alternative
explanations of their behavior in terms of bandwagon e¤ects or conformist behavior, ob-
97Observed turnout in that treatment is slightly under 50%.
98Purely instrumental voters would have an incentive to vote their true preference, since there is no
direct cost to voting. regardless of the (positive) probability their vote is decisive.
99In some variations, only "yes" voters are required to make a contribution if the vote exceeds the
quorum.
100This is not equivalent to eliciting the beliefs about pivot probabilities.
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serving that subjects tonded to be more likely to vote yes when they report beliefs that
the proposal is more likely to pass.101 Fischer (1996) nds some support for the low cost
hypothesis, but the experiment is less controlled; it was conducted as a classroom exercise
by the lecturer, and group sizes were not carefully controlled.
Feddersen et al. (2009) conduct an experiment closer to the standard costly voting
designs discussed earlier in this section. There were NA voters in favor of A, NB voters
in favor of B, and a subset n of the B voters were designated as active. Only the active
B voters were allowed to vote. They decided simultaneously to either vote for A, vote for
B, or abstain. Voting for one of the alternatives resulted in a voting cost, c. One of the n
active B voters was then selected and the outcome was determined by that voters vote.
If they abstained the outcome was determined by a coin toss. Thus, the pivot probability
is directly controlled by varying n. Also, note that the pivot probability is exogenous,
and doesnt depend on the other active votersdecisions. In all cases, NA>NB and A
voters have more intense induced preferences, so a selsh vote by a B voter is to vote for
B and an ethically expressive vote is for A, the group payo¤ maximizing outcome. They
nd (a) average turnout about 40%, with somewhat more selsh than ethical voting; (b)
insignicant responses of ethical voting to pivot probabilities; (c) large and signicant
e¤ects of the pivot probability on selsh voting; and (d) the probability of voting selshly
decreases in NA, with no e¤ect of NB. In summary, this study is the cleanest laboratory
study yet of expressive voting, but it nds mixed results. The fact that there is nearly
as much A voting as B voting suggests there is some degree of ethical voting, but failure
of a number of predicted comparative statics cast some doubt on the theory as a useful
predicter (or explanation) of how voting outcomes respond to changes in the underlying
driving variables such as voting cost, relative party size, and electorate size.
Principal ndings for voter turnout
1. In experiments with direct costs of voting that are private information (e.g., Levine
and Palfrey (2007), Herrera et al. (2013), Du¤y and Tavits (2008)), many of the
comparative statics predictions of the game theoretic instrumental voting model are
observed in the data. This includes the size e¤ect, competition e¤ect, and underdog
e¤ect. The bottom line is that voters are more likely to vote when they are more
likely to be pivotal, or believe they are more likely to be pivotal
2. In most studies there is higher turnout that is predicted in equilibrium with purely
101The question of causality is more complicated. These two tasks (voting and reporting beliefs) are
not entirely independent. By voting "yes" a voter increase the probability that the quota is achieved.
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instrumental voting.
3. The logit quantal response equilibrium model accounts for much of the observed
over-voting, and also the occasional observations of undervoting.
4. Experimental studies have found important di¤erences in aggregate turnout between
proportional representation and winner-take-all elections, and these di¤erences are
qualitatively consistent with instrumental voting theory.
5. The low cost hypothesis about expressive voting over charitable contributions, pro-
posed by Tullock, has relatively little support in the data.
5 Information aggregation in committees
The earlier sections of this chapter discussed experiments designed to address questions
of preference aggregation. Given a feasible set of policies, a prole of preferences of the
political actors (voters, legislators, etc.), and a political institution, what outcomes will
result. Then, as we vary the prole of preferences and the feasible set of policies, xing
the political institution, a picture emerges about how that particular political institution
transforms diverse preferences into social choices.
This section discusses experiments aimed at understanding an equally important set of
questions in social choice theory: how political institutions aggregate the diverse private
information of the political actors. While in some cases the aggregation of preferences
and information interact in complex ways, most of the political economy research on
information aggregation has focused on the pure common values case. The political actors
are like-minded and thus have identical preferences, and they must decide on a policy
where the payo¤ is uncertain and depends on the state of the world. Although the state
is unknown, each actor has some private information about the state of the world. Thus,
not only does the committee have limited information about the payo¤ relevant state, but
this information is dispersed across the actors. How do di¤erent political institutions pull
this information together into a collective decision? Because individuals have identical
preferences, one can make unambiguous welfare comparisons across institutions if some
institutions lead to more informative decisions than others. That is, in this class of models,
an institution is better the more successfully it reects all of the dispersed information.
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5.1 Strategic Voting in the Condorcet Jury Model
Marquis de Condorcet was the rst to formally address this question and he presented a
mathematical argument for the superiority of majority rule as way to aggregate dispersed
information when everyone has common preferences. His very simple voting model, the
Condorcet JuryModel (CJM) has survived for over two centuries, and is still the workhorse
model of information aggregation in political science. There are two equally likely states
of the world, a and b and each voter (juror) has a privately known clue (or hunch) as
to which state of the world is more likely, in the form of a binary signal,  or . The
voters must collectively decide on one of two possible policies, A and B, where all voters
prefer A in state a and B in state b. If the individual clues are at all informative (e.g.,
prfjag = prfjbg = q > 0:5), then as the number of voters gets large, all voters voting
for the policy they personally think is best given their private information, the probability
that a majority rule vote will result in the correct decision goes to 1 as the number of
voters becomes large. The result is a simple example of the law of large numbers.
A watershed paper by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) raises serious questions about
Condorcets implicit assumption that all voters will vote naively, that is, vote as if they
were the only voter. They formally recast the CJM as a voting game and study the
properties of the Nash equilibria of the game. They show that the common assumption of
naive voting is generally inconsistent with equilibrium behavior. Instead, the equilibrium
of the game can be quite complicated, and can lead to counterintuitive and perverse
results. These equilibrium voting strategies are quite sensitive to the details of the voting
procedure as well. The main insight is that since optimal voting behavior follows a pivotal
voter calculus,102 a voters equilibrium posterior over the states depends not only on his
private signal, but also on the information implied by the event that he is a pivotal
voter; and that information depends on the strategies of the other voters. However, the
logic and the cognitive requirements of equilibrium behavior are daunting, so this raises
the behavioral question of whether voters vote naively/sincerely or vote according to the
equilibrium pivotal calculus. The answer has signicant implications for the aggregation
of information in voting rules, because full information aggregation in the limit may not
be a property of plausible Nash equilibria, even when it is a property of naive voting.
102That is, the calculus of voting involves conditioning on the event that a voter is pivotal.
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5.2 Condorcet Jury Experiments
Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) is the rst published laboratory study of behavior in CJM
voting games with information aggregation.103 The paper is based on Feddersen and
Pesendorfers (1998) analysis of strategic voting under unanimity rule, with a default
status quo. That is, outcomeA occurs unless all voters (jurors) vote forB. The motivating
example is the commonly-used voting rule for juries in criminal trials in the United States.
The defendant is convicted if and only if all jurors vote for conviction, otherwise he goes
free.104 So, a corresponds to innocent, b guilty; A corresponds to acquit and B convict; 
corresponds to a private signal indicating "probably innocent" and  "probably guilty".
The standard justication for unanimity rule is to protect the innocent: that it reduces
the probability of a "bad" error, where an innocent defendent is convicted, possibly at
the expense of increasing the probability of the "less-bad" error of acquitting a guilty
defendent. Feddersen and Pesendorfers (1998) remarkable result is that, in equilibrium,
the unanimity rule in juries has the opposite e¤ect of the intended one: Nash equilibrium
may lead to a higher probability of convicting the innocent than sub-unanimity rules,
including majority rule. In particular, it is generally not a Nash equilibrium for all voters
to just follow their own signal. Put yourself in the position of a voter with an innocent
signal (), and think about how you should vote if you believe everyone else on the jury is
voting according to their signal (vote A with an  signal, and B with an  signal). Your
vote only makes a di¤erence when your vote is pivotal, which - because of the unanimity
rule - occurs only if all other voters vote B. But that means that collectively the jury
must have received n  1 private  signals, and just a single  signal (yours). Given this
information, the state of the world is much more likely to be b than a, so your optimal vote
is B (convict). Therefore, it is not a Nash equilibrium for everyone to vote their signal.
The only way any information at all can be aggregated in a symmetric Nash equilibrium
must have some fraction of voters with  signals voting for B - a mixed strategy. The
strategic incentive for voters with a  signal are not adverse, so they all vote according to
their signal. Hence, in equilibrium the voters will adopt strategies that (partially) cancels
out the A-bias of the voting rule.
Note that, according to this equilibrium logic, the adverse incentive e¤ect to vote B
with an  signal becomes stronger as n increases. Therefore, the problem is not overcome
by having larger juries; to the contrary, this problem can be worse in large juries than
103Ladha, Miller, and Oppenheimer (unpublished working paper, 1999) also investigate strategic voting
in information aggregation experiments.
104The analysis assumes re-trial is not possible.
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small juries. This directly contradicts the standard jurisprudential argument both for
unanimity rules and for relatively large (12-member) juries. Naive intuition suggests that
raising the hurdle for conviction will reduce the chances of a false conviction. But that
intuition relies on an assumption that voting behavior is una¤ected by the voting rule
or the jury size: voters are assumed to be nonstrategic and just vote according to their
own personal signal, as if there were no other voters. Game theoretic reasoning says the
opposite: when the hurdle for conviction is raised, voters are less willing to vote to acquit.
There are a number of reasons to second-guess the behavioral predictions of Nash equi-
librium in this voting game. First, if legal scholars and brilliant minds like Condorcet
believe voters will be sincere, then how could one expect the average voter to be smarter,
and realize that this simple intuitive reasoning is awed? Second, logic requires voters to
condition on hypothetical events - the event that ones vote is pivotal. The strategic piv-
otal calculus of Nash equilibrium is extremely complicated, and its computation requires
repeated application of Bayesrule, conditioning on low probability hypothetical events
(pivot probabilities), and expectations that other voters are also doing these calculations.
There is abundant evidence from economics and psychology that judgements of low prob-
ability events are awed, that individuals update beliefs in ways that often systematically
violate Bayesrule, and that they poorly understand how to condition probabilities on
hypothetical events. Third, as it turns out these equilibria typically involve the use of
mixed strategies, and there is laboratory data in other contexts indicating (1) individuals
nd it di¢ cult to implement mixed strategies and (2) Nash equilibrium is often a poor
predictor of behavior in games with mixed strategy equilibria, even when the equilibrium
is unique (Ochs 1995).
As if three reasons were not already enough to justify an experiment, there was an
additional fourth reason that motivated the Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) experiment: Logit
auantal response equilibrium and Nash equilibrium make drastically di¤erent qualitative
and quantitative predictions about the e¤ects of jury size and voting rule on the proba-
bility of correct jury decisions, especially for large elections. The limiting result about the
accuracy of jury group decisions in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) is a knife edge re-
sult that depends on 100% rationality of the voters. With stochastic choice, the standard
jurisprudential arguments re-emerge as properties of the quantal response equilibrium:
(a) majority rule leads to more false convictions than unanimity in large juries, and (b)
larger unanimous juries produce fewer false convictions than smaller unanimous juries.
The experimental design was 2x2x2, where the treatments varied according to: (1) jury
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size - 3 or 6; (2) voting rule - majority or unanimity105; and (3) preplay communication:
straw poll or no straw poll. For all treatments in the design the two states were equally
likely a priori and signal informativeness was q = 0:7. A within subject design was
employed with respect to the voting rule and the straw poll. That is, in each session
of the experiment the jury size was xed, but subjects participated in an equal number
of committee decisions under both majority and unanimity rule and with and without a
straw poll. This was done by dividing each session into a sequence of four parts, with
15 repetitions of each part with random matching. Four sessions were run, each with 12
subjects.
The central nding was that voters do indeed vote strategically in juries that operate
under a unanimity requirement. In the unanimity committees that operated without a
straw vote, essentially all  signal voters vote for B and a large fraction of  signal voters
also vote for B rather than following their signal. Moreover, the fraction of  signal voters
who vote for B rather than following their signal was signicantly higher in the 6 person
committees than in the 3 person committees. The proportions are given in left panel of
Table 2 below.
U Voter signal
n  
3 .36 .95
6 .48 .90
M Voter signal
n  
3 .06 .97
6 .21 .98
Table 2. Proportion voting for B, by signal.
In contrast, under majority rule voters without a straw poll voted their signal more than
94% the time (right panel).106
The second nding was that the straw vote led to signicantly better information
aggregation under both voting rules. It is easy to show (Coughlan 2000) that under
unanimity rule it is an equilibrium for voters to vote sincerely in the straw vote stage,
and then follow the majority outcome of the straw vote in the binding vote stage. Nearly
all of the gains occur in the b state, because with a straw vote nearly all  signal voters also
vote for B rather than following their signal if B won the straw vote. Table 3 compares
105Under unanimity, the outcome was B unless all voters voted for A. Under majority rule, the outcome
was B unless a clear majority voted for A.
106In 6 person majority rule juries  signal voters voted for A only 79% of the time. However, sincere
voting is a weak equilibrium with an even number of voters because the rules required a clear majority
for A to win. As a result, in equilibrium  signal voters are actually indi¤erent between voting for A and
B.
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the proportion of incorrect committee decisions in state b for all the treatments.
Unanimity
n no straw vote straw vote
3 .53 .36
6 .73 .44
Majority
n no straw vote straw vote
3 .30 .19
6 .21 .11
Table 3. Proportion of incorrect committee decisions in state b.
In other words, the straw vote stage converts the unanimity mechanism into what is
essentially a majority voting rule. This is what was observed in the data. Voters voted
their signal over 95% of the time in the rst stage and followed the straw-vote majority
about 85-90% of the time in the second binding-vote stage.
Third, the predictions of QRE capture several of the main features of the data, both
with respect to comparative statics and quantitatively, while many of the Nash equilibrium
comparative static predictions about committee decisions fail.107 But the main takeaway
from the experiment is what the data say about the three "obvious" reasons to be suspi-
cious of the Nash equilibrium behavior. (1) Do voters follow the same naive intuition as
legal scholars and great thinkers? No, it is something in between Nash equilibrium and
naive play. Most voters respond strategically to the voting rule; but their response has a
signicant stochastic component. (2) Is the strategic reasoning too complicated for voters
in the laboratory to behave according to theory? No, their behavior indicates that they
understand the basic incentives, although they do not perfectly best respond. Variations
in strategic behavior can be approximated by the Logit version of QRE. (3) Does the fact
that the equilibrium is in mixed strategies lead to problems? No. In fact, QRE assumes
that behavior is inherently stochastic and accurately predicts the probability distribution
of aggregate behavior. Analysis of individual behavior in these experiments uncovers a
wide diversity of patterns of individual choice behavior. Aggregate behavior is consis-
tent with the interpretation of mixed strategy equilibria (or QRE) as an "equilibrium in
beliefs."
Others have investigated variations on this basic jury experiment. Ali et al (2008)
conduct an experiment that does two things. First, it demonstrates the robustness of
the Guarnaschelli (2000) results about strategic voting, by conducting a new experiment
with the same basic environment, but with much di¤erent implementation in terms of ex-
107Specically, the study found that majority rule leads to more false convictions than unanimity in
large juries, and that larger unanimous juries produce fewer false convictions than smaller unanimous
juries. Nash equilibrium predicts the opposite e¤ect in both cases.
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perimental protocol and procedures. Ali et al. (2008) use repeated matching ("standing
committees") rather than random matching ("ad hoc committees"), use a signal infor-
mativeness of q = 2=3, employ a between subject design rather than a within subject
design, use a di¤erent computer program, with a much di¤erent interface, computerize all
the randomizations108, computerize the (much shorter) instructions, and use a di¤erent
subject pool and laboratory. They do not have any straw votes, and report results only
for unanimity rule.109 The Nash equilibrium probability of voting for B given an  signal
is 0:32 for n = 3 and 0:66 for n = 6. The empirical proportions voting for B in the
experiment are given in Table 4 below:
U Voter signal
n  
3 .35 (382) .94 (338)
6 .52 (616) .94 (464)
Table 4. Proportion voting for B, by signal. Ali et al. (2008)
Ali et al. (2008) also test theories of equilibrium bandwagon e¤ects110 by observing
voting behavior in committees that operate under sequential voting rule, where later voters
are able to observe the votes cast by earlier voters. They provide some weak evidence of
bandwagon e¤ects, but the overall e¤ect on voting outcomes is relatively small. The main
di¤erence is that sequential voting produces more B outcomes (i.e., unanimous verdicts)
than simultaneous voting. As a result the probability of a correct decision in the a state
is lower with sequential voting and the probability of a correct decision in the b state is
higher. Hung and Plott (2000) also look at majority juries that vote sequentially rather
than simultaneously and obtain similar results to Guarnaschelli et al. (2000).
Goeree and Yariv (2011) successfully replicate and signicantly extend Guarnaschelli
et al. (2000). In particular, the paper explore more deeply the earlier nding that straw
votes improves information aggregation in laboratory Condorcet jury games. They allow
richer preplay communication111 than the simple binary message preplay communication
108In Guarnaschelli et al. (2000), a student monitor determined the state of the world by rolling a fair
die, and subjects drew their own signals from a virtual urn on their computer screen.
109Ali et al. (in preparation) reports results for an expanded design that includes larger committees
(n=12) as well as committees operating under majority rule.
110See Ali and Kartik (2011) and Callander (2002) for information aggregation models of bandwagon
e¤ects in voting games. Equilibrium bandwagon e¤ects can occur in these games in a way that mimics
choice behavior in the herding equilibriim of Bikhchandani et al. (1984).
111Communication is essentially unrestricted and implemented by a chat box on each subjects computer
screen. Messages can be either broadcast or targeted.
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of a straw vote, consider preference congurations that are heterogeneous and compare
voting behavior in committees operating under three di¤erent voting rules (5/9,7/9, and
9/9). They nd that their richer message space leads to much greater improvements
in information aggregation than was observed in the Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) study.
Voters generally reveal their signal to all other committee members during the chat stage.
The results also relate to the theoretical paper of Gerardi and Yariv (2008) which shows
that, if one allows for unrestricted communication, then nearly all voting rules generate
the same set of equilibrium outcomes, in particular, they can lead to higher e¢ ciency.112
Goeree and Yariv (2011) nd that their three di¤erent voting rules produce very similar
outcomes, suggesting that there is some deeper equilibrium selection criterion that applies
to all voting rules with unrestricted communication. To the extent that these information
aggregation problems are largely common-value coordination games, then e¢ ciency seems
like a natural selection criterion that would apply with roughly equal force to all these
voting games with communication.
Dickson et al. (2008) explore the e¤ect of preplay communication, or deliberation,
in a three-person committee voting experiment where voters have signals about the true
state of the world and preferences have both a private and a common value component.
Incentives to communicate are more complex in this environment because the voters
have di¤erent state-contingent preferences. They nd that deliberation induces more
information transmission than the equilibrium predictions would sugggest. This nding
is similar to results of previous studies based on the Crawford-Sobel model of strategic
information transmission (Dickhaut et al. 1995; Cai and Wang 2006), but in a much
di¤erent setting with less structured communication.
Morton and Williams (1999, 2001) report experiments that are a hybrid of the Hung-
Plott sequential elections and earlier experiments described above on multicandidate elec-
tions. Just as polls can serve as a coordination device for voters, so can sequential elec-
tions. Indeed this is exactly the idea behind bandwagons in primary campaigns. Voters
of the same party converge on the candidate who seems most likely to win in the general
election (ceteris paribus). Di¤erent voters have di¤erent information, or "hunches" about
the electability of the candidates and so the question is whether this information is grad-
ually aggregated over sequential elections. Their experiments show that voters do indeed
learn from earlier results.
All of the above studies explore models where voting is costless. Following Battaglini
(2005), Battaglini et al. (2008a) compare sequential and simultaneous voting in Condorcet
112The exception is unanimity rule, which can achieve only a subset of the outcomes achievable by other
voting rules.
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jury games, when voting is costly and each voter chooses between voting for A, B, or
abstaining. In this case the e¢ ciency question revolves around more than just information
aggregation. Voting costs are also relevant. A committees objective is to reach the best
decision at the lowest cost. The study uses three-person committees. Ties were broken
randomly. There was a high cost treatment and a low cost treatment. All voters had
the same costs, and signal informativeness was q = 0:75. Each subject participated in 20
repetitions of one of the sequential voting games (high or low cost) and 20 repetitions of
one of the simultaneous voting games, with random matching.
The simultaneous voting games were conducted much like in Guarneschelli et al., but
with the added twist of a voting cost and the opportunity to abstain. Observed turnout
was higher in the low cost treatment than the high cost treatment as expected. However,
there were signicant departures from the symmetric equilibrium. In the high cost treat-
ment, the observed turnout rate (32%) was signicantly above equilibrium (11%). In the
low cost treatment, the observed turnout rate (61%) was signicantly below equilibrium
(100%).113
The equilibrium in the sequential game was quite a bit more complicated. There can
be two kinds of equilibria. For su¢ ciently low cost of voting, the equilibrium is for the
rst voter to vote; the second voter votes only if he received a signal the opposite of how
the rst voter voted and abstains otherwise; the third voter votes only to break a 0-0
or 1-1 tie.114 For su¢ ciently high cost, the rst and second voters abstain and the third
voter votes. Thus, with low costs, the early voters bear more of the voting costs, and
with high costs, the later voters bear the voting costs, so there are opposite implications
about turnout "trends" over the voting sequence, and also implications about equity. The
results are qualitatively similar to the theory, in the sense that for almost all information
sets voters abstain most of the time when that is their equilibrium action and vote most
of the time otherwise.
However, like the simultaneous voting game, there is quite a bit of noise in the data.115
With this in mind, the logit QRE model was t to the data. Fairly close ts are obtained
in both the sequential and the simultaneous voting games, constraining the  estimates to
the be same across cost treatments (or tting one cost treatment using the out-of-sample
estimate obtained from the opposite cost treatment). The paper also compares both the
informational e¢ ciency (probability of a correct decision) and economic e¢ ciency (taking
113The latter observation is a bit surprising, since the group e¢ cient level of turnout coincides with the
equilibrium level (100%), in the low cost treatment.
114All votes are sincere. A 0-0 tie after the rst two stages is o¤ the equilibrium path.
115For example, in the low cost treatment, the rst voter abstains 33% of the time, and in the high cost
treatment the third voter abstains more than 33% of the time following a 0-0 or 1-1 tie.
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into account voting costs) between simultaneous and sequential voting methods.116 With
respect to both kinds of e¢ ciency, the sequential voting method is slightly more e¢ cient
but most of the di¤erences are either not signicantly di¤erent from zero or signicant but
small in magnitude. In both cases, as expected, there is little di¤erence in informational
e¢ ciency and somewhat greater di¤erence in economic e¢ ciency.
Principal ndings for Condorcet jury experiments
1. Most voters vote strategically in the laboratory in ways that are qualitatively similar
to equilibrium models of Condorcet juries with noisy best reponse.
2. There are strong and signicant di¤erences in voting behavior between simultaneous
voting procedures and sequential voting procedures. However, the di¤erences in
e¢ ciency are relatively small, with sequential voting procedures somewhat more
e¢ cient, especially if voting is costly and abstention is allowed.
3. Preplay communication in the form of either straw votes or deliberation, increases
e¢ ciency, and such communication reduces or eliminates the e¤ects of di¤erent
voting rules.
5.3 The Swing Voters Curse
The swing voters curse is an especially interesting application of the Condorcet Jury
model. If voters are di¤erentially informed (i.e., some are better informed than others),
then even when voting is costless, abstention is a relevant equilibrium phenomenon. Its
fairly easy to see why. Suppose you and your two roommates have identical preferences
over movies, but it is common knowledge that only you actually know the content of two
possible movies, A and B, that are playing in your local theater, and you have all decided
to go out. Your roommates, with no information at all, have a prior equal to .50 that A
is better. Being a democratic group, you vote on everything but anyone can abstain if
they want. What is the equilibrium of the majority voting game where ties are broken
randomly? You, with full information, vote for the movie you prefer, and your roommates
abstain. They cant possible gain by voting, and if one of them votes for the movie you
dont vote for, then your group goes to the wrong movie with probability 0.50. In other
words, a poorly informed voter reduces his own utility if he is pivotal. That is the simplest
example of the swing voters curse.
116The expected e¤ect of voting costs on both kinds of e¢ ciency (higher costs lead to lower e¢ ciency)
were also observed.
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That was easy. Now suppose instead that your roommates share a common prior belief
of .99 that A is better. Wouldnt they be better o¤voting for A? No. The argument above
is independent of the priors of the uninformed voters. They should still abstain. Next
consider a variation on this. Suppose that one of your roommates, Ann, has di¤erent
preferences, and always prefers to go watch a comedy rather than any other type of
movie, regardless of how corny the comedy happens to be; and suppose A is a comedy.
The other roommate, Bill, has preferences just like you, and wants to go to whichever
movie is "better". What is the equilibrium now? It is perhaps a bit unintuitive, but the
equilibrium has you voting for the movie you "know" is better, Ann votes for A, and
Bill votes for B (even though his prior is very strongly in favor of A). He votes for B
because it ensures that you will cast the pivotal vote. This phenomenon can be called
vote balancing.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997, 1999) are theoretical papers that explore the
equilibrium properties of the swing voters curse and its implications about patterns of
abstention and information aggregation in committees and in large elections. Battaglini
et al. (2010) conduct the rst experimental test of this theory, which (like the example
above) can have rather unintuitive voting strategies. That study considers committees
with 7, 9, and 11 members. Seven of the voters are just like voters in the standard jury
problem with identical preferences and just want to choose the "better" outcome, which
depends on the state). In the 9 member committee, there are also 2 partisans, who, like
Ann, prefer outcome A regardless of the state; in the 11 member committees there are 4
A-partisans. In the experiment, the partisans votes are automated by a computer so they
always vote for A. The remaining seven human subjects then each independently draws
a signal. With probability 1/4 a signal is perfectly informative, and with probability 3/4
a signal is completely uninformative. Each voter only observes their own signal, so they
dont know how many (if any) of the other subjects are informed. In one series, subjects
all start out with a prior belief of  =1/2 on state A; in the other series, the prior is
 =5/9. As in the model, the information structure is common knowledge. In the 7 voter
committees, the equilibrium is just like the simplest example above. For both of these
prior beliefs, only informed voters should vote, and all other voters should abstain. In
the 9 and 11 voter committees, the uniformed voters should balance by mixing between
abstention and voting for B. In each session, the prior is xed for the whole session, and
subjects engage in 30 elections - 10 each with 7, 9, or 11 voters in the committee - using
a random matching protocol.117
117Two of the  =5/9 session only had only 7 subjects, so there was not rematching of committees
between elections in those sessions.
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The observed voting frequencies of uninformed voters are given in Table 5. Equilibrium
probabilities of voting for B are in parentheses.
n A B abs
 =1/2
7 .00 .08 (.00) .91
9 .06 .43 (.36) .51
11 .04 .77 (.76) .19
 =5/9
7 .20 .07 (.00) .73
9 .12 .35 (.33) .53
11 .16 .56 (.73) .28
Table 5. Voting behavior of uninformed voters.
All the comparative static predictions of the theory are supported. More partisans
lead to more balancing, with less balancing if the prior state probability is biased toward
the partisans. With  =1/2 the results are very close to the theory. Very few uninformed
voters succumb to the swing voters curse in this series (about 5% of votes overall).
However, in the series with a biased prior,  =5/9, a non-negligible fraction of voters
succumb to the swing voters curse by voting for A. There is also a fair amount of learning,
with cursed voting declining signicantly with experience.
In a followup study, Battaglini et al. (2008b) conduct a replication with larger com-
mittees ranging from n=17 to n=33, including up to 12 partisans. The results scale up
fairly well, including the comparative statics on the number of partisans and the nding
of 10-20% cursed voting behavior in the  =5/9 series. One minor di¤erence is that in one
session (with 21 human voters) there was a surprising amount of cursed voting (around
20%), including in the elections with no partisans. However, there were only 4 sessions
conducted in total, and no random rematching between elections, so the e¤ective sample
size is not very large.
Morton and Tyran (2010) observe that there can be multiple equilibria in voting
games with a swing voters curse, for some preference and information congurations.
They extend the Battaglini et al. experiments by exploring an environment where poorly
informed voters are not completely uninformed - they just receive lower quality informative
signals. This can lead to multiple symmetric pure strategy equilibria. There can be an
equilibrium where all voters vote, and at the same time an equilibrium where the poorly
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informed voters abstain.118 If the information gap is large between high and low quality
signals, then the latter equilibrium is more e¢ cient, while the full turnout equilibrium
is more e¢ cient when the information gap is small. They nd signicant abstention in
both cases, suggesting that e¢ ciency is not a good selection criteria in these games, and
also suggesting that the logic of equilibrium abstention in these asymmetric information
games is intuitive and compelling even for naive subjects.
A natural question arises concerning the relation between these results for the swing
voters curse summarized above and experimental ndings about the well-known winners
curse problem that leads to overbidding in common value auctions. Like the winners
curse in auctions, the swing voters curse can only happen if there is some degree of
common preferences shared among some subset of voters (bidders), and if voters do not
condition expected payo¤s properly on the strategies of other players and low-probability
hypothetical events. In the case of the common value auction, the hypothetical event is
winning the auction, which is not known until after the bid is submitted. In the case
of the swing voters curse the hypothetical event is casting a decisive vote, which is not
known until all votes have been counted and a candidate has been elected. Rational
decision making in both cases requires a deep understanding of the strategic complexity
of the game, as well as a correct (and subtle) application of Bayes rule. In spite of
this apparent similarity between the environments, the results reported from laboratory
experiments are quite di¤erent. In the case of the swing voters curse, the ndings are
relatively consistent with the theoretical equilibrium: voters seem to "get it", and abstain
(or balance against partisans) when they are poorly informed. In contrast, bidders in
laboratory auctions often fail to adequately discount their bids to compensate for the
winners curse e¤ect. This is puzzling: Why is the winners curse in laboratory auctions
a major behavioral e¤ect that persists with experience, while the swing voters curse in
elections appears to be at best a minor behavioral phenomenon that declines rapidly with
experience? There are several possible answers.
One conjecture has to do with learning and feedback. In the swing voters curse
experiments, voters observe that many voters are abstaining in early rounds, so imitation
could lead to convergence in the case of no partisans. Also, in the swing voters curse
experiments where the informed voters are perfectly informed, an uninformed voter who
was pivotal and voted for the wrong candidate probably can infer that the voters who voted
118In some of their treatments, there also an ine¢ cient third equilibrium where low information voters
mix. In addition, there can be asymmetric equilibria. Because the sessions are run using a "partners"
repeated-game design for 60 repetitions, and committees are very small (n=3), it is plausible that di¤erent
groups converge to di¤erent asymmetric equilibria. The authors dont nd evidence of The authors dont
nd evidence of these other kinds of equilibria in their data.
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the other way were probably perfectly informed. In fact, these perfectly informed voters
conform to equilibrium by voting their signal virtually 100% of the time. If uninformed
voters make this reasonable inference, then it is an easy next step to adapt their behavior
and abstain.
A second conjecture is that both the information structure and the strategy space
in a typical common value auction experiment are far more complex than in the swing
voters curse experiments. In the auctions, the signals are virtually continuous and the
joint distribution of signals and states very complicated. The strategy space is also nearly
continuous. In the swing voters curse experiments, the strategy space is discrete, with
only three possible actions, the state space and signal space are both binary, and the
signals (in most cases) are perfectly informative. With this second conjecture in mind,
the following experiment was designed and a few sessions conducted.
The idea is to run a common value auction experiment where the informational and
strategic environments are as close as possible to the laboratory elections. In the elections
reported in Battaglini et al [ BMP 2008b,2010], there are two states of the world, perfectly
informative signals, and three possible choices. We study here a rst price common value
auction environment with nearly the same information structure: there are two states (a
high common value and a low common value), perfectly informative signals, and three
possible choices (bid high, bid low, bid medium).
The experiment, reported in Palfrey (2012), is a 7-bidder rst price common value
auction. There are two possible common values, high (V=$20) and low (V=$4). It
is common knowledge that these are the only two possible values and they are equally
likely. Before the auction begins, the true value is drawn by nature, and exactly three
of the bidders are informed of the true value. The remaining four bidders receive receive
an uninformative signal.119 The bidders then are allowed to submit one of three bids,
$14, $B, or $1. There were two slightly di¤erent treatments. In one treatment, B=$10.
In the second treatment, B=$11. Initially, one session of each treatment was conducted,
using Caltech students as subjects, and later a second session with B=$11 was conducted
to see if the results replicated. Each session had 14 subjects and each subject was in
30 seven-bidder auctions, with a random matching protocol (and random assignment of
informedness). The equilibrium in all cases is for informed bidders to bid $14 or $1 if the
value is $20 or $4, repectively. Uninformed bidders should always bid $1. Uninformed
bidders bidding $B is a cursed equilibrium strategy.
Out of 540 bids by informed bidders, 539 were equilibrium bids. More surprising is that
119In the experiment, the uniformative signal was implemented as a statement on their computer screen
that says "You are uninformed".
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uninformed bidders quickly converged to the strategy of bidding $1. This is summarized
in Table 6 below.
Session Treatment All 30 rounds n Last 15 rounds n
Bid 14 BCE 1BNE 14 BCE 1BNE
1 B=10 .04 .07 .89 240 .03 .01 .96 120
2 B=11 .04 .03 .93 240 .03 .01 .95 120
3 B=11 .04 .07 .89 240 .04 .00 .96 120
Pooled .04 .06 .90 720 .04 .01 .95 360
Table 6. Observed frequency of uninformed bids.
The ndings, while based on a small sample, are decisive. There is very little winners
curse behavior in these auction, and it completely disappears with experience. There
is almost no di¤erence between the two B treatments nor across the three sessions. If
anything, there is less winners curse behavior in these auctions than there is swing voters
curse behavior in the BMP elections. These results suggest that it would be useful to
explore more complex information environments in the committee setting in order to dig
more deeply into the swing voters curse phenomenon. If the conjecture in this paper
about the connections between complexity and cursedness are valid, then it should not be
too di¢ cult to design a swing voters curse experiment where cursed behavior is prevalent.
On the theoretical side, it would seem useful to explore and develop models that connect
some formal measures of complexity or transparency of games to the degree to which
economic and political agents are subject to behavioral limitations such as cursedness,
strategic unsophistication, and noisy best response.
Principal ndings for the swing voters curse
1. Voters with relatively poor information abstain in ways that are largely consistent
with swing voters curse theory. That is, for the most part voter avoid the curse by
abstaining.
2. There is some cursed voting behavior (10-20%) if the uninformed votersprior on
the state of the world is biased for one of the states.
3. Uninformed voters balance, with a signicant fraction of them voting against the
partisan tide in the election. This fraction increases in the number of partisans.
4. The results scale up to larger electorates.
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5.4 Voting mechanisms that reect preference intensity
Most of the classic literature in voting theory and social choice theory employs ordinal
models of preference in one dimension or with a nite number of alternatives, or consider
purely redistributive politics, as in the BF model. Spatial models typically assume Euclid-
ean preferences, which, in two dimensions implies that there is no di¤erence in preference
intensities across issues.120This lack of emphasis on preference intensity, or "willingness to
pay", stands in stark contrast to the classic literature on public goods, where intensities
of preference for a public good play a fundamental role; in the standard public goods
literature intensities are often captured by marginal rates of substitution between public
goods and a numeraire private good.
In the absence of di¤erent preference intensities across issues, there are some com-
pelling arguments for using majority rule issue-by-issue voting. In particular, majority
rule is the unique method for choosing over binary issues in a way that simultaneously re-
spects anonymity of the voters, neutrality with respect to the alternatives being voted on,
and is positively responsive to preferences. However, with di¤ering preference intensities
across issues (as represented by di¤erent marginal rates of substitution between the public
decisions and a numeraire private good, or "private valuations" as in auction theory), it is
easy to nd examples where majority rule will lead to highly ine¢ cient public decisions.
A typical example of ine¢ ciency might have three voters and two binary issues. In
issue one, the alternatives are fx1; y1g and in issue two the alternatives are fx2; y2g.
Suppose the private valuations of voters are as in Table 7:
x1 y1 x2 y2
Voter 1 15 0 5 0
Voter 2 0 8 0 2
Voter 3 0 4 0 2
Table 7. Voter preferences on two binary issues.
The majority rule outcomes are y1 for issue 1 and y2 for issue 2. However, the e¢ cient
outcome would have outcome x1 for issue 1 and x2 for issue 2. Majority rule issue-by-issue
voting clearly fails to lead to an e¢ cient decision. Are there better voting methods that
circumvent this problem of the "tyranny of the majority"?121 One might propose to allow
120A few papers investigate more general utility specications in multiple dimensions, such as elliptical
indi¤erence curves, to allow for di¤erent intensities across issues.
121There is a large literature on public goods mechanisms using side payments for producing e¢ cient
allocations, such as Groves mechanisms, the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, dAspremont and Gerard-Varet,
and so forth. We are interested in problems where participants are endowed with voting rights. A few
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for vote trading, but voters 2 and 3 always win on both issues so there are no mutual gains
from vote trading. One might also propose to o¤er an "omnibus" bill which combines the
two issues. For example, one could vote for the e¢ cient combined outcome x1x2 against
the complementary alternative y1y2. But this doesnt work because voters 2 and 3 both
prefer y1y2 to x1x2, which would actually result in the least e¢ cient outcome on both
issues. In fact, the issue by issue majority rule outcome, y1y2 is a Condorcet winner, or
majority rule core, and hence a very stable outcome with respect to simple majoritarian
mechanisms.
The rest of this section reviews the experimental ndings based on various theoret-
ical voting mechanisms that have been proposed to ameliorate the preference intensity
problem inherent in majority rule (or any other simple voting rule based solely on ordinal
preferences). The basic approach is along the lines of mechanism design theory, and hence
the main questions and the questions most intently focused on in the laboratory exper-
iments concern the welfare gains of these alternative voting mechanisms as compared
to simple issue-by-issue majority rule. Under what conditions does an alternative voting
scheme lead to better or worse outcomes than majority rule, from a welfarist criterion?
Is the kind of strategic behavior predicted by equilibrium theories of behavior in these
voting games similar to what is observed in the experiments? Do some of these alternative
schemes perform better than others? Are the ndings robust with respect to environments
and institutional details?
5.4.1 Mechanisms where a budget of votes can be allocated across issues
Storable Votes A mechanism called "Storable Votes" was proposed by Casella (2005,
2011). A committee of voters faces an upcoming sequence of votes on T binary issues.
In the simplest version of it, each voter is endowed with a total of T votes, one for each
issue, but a voter can choose to abstain on issue t, and save the vote for use in a later
issue. Thus, for example, in the case of T = 2 a voter can cast one or zero votes on issue
one, and as a result have one or two votes for issue two. One solves for subgame perfect
equilibria in stage undominated strategies (i.e., any votes cast on an issue are cast for the
voters preferred alternative).
Referring to the example above, there is an equilibrium where voter 1 votes twice on
issue one and voters 2 and 3 each mix between voting twice on issue 1 and voting once on
each issue. Even though the outcome is not fully e¢ cient a probability distribution over
papers explore models that combine voting rights with side payments, and these are discussed below in
the section on vote markets.
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outcomes it improves over issue-by-issue majority rule.122 The main theoretical result
is that storable votes typically improves over simple majority voting.
Casella et al. (2006) study a variation123 of this voting mechanism using a laboratory
experiment, for T = 2; 3 and committee sizes n = 2; 3; 6. Each session consisted of
between 8 and 21 subjects, playing 30 repetitions of the storable votes mechanism using a
random matching protocol. Valuations for each voters favored outcome on an issue were
independently and uniformly distributed between 1 and 100. The direction of preference of
each voter (i.e., which outcome on an issue was a voters favored outcome) was determined
by a computerized coin toss. Voters were fully informed at the beginning of period t of
their own valuation and direction of preference for issue t. Each voters endowment of
bonus votes was xed at B = T . There were several ndings. The main nding was
that the e¢ ciency improvements predicted by the theory were largely borne out in the
data. A second nding was that the voting strategies of subjects were substantially (and
signicantly) di¤erent from the equilibrium strategies. For example, in the T = 2 case,
equilibrium strategies always have voters using all their bonus votes on one single issue
rather than splitting. However, splitting of bonus votes was commonly observed. On the
other hand, subjects did generally use monotone strategies, in the sense that the number
of bonus votes used on the rst issue was an increasing function of the voters valuation
on that issue. The paper considers a range of stochastic choice models and shows that
among these models, the logit QRE model organizes the data rather well.
Casella (2011a) investigates a variation of the model where an agenda setter can choose
the order that issues are voted on. There exist equilibria where the agenda setter indeed
has proposer power in the sense of getting a higher expected payo¤ than if the agenda
were set randomly. For the example with T = 2, this is done by rst conducting a vote
on the issue for which the setter has the higher valuation. This signals to the other voters
that the agenda setter is going to use his bonus votes for the rst issue, which has a pre-
emptive e¤ect on other voters. Theoretically there are still overall welfare gains compared
to simple issue-by-issue majority voting. The experiments (using n = 3; 4 and T = 3 and
a random matching protocol) conrm the welfare gains, thus replicating the ndings of
Casella et al. (2006) in a more complex setting. However, there is no measurable proposer
advantage. The setter is unsuccessful in exploiting his control of the agenda order.
122The information structure in the standard storable votes model has incomplete information. In period
t voters know only their own valuation for the current issue, but have only probabilistic information about
other voterscurrent and future valuations and their own future valuations.
123The main variation is that voters always have one "regular" vote that they must use in each issue,
but are endowed at the beginning with B "bonus" votes, that they may cast in addition to their their
regular votes.
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One of the supposed advantages of storable votes, besides producing some e¢ ciency
gains, is overcoming the problem of the tyranny of the majority. This has been a topic
of considerable importance in democratic theory, since the legitimacy of majority rule
democratic procedures may be eroded away if systematic minorities always fail to have an
e¤ective voice. Storable votes make it feasible for minority political factions to exercise
power on at least some issues by concentrating their votes on those issues most important
to them.124 Casella et al. (2010) investigate the question of whether minorities are more
successful with a storable votes system than simple majority rule, and how this can a¤ect
e¢ ciency. Their experiment is another variation on Casella et al. (2006), but having
di¤erent numbers of members with preferences for or against proposals. To reect the
importance of systematic minorities, the smaller faction was always in favor of outcome at
and the larger faction was always in favor of outcome bt. Thus, under simple majority rule,
the outcome would always be bt for all t. The experiment varied a number of factors such
as the correlation of valuations and the ability of groups to communicate prior to voting.
The main nding is that storable votes does indeed help minorities win on those issues
where they have the highest valuation. This e¤ect is magnied when their valuations are
correlated. The second nding is that this increase in minority representation comes at
essentially no e¢ ciency loss. The third nding is that the ability to coordinate via direct
communication had relatively little e¤ect on outcomes.
Qualitative Voting and Linking Decisions The storable votes mechanism is but
one example of a more general phenomenon that Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) refer
to as linking decisions. That is, one can link the outcomes across issues in such a way that
voters who are successful on one issue will be less likely to be successful on other issues.
Such mechanisms create incentives for voters to adopt strategies that will be more likely
to lead to successful outcomes on those issues they care most about. In the storable votes
mechanism, this is completely intuitive: by using up ones bonus votes on issue one, it
reduces the likelihood of winning on issue two. Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) consider
a more general class of mechanisms where voters can cast continuous votes (similar to bids)
for or against each proposal, subject to a budget constraint on total votes. However, voters
are e¤ectively constrained so that the frequency distribution of votes they cast across the
issues is tied to the probability distribution of their valuations. Thus, for example, if
valuations were drawn from a uniform distribution, then a voter would have to cast votes
across the issues that approximated a uniform distribution. Such a mechanism has strong
124Other methods, such as supermajority requirements, also give minorities more power.
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incentive compatibility properties if there is a large number of issues, and hence leads to
e¢ cient decisions in the limit as the number of issues becomes innite.
Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer (2010) conduct an experiment to explore a mecha-
nism that links a nite number, N , of issues in a committee of two members, by endowing
each member of the committee with a budget of 6 votes that they can allocate across the
issues. Voting takes place simultaneously on all N issues, using majority vote with ties
broken randomly.125 They run treatments of N = 2; 3; 6. The two members have opposite
preferences, but can di¤er in their intensities (valuations) on each issue, as in the storable
votes model. One is always in favor and one is always opposed, in all issues. Intensities
are independent draws from a uniform distribution over a coarse grid ranging from 7 to 11
possible values. Voting takes place after each member has observed his own intensities for
all issues, but none of the intensities of the other voters. Thus, it is essentially the same
as the storable votes experiment, except all valuations are announced at the beginning
and all voting takes place simultaneously. The unique Nash equilibrium predicts e¢ ciency
to be above 80% in all treatments, and to be increasing in the number of issues. Both
these equilibrium properties are observed in the data. However, as in the storable votes
experiments, subjects generally do not use equilibrium strategies, although strategies are
nearly always (96%) weakly monotone in valuations. That is, more votes are allocated
to higher intensity issues. As is the case with storable votes, the mechanism is somewhat
robust in the sense that signicant e¢ ciency improvement results simply from the use of
monotone strategies, even if they are not using equilibrium strategies.
Hortale-Vallve et al. (2012) compare the performance of the above mechanism to
open negotiation with unlimited communication and a deadline, and investigate how the
comparative performance depnds on the information structure. Under negotiation, an
agreement requires a vector of decisions, one for each issue.126 Valuations are drawn
uniformly from a grid of 10 valuations, {50, 100, 150,..., 500} subject to the constraint
that valuations across all issues for a voter sum to 600. Thus there is dependence across
issues in the draws for a given voter, but independence across voters. In case the deadline
is reached without agreement, both voters receive 300, the expected payment if there were
to be a coin toss on each issue. In the voting mechanism, ties result in each voter receiving
half their valuation. As in the earlier experiment, they consider N=2,3,6. They nd an
interesting interaction e¤ect between information conditions and mechanism performance.
With complete information the bargaining mechanism produces more e¢ ciency gains, but
the comparison is reversed with incomplete information.
125This is similar to the voting scheme proposed by Casella and Gelman (2008).
126Failure to reach agreement results is a random coin toss on every issue.
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Engelmann and Grimm (2012) also conduct an experiment using a simplied version
of the linking mechanism. Subjects are assigned valuations (intensities) across 40 issues,
and are paired (N = 2). The issues are decided in sequence. There is no repetition of the
task. The two members of a pair have opposite directions of preference on a binary issues.
Valuations can take on only two values, high or low, which are determined randomly and
independently across issues. For each issue, subjects are asked to say whether their
valuation is high or low. If they make di¤erent announcements, then the social decision
is the one preferred by the agent with the high valuation. If they both make the same
announcement, the social decision is deterimined by a coin ip. Finally and this is the
key subjects are only allowed to announce high valuations on 20 of the 40 issues.127 It
is an equilibrium in this game to announce truthfully unless one has high valuations on
more than 20 issues (in which case it is an equilibrium to randomly select 20 of those
issues to announce "high"). Theoretically, e¢ ciency should be almost perfect, in contrast
to simple majority rule where there would be a tie in each period, so e¢ ciency 50%. They
contrast this with a mechanism that is essentially equivalent to simple majority rule with
a random tie break.
The ndings track the theoretical predictions. In the (majority rule) treatment with
no constraint on "high" announcements, subjects announce "high" nearly all the time. In
the mechanism that links decisions by constraining high announcements, subjects honestly
report their intensities about 90% of the time.
Principal ndings for mechanisms where voters have multiple votes to distrib-
ute across issues
1. E¢ ciency is generally higher than simple majority rule, as predicted
2. Voting strategies are monotone: voters use more of their budget on high-valuation
issues, but the response is smoother than predicted by theory.
5.4.2 Combining voting with markets
At least since Buchanan and Tullock (1962), scholars in political science have conjectured
that having a market for votes could potentially lead to more e¢ cient decision making
in committees, drawing an analogy with the rst welfare theorem of general equilibrium
theory. Two di¤erent models of a market for votes have been studied. The rst model,
127Observe that this mechanism is equivalent to a storable votes mechanism, where each voter is given
20 bonus votes, but is allowed to use at most one bonus vote on any given issue.
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usually called vote trading or logrolling, is a model of pure exchange. The second model
is in the Marshallian tradition, where votes are traded against a numeraire private good
commodity, or money.
Vote Trading and Logrolling With logrolling or vote trading, a committee member
who feels strongly about issue 1 can trade his vote on issue 2 to another voter who feels
strongly about issue 2. If these voters would otherwise be pivotal on these two issues,
they have clear incentives to make such a trade. This is essentially what is mimicked in
the storable votes mechanism, but the mechanisms are di¤erent so equilibrium outcomes
may be di¤erent. Riker and Brams (1972) develop a noncooperative game model of vote
trading and show that in some cases vote trading can have negative e¢ ciency consequences
because of externalities. Indeed the two voters who trade their votes will obviously have
made a mutually benecial exchange in equilibrium, but this can impose costs on voters
who were not involved in the trade. They construct examples illustrating how the external
costs can easily outweigh the benets to the vote traders.
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1980) conduct an experiment to see whether vote trad-
ing leads to higher or lower e¢ ciency than the outcome that would arise under simple
issue-by-issue majority rule without vote trading. They examine 3-person and 5-person
committees and compare outcomes where binding bilateral commitments are possible to
outcomes under more open committee bargaining protocols more along the lines of the
unstructured committee bargaining experiments described earlier in this survey.128 With
binding bilateral commitments, they nd some support for the Riker-Brams hypothesis
that permitting vote trading can lead to ine¢ cient allocations. However, if agreements
to trade votes are not binding and the committee of the whole has pre-vote discussions,
then this kind of ine¢ cient logrolling is just not possible. Since the latter allows for essen-
tially costless coalition formation of more than two members, bilateral attempts to reach
deals that are harmful to the group as a whole are undermined. As a result, cooperative
game theoretic solution concepts organize the data from the open bargaining experiments
without binding vote trades much better than the noncooperative vote trading model.
Markets for Votes A market for votes can lead to more e¢ cient outcomes, even in the
case where there is only one binary issue. In particular, if the minority coalition in favor
of a proposal has more intense preferences than the majority coalition that opposes the
128In the binding commitment case, voters were given physical ballots for each issue, and there was a
trading period during which the ballots could exchange hands, in a manner similar to trading baseball
cards.
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proposal, then members of the minority would be willing to pay members of the majority
to vote for the proposal in such a way that all members of the committee are better o¤.
One possible way to achieve this is to allow members of the committee to openly trade
their votes for money. The idea obviously extends to multiple issues as well, and the
natural model to apply is general competitive equilibrium, where money is modeled as a
numeraire perfectly divisible private good commodity and utility is additive across issue
valuations and money.
The di¢ culty with this approach is that the market for votes is somewhat pathological
for a variety of technical reasons. It is a market with complications including externalities,
indivisibilities, public goods, and the outcomes respond to vote allocations in discontinu-
ous ways. Furthermore, votes have no intrinsic value at all, and only have indirect value
if a voter is pivotal. As a result, competitive equilibrium as one usually denes it fails to
exist.
The nonexistence problem is illustrated by the following simple example from Casella
et al. (2012, CLP). Suppose a committee deciding on a binary decision (X or Y) under
majority rule has three voters, 1, 2, and 3. Voter valuations are given in Table 8.
Voter X Y
1 10 0
2 12 0
3 0 30
Table 8. Voter valuations for nonexistence example.
The majority rule outcome without a market for votes is X, but the e¢ cient decision is
Y. What would a competitive equilibrium look like? It would be a price, p, and demands,
(x1; x2; x3) such that xi is an integer greater than or equal to 1 and demands sum to zero.
At any positive price, voter 3 demands at most one vote: any positive price supporting a
vote allocation where either side has more than two votes cannot be an equilibrium; one
vote would be redundant and so at any positive price there would be excess supply. Voter
3 could buy 1s vote at a price of 11. But again the market will not clear: Voter 2s vote is
now worth nothing and therefore 2 would be willing to sell it for 11. In fact, any positive
price supporting 3s purchase of one vote cannot be an equilibrium: the losing vote is
worthless and would put up for sale at any positive price. But a price of zero cannot be
an equilibrium either: at zero price, 3 always demands a vote, but 1 and 2 will not sell
and there is excess demand. Finally, any positive price supporting no trade cannot be an
equilibrium: if the price is at least as high as 3s high valuation, both 1 and 2 prefer to
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sell, and again there is excess supply; if the price is lower than 3s valuation, 3 prefers to
buy and there is excess demand.
CLP denes an ex ante competitive equilibrium for a market for votes like this one, and
show by construction that a nontrivial equilibrium exists. The equilibrium always results
in dictatorship if there is any trade at all. Consequently, the market for votes generates
welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or
the distribution of values not very skewed. They test the theoretical implications by
implementing a competitive vote market in the laboratory using a continuous open-book
multi-unit double auction.
The experiment uses committees of size 5 and 9, and each committee engages in
competitive markets for votes under four di¤erent distributions of valuations. Following
standard laboratory market protocol, each schedule of valuations is repeated indepen-
dently for multiple repetitions to allow for price discovery and convergence. A total of
20 markets were conducted for each session (ve repetitions of each of the four valuation
schedules). They have three main ndings.
The rst nding is that prices begin above the competitive equilibrium and decline
over time to a level above the risk neutral competitive equilibrium price, but close to
or within the range of competitive equilibrium with risk averse voters. Estimates of
asymptotic price convergence fail to reject the competitive pricing model in six out of
eight treatments and reject it marginally in the remaining two treatments. Figure 15
below shows the price dynamics for one of the valuation schedules in 4 di¤erent sessions.
The equilibrium price under risk neutrality for the markets in the gure is 50 and the
equilibrium range with risk aversion is 50-100. The prices labeled as Market 1 consists of
completely inexperienced traders, while Market 4 traders had the most experience.
Figure 15 about here, does not appear in published article. marketforvotes_prices:png
Second, in smaller committees, dictatorship resulted between 80 and 100 percent of
the time when traders were experienced. In larger committees, where the purchase of four
votes is required for dictatorship, the frequency of dictatorship was signicantly lower,
but increased with experience.
Third, the welfare predictions of the theory were borne out in the data. The di¤erence
in e¢ ciency between vote markets compared to majority rule without vote trading had
the correct sign for all treatments.
Casella et al. (2011, CPT) investigate several related questions about markets for
votes, but with some important di¤erences in both the approach and the motivation.
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First, the informational conditions are di¤erent; in CLP the direction of preference (i.e.,
whether a committee member would vote for X or Y) was private information, and the
direction of preference was independently drawn with equal probability for each member.
In CPT, each members direction of preference was common knowledge. The valuations
were drawn independently from a uniform distribution, and this distribution was also
common knowledge.129 Second, the vote markets in CPT were implemented as one-sided
continuous open book auctions, where only bids to buy could be submitted; in CLP
markets were implemented as double-sided continuous open-book auctions where both
bids and o¤ers could be submitted. Third, CPT was motivated by questions about how
vote markets a¤ect the tradeo¤ between minority voice (i.e., the probability that an
intense minority can win) and e¢ ciency (as in Casella 2011), and the extent to which this
tradeo¤ depended on the ability of the members of each side to coordinate their actions.
Coordination was modeled as a 2-player game between party leaders, which reduces the
problem theoretically to a bargaining game similar to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
or Cramton et al. (1987). The theoretical Bayesian equilibrium was derived for these
games. For the multiplayer vote markets without coordination through party leaders, the
ex ante competitive equilibrium solution was the benchmark used for predictions about
behavior in the experiment.
The theory has strong predictions. In both cases (with or without coordination),
trading falls short of full e¢ ciency, but for opposite reasons: with coordination through
party leaders, the minority wins too rarely; with a decentralized market in the absences
of party leaders to coordinate trades, the minority wins too often. As a result, with party
leaders, vote trading improves over no-trade; with market trades, vote trading can be
welfare reducing. These basic properties are satised by all experimental sessions. As in
CLP, the data show some evidence of overpricing relative to equilibrium prices.
Principal ndings for majority rule committees with vote markets
1. Transaction prices for votes are generally higher than the risk neutral cometitive
equilibrium price, but converge downward to a range consistent with equilibrium
pricing with risk averse voters.
2. Dictatorship outcomes are observed more than half the time, and such outcomes
increased with experience and decreased with committee size.
3. Decentralized markets for votes, or vote trading, can cause signicant e¢ ciency
129In CLP2, no distributional information was given about the distribution of valuations.
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losses in a way that is consistent with the equilibrium model. Ine¢ ciencies are
greater in larger committees and in committees where the distribution of values is
skewed toward higher values.
4. If vote trading is coordinated through party leaders, it generally leads to e¢ ciency
gains compared to no vote trading but falls short of full ex post e¢ ciency.
6 Where do we go from here?
The basic ndings from these various classes of political science experiments are sum-
marized at the end of each section. Therefore, rather than re-summarizing, this section
will provide some discussion that points to some possible promising lines of new research
in each of these areas, and a discussion of open theoretical questions and what sort of
experiments might be especially informative.
What is on the horizon in the coming decade of laboratory research in political econ-
omy? First, one rather obvious observation. Using history as a guide, laboratory exper-
iments in political economy will follow the current trends in theory. Thus, for example,
new experiments relating to the design of optimal voting procedures in committees are a
good bet, since there has been a urry of theoretical research on this recently. In fact, we
are beginning to see some experiments along this line, such as Hortala-Vallve (2010) and
Casella, et al. (2006, 2008), which explore the behavior of laboratory committees using
novel voting methods that allow members to express strength of preference. The research
on deliberation and information transmission in committees with conicting preferences
(e.g., Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2005, Meirowitz 2004) suggest a wave of experiments
that would be a hybrid of the early committee experiments and the more recent experi-
ments on information aggregation in juries. Dickson et al. (2008) is an example of recent
work along these lines. Questions of information aggregation in elections with more than
two candidates is another promising area of research that is just starting to be investi-
gated, both theoretically and in the laboratory (Bouton et al. 2012). A fourth set of
experiments is suggested by theoretical models of endogenous candidate entry. These
could blend insights from the earlier experiments on candidate spatial competition and
more recent experiments on entry and coordination in abstract games. To date there have
been only two experiments130 that investigates citizen-candidate models of political com-
petition, and none that explore other models of competition where entry and candidate
policy preferences are important factors. Such experiments are surely on the horizon.
130Cadigan (2005) and Elbittar and Gomberg (2009).
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A second, less obvious observation is that the line between political science theory-
testing experiments and experiments in economics and game theory has become very
blurred. Accordingly, many of the recent developments and exciting frontiers in laboratory
experiments in economics similarly represent exciting new frontiers of research in political
science experimentation. The inuence of behavioral models in economics that relax the
classical model of perfect rationality has been felt in the political science community as
well.131 Similarly, the questions that political scientists are interested in and basic game
theoretic models overlap signicantly with the kinds of questions and models explored
by economists in the laboratory. The last example (competitive markets for votes) is
one obvious example. But more to the point, political scientists are deeply interested in
theories of free riding (e.g., Olson 1965, Ostrom 1990), cooperation in repeated games
(Axelrod 1980), coordination problems (Banks and Calvert 1992), contests and all pay
auctions (Tullock 1980) and other such problems that are at the heart of pure and applied
game theory. Thus, what many social scientists, or at least economists, automatically
think of as "economics experiments" (just look at the title of this volume) voluntary
contribution to public goods, bargaining games, coordination games, repeated games,
reciprocity in trust games, the dictator game, and so forth address central questions
in theoretical political science that are of signicant interest to political scientists in all
three main subantive elds of the discipline: American politics, comparative politics, and
international relations.
This brings us full circle to the dilemma faced at the start of this essay: how to
dene political economy experiments? This essay limited the scope of that broad swath of
research out of necessity. Political scientists should be and will be interested in many of the
other chapters of this handbook. While some of the most exciting experimental research
in political economy focuses, like this chapter, on voting, committees, and elections, the
body of laboratory research in game theory and choice behavior that shares the interest
of modern political scientists and economists alike resides in an important and even larger
wing of the library of political economy experimentation.
131Indeed, if anything the political science community is even more open minded about such behavioral
relaxations of rational choice theory. Traditionally, the modal behavioral view in political science has
been quite hostile to and suspicious of rational choice theory. See for example Green and Shapiro (1994).
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